DONALD E. MORRISON, PETITIONER,
v.
MARGARET L. CHAMBERS AND HER HUSBAND, HENRY W. CHAMBERS, RESPONDENTS

Fla. | 1955-09-28
TERRELL, ROBERTS and BUFORD, JJ., concur,
82 So. 2d 594 Florida Supreme Court (1955) Caution
Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Morrison sought to reinstate a common law action that was dismissed for lack of activity. The Florida Supreme Court held that a letter from the court clerk about scheduling could not constitute a step in the action sufficient to prevent dismissal under the statute, and quashed the order reinstating the cause.


Holding

The court held that the clerk's letter was not a step in the cause as contemplated by the statute and therefore could not prevent dismissal. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter an order reinstating the cause after the dismissal order was properly entered.


Key Quotes

“because it affirmatively appears that no action of any kind has been taken therein since September 25, 1953”

The basis for the motion to dismiss under the applicable statute

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Morrison filed a common law action on February 5, 1951. No action was taken in the case after September 25, 1953. On February 14, 1955, defendants mov…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
DREW, Chief Justice.-

DREW, Chief Justice.-

This common law action was commenced in the lower court.February-5, 1951. February 14, 1955, the defendant b.elovy moved the court to. dismiss the cause pursuant to Section 45..19, F.S.1953, F.S.A., “because it affirmatively appears that no action of any kind has been taken therein since September 25, 1953.” This motion was granted and an order of dismissal was entered the same day. More than two months later, April 20, 1955, plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate the order of dismissal, and to reinstate the cause. Su.ch motion was granted and the court entered an order reinstating the cause on May 31, 1955.

Defendant petitions this Court for certiorari -to review the order' reinstating the cause and urges that it be quashed for the reason that the Court had no jurisdiction to enter it.

The situation presented to this-Court by the record before us is identical to that in the case of Ivy H. Smith Co. v. Moccia, Fla. 1952, 59 So. 2d 629, where we granted certiorari and quashed the order reinstating the cause.

In support of the validity of the-order of dismissal, respondent alleges that he wrote the Clerk of the lower court on February 5, 1955, inquiring about the case and refers to a letter from the Clerk, under date of February 8, 1955, advising him that the •case would be placed on the trial docket for the spring term of the court beginning the following April 25. ' This letter can have no effect under the facts presented. It was not a step in the cause as contemplated by the statute. Moreover, it was never filed in the cause nor appeared on the docket until the motion to vacate was filed and then it was no more than an exhibit.

On the authority of the last mentioned case, certiorari is granted and the order reinstating the cause is quashed.

TERRELL, ROBERTS and BUFORD, JJ., concur,


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • LaVonne D. Reilly v. Fuss, 170 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
    …scover the name of a witness is not an affirmative showing of such act as will stay the running of the one year period provided by said Section 45.19 (1). Railway Express Agency v. Hoagland (Fla.1952), 62 So. 2d 756; Morrison v. Chambers (Fla.1955), 82 So. 2d 594; and Davant v. Coachman Properties, Inc. (Fla.Appeals 1960), 118 So. 2d 844 [80 A.L.R.2d 1396]. “C. That the ‘good cause’ to be shown by the plaintiff which would justify the Court in denying the motion to dismiss is the same as must be shown in or…
  • Moore v. Gannon, 178 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
    …; Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Hill, Fla.1955, 76 So. 2d 861. . Davant v. Coachman Properties, Inc., Fla.App.1960, 118 So. 2d 844, 80 A.L.R. 2d 1396; Miller v. Hartley’s, Inc., Fla.App.1957, 97 So. 2d 211; Morrison v. Chambers, Fla.1955, 82 So. 2d 594; Railway Exp. Agency, Inc. v. Hoagland, Fla. 1952, 62 So. 2d 756; Gulf Appliance Distributors, Inc. v. Long, Fla.1951, 53 So. 2d 706. . Little v. Sullivan, Fla.1965, 173 So. 2d 135.…
  • …had expired the trial court was without power to reinstate a cause. See: Ivy H. Smith Co. v. Moccia, Fla.1952, 59 So. 2d 629; B&L Trucking Co. v. Loftin, Fla.1953, 63 So. 2d 276; Bowyer v. Cannon, Fla.1953, 68 So. 2d 564; Morrison v. Chambers, Fla., 82 So. 2d 594. Prohibition is an appropriate remedy to prevent an inferior tribunal from exercising a jurisdiction it does not possess or one that has expired. State v. Trammell, 140 Fla. 500, 192 So. 2d 175; Bowyer v. Cannon, supra; State ex rel. Huntley Bros.,…

Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw