JOHN W. MARTIN, AS TRUSTEE OF THE PROPERTY OF FLORIDA EAST COAST RAILWAY COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
LENA SUSSMAN, APPELLEE
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed a trial judge's order granting a new trial in a railroad crossing death case, holding that the jury verdict for the defendant railroad company was supported by undisputed evidence and that the trial judge abused discretion in setting it aside.
The court held that the 'last clear chance' instruction could not have been harmful to the plaintiff, and more importantly, the jury verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The undisputed facts and the jury's reasonable evaluation of them under the standard of how a reasonable person would have acted fully supported the verdict for the defendant railroad company.
“It is error to grant a new trial when the verdict set aside is supported by the testimony appearing in the record and nothing can be accomplished except to have another jury review the cause.”
Establishes the court's core holding that a new trial should not be granted when the jury verdict is supported by undisputed evidence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLena Sussman's daughter died in a collision between her car and a Florida East Coast Railway train at a railroad crossing. The evidence showed undispu…
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ROBERTS, Justice.
This is an appeal by the defendant railroad company from an order of the" lower court granting a new trial to . the plaintiff, after a jury verdict in favor of the defendant, in ¡plaintiff’s suit to recover damages for the death of her daughter, in a railroad crossing accident. .The trial judge granted the new trial because, in his opinion, it was harmful error to charge the jury on the “last clear chance” -and also because he thought the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The charge on the “last clear chance” could not be harmful to plaintiff, so that this ground of the order granting a new trial cannot be sustained. (It should also be noted 'that, since Loftin v. Nolin, Fla.1955, 81 So. 2d 200, the doctrine óf the “last clear chance” is no longer applicable in suits against a railroad company.)
On the question of whether the trial judge erred in holding that the verdict in favor of the defendant was against the manifest weight of the evidence, we think the defendant’s contention that this was error must be sustained.
There was no dispute in the evidence. The only possible area of conflict was as to whether the engineer rang the' bell and blew the whistle at the crossing. The negative testimony of disinterested witnesses that they didn’t hear any signals cannot be said to create a genuine issue on this point, in view of their statements that they weren’t listening and couldn’t really say whether the whistle did or did not blow. Loftin v. Nolin, supra, 81. So. 2d 200.
This was a case where 'the evidence showed without contradiction that the deceased drove, without stopping, onto the railroad track in front of the approaching train. The inference was permissible that, i-f the engineer had’applied the emergency brake when he first saw the car in which deceased was riding, the accident might have been avoided. This does not fasten liability irrevocably on the defendant railroad company. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Timmons, 160 Fla. 754, 36 So. 2d 430; Martin v. Rivers, Fla. 1954, 72 So. 2d 789.
The trial judge also thought that the speed of the train- (71 miles per hour) was unreasonable in view of the “meagerness” of the warning signs, which were a standard crossarm and a reflectorized sign. The accident happened at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon. Visibility was good. The deceased could have seen the signs, if she had been looking, and she could have seen the train as it was approaching. The jury had the right to find that she chose to ignore both. They also had the right to find that the train’s speed of 71 miles per hour was not unreasonable, in view of the fact that the street upon which decedent was traveling intersected a main highway, running parallel to the railroad, just before it crossed the defendant’s railroad track/and that the lawful speed on such highway at the intersection was 60 miles per ’hour. While we have many times held that the trial judge, should grant a new trial when the jury’s verdict is against the manifest weight and probative force of the evidence, we think the rule has no application here. There was no real conflict in the evidence. All the jury had to do was evaluate the undisputed evidence in the light of what a “reasonable” man would have done, if he had been in the shoes of the defendant’s employee. .No procedural errors were committed. The only thing that would be accomplished by the re-trial of this cause would be a re-submission of the same undisputed facts to another jury for a re-evaluation of the evidence. “It is error to grant a new trial when the verdict set aside is supported' by the testimony appearing in the record and nothing can be accomplished except -to have another jury review the cause. See Seaver v. Stratton, 133 Fla. 183, 183 So. 335. Martin v. Stone, Fla.1951, 51 So. 2d 33, 35. For the reasons stated,‘the order granting a new trial should be and it is hereby
Reversed, with direction to enter judgment on the verdict. .
DREW,. C. J., TERRELL, J., arid AD LEN, Associate Justice, concur.
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Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973)…at of the defendant, the amount awarded to the plaintiff should be reduced by one-half from what it otherwise would have been. The doctrine of last clear chance would, of course, no longer have any application in these cases. See Martin v. Sussman, 82 So. 2d 597 (Fla.1955). We decline herein to dissect and discuss all the possible variations of comparative negligence which have been adopted in other jurisdictions. Countless law review commentaries and treatises can be found which have covered almost every…
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Cloud v. Fallis, 107 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)…Court decided Martin v. Stone, Fla.1951, 51 So. 2d 33, using stronger language than in the Hart case, above, and citing the Seaver case, above. See, also, Poindexter v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., Fla.1951, 56 So. 2d 905; Martin v. Sussman, Fla.1955, 82 So. 2d 597. These cases all seem to state and re-emphasize the rule that a trial judge who grants a new trial will be reversed if the sole, apparent result [*268] is to have another jury consider the same facts, or to put it another way, if the apparent reason…
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Apalachicola N. R.R. Co. v. Tyus, 114 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)…stion in the record on appeal or in the petition for rehearing that there is now available to plaintiff any evidence that was not available on the trial. Under such circumstances we must conclude, as did the Supreme Court in Martin v. Sussman, Fla., 82 So. 2d 597, 598: “The only thing that would be accomplished by the re-trial of this cause would be a resubmission of the same undisputed facts to another jury for a re-evaluation of the evidence.” Again we point out that our reversal of this cause was based…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Martin v. Stone, 51 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1951)
- Seaver v. Stratton, 133 Fla. 183 (Fla. 1937)
- Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Timmons, 160 Fla. 754 (Fla. 1948)
- Martin v. Rivers, 72 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1954)
- Walker v. Faye McDANIEL, 81 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1955)