BERTHA ROSE, A WIDOW, APPELLANT,
v.
HUGH PETERS, PRESTON B. BIRD, I. D. MACVICAR, JESSE YARBOROUGH, HAROLD TURK, AS THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, CONSTITUTING THE DADE COUNTY PORT AUTHORITY, AND AERODEX, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A widow sued the Dade County Port Authority and Aerodex, Inc. for the death of her husband, a roofing company executive who fell through a dangerous roof while attempting to repair it. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the directed verdict for defendants, holding that the rescue doctrine could not apply because the deceased was aware of the danger, failed to warn his workers, and the defendants were not negligent toward him.
The rescue doctrine does not apply in this case because (1) the deceased was aware of the dangerous roof condition for two hours before work commenced but failed to warn his workers; (2) there is no showing that the defendants' tortious acts contributed to the rescue attempt or that they were negligent toward the deceased; and (3) the roof defects were obvious, not latent or concealed, and the experienced foreman was fully advised of the dangers.
“It is true that the "rescue doctrine" may be invoked in a personal injury action to offset contributory negligence provided the attempted rescue is not recklessly or rashly done or the defendant was not guilty of negligence to the person rescued nor did such person contribute to his peril by placing himself in a position of danger not necessary to effect the rescue.”
Establishes the general requirements for applying the rescue doctrine in personal injury cases.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Dade County Port Authority hired a roofing company to repair Miami International Airport's Hangar No. 2, which was occupied by Aerodex, Inc. On Oc…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Rescue Doctrine cases and more on FLexlaw
TERRELL, Justice.
Dade ' County - Port Authority engaged Guaranty Roofing Company, hereinafter re-'ferrfed-td as “Roofing'- Company,” to make repairs on Miatni' International Airport up-tin a cost'plus contract; the Roofing Com pany to furnish materials and equipment.* October 19, 1950, the roofing crew under supervision of Mr. Czepiel was directed to Hanger No. 2 which was occupied by Aero-dex, Inc., to begin the repairs. The dangerous condition of the roof was pointed out to Mr. Czepiel who was an experienced roof mechanic and fully explained to him. He instructed the crew as to the dangerous condition of the roof and ordered them on it to begin repairs. Soon after the crew commenced work, Mr. Alex J. Rose, vice president of the Roofing Company and an experienced engineer, climbed the ladder where the crew was working. Mr. Czepiel was working near him and told him of the dangerous'condition of the roof and warned him to walk upon a rafter which was pointed out to him. He had previously been given knowledge of the dangerous condition of the roof. He took a few steps on the rafter, as he was instructed to do, but accidentally missed it and fell through the roof to the cement floor and was killed instantly.
This action was brought by Bertha Rose, widow of Alex J. Rose, to recover damages for his death. The complaint is grounded on the theory that deceased met death in an attempt to rescue his men who were placed in a position of great danger and peril due to the negligence of defendants. Answers to the complaint denied all allegations of negligence and proffered pleas of contributory negligence on the part of decedent. The case came on for trial before a jury but at the close of plaintiff’s case, the court granted motions for directed verdict in favor -of both defendants. A new trial was denied and the plaintiff appealed.
' Several questions are urged for determination, but the real issue in the case is whether or not what is known .as the “rescue doctrine,” relied on by appellant, is applicable to this case.
It is true that the “rescue doctrine” may be invoked in a personal injury action to offset contributory negligence provided the attempted rescue is not recklessly or rashly done or the defendant was not guilty of negligence to' the person rescued nor did such person contribute to his peril by placing himself-in-a position of danger not necessary to effect the rescue. Lolli v. Market St. R. Co., 43 Cal.App.2d 166, 110 P. 2d 436, 438.
We are convinced that the doctrine cannot, be 'invoked here because (1) 'Mr. Rose was aware of the dangerous condition of the roof for two hours before work was commenced on it but did not warn his men of its dangerous condition. Brown v. Columbia Amusement Co., 91 Mont. 174, 6 P. 2d 874; Alabama Power Co. v. Conine, 213 Ala. 228, 104 So. 535. (2) There is no showing here of. tortious acts of defendant contributing to the rescue or that the defendant was guilty of negligence to Mr. Rose at any time. Brady v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 265 Wis. 618, 62 N.W. 2d 415. (3)Mr. Czepiel was • fully advised of the damage to the roof of Hangar No. 2 arid the danger in accomplishing the repairs to it if not done according to instructions. He was an experienced crew foreman. The Port Authority nor Aerodex, Inc., attempted to instruct Mr. Czepiel as to details of performing the work. The defects in the roof were not latent or concealed; they were obvious. For these and other reasons, we do not think the rescue doctrine has any application here. See Hickory House, Inc., v. Brown, Fla.1955, 77 So. 2d 249, and Bottom v. Rank, Fla.1954, 70 So. 2d 832.
The proffered testimony that is complained of was properly excluded because it was not an exception to the hearsay rule and was not material to a decision of the case. Another reason this testimony was properly excluded is that it could not be tested under cross-examination.
As to objection based on proffer of the insurance policy between Dade County and Maryland Casualty Company, it is sufficient to say that said evidence was properly excluded under the .doctrine of Carls Markets, Inc. v. Meyer, Fla.1953, 69 So. 2d 789. Then the Port Authority did not plead governmental immunity and did not attempt to secure reduction of the ad damnum clause to .the amount of insurance coverage. For all of which the judgment appealed from must be and is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
DREW, C. J., and ROBERTS and BARNS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Newsome v. ST. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 350 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)…: The rescue doctrine, . . . generally is that one who is injured in reasonably undertaking a necessary rescue, may recover for his personal injuries from the person whose negligence created the peril necessitating the rescue. See Rose v. Peters, 82 So. 2d 585 (Fla.1955). For the rescue doctrine to come into play the defendant must have been negligent, the person (or property) to be rescued must have been in imminent peril, and the rescuer must have acted reasonably. Without definitively answering any of…
-
Hunt v. State, 429 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…’s argument that the probative value of the testimony outweighs any prejudice must also fail. Probative value is not the test; the test is simply whether a hearsay exception is applicable. Section 90.802, Florida Statutes (1981). See Rose v. Peters, 82 So. 2d 585 (Fla.1955). Hunt has asserted that the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule is the only exception which could conceivably apply to allow the testimony into evidence. Section 90.803(3), Florida Statutes (1981). He has argued that even this ex…
-
Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Orin C. Korte, 357 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…defendants. [*230] The Supreme Court, prior to Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla.1973), recognized that the rescue doctrine could be invoked in a personal injury action to offset contributory negligence on the part of a rescuer, Rose v. Peters, 82 So. 2d 585 (Fla.1955), but there has been no detailed analysis of the doctrine. In most cases where it has been considered, our appellate courts have found it to be inapplicable, Rose v. Peters, supra, Adair v. The Island Club, 225 So. 2d 541 (Fla.2d DCA 1969)…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Carls Mkts., Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1953)
- Hickory House, Inc. v. Brown, 77 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1955)
- Brown v. Linton, 70 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1954)