STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
RICHARD GREENE, APPELLEE
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Florida's Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Florida Statute § 784.05 (culpable negligence), rejecting an argument that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The court held that although 'culpable negligence' is difficult to define, it is a well-established legal term with sufficient clarity to inform the public of prohibited conduct.
The statute is constitutional. Although the term 'culpable negligence' is difficult to define, it is sufficiently established in law and commonly used to meet constitutional standards of clarity. The public can understand that reckless acts creating great risk of danger to others are criminally prohibited, and the statute adequately informs persons of the nature of the criminal conduct proscribed.
[1] Surplus language in an information that does not misinform the defendant of the nature of the criminal act charged does not render the information defective.
[2] A statute is not unconstitutionally vague if the proscribed conduct is understandable to the public, even if the statutory language employs legal terms that are difficult…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The purpose of the statute is to make criminal those acts which create an unreasonably great risk of harm to others.”
Establishes the statutory purpose and scope of the culpable negligence statute.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRichard Greene was charged under Florida Statute § 784.05 with culpable negligence in discharging a pistol on January 4, 1976, thereby injuring anothe…
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BOYD, Justice.
An information was filed in the County Court of Lee County against Richard Greene. It charged that through culpable negligence or reckless disregard for the safety of another in discharging a pistol on January 4, 1976, he had injured a person contrary to Section 784.05, Florida Statutes. Greene moved to dismiss the information because it included language (reckless disregard for the safety of another) struck from the statute by an amendment1 effective before the date of the charged offense. The motion was denied. Again Greene moved to dismiss the information. The second motion was granted because the trial judge believed the statute to be unconstitutionally vague. We have jurisdiction. Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. We agree with the trial judge that the information was not defective because it contained language not present in the statute. The surplus language did not misinform Greene of the nature of the criminal act charged. We must disagree, however, with the trial judge’s declaration that the statute is unconstitutional.
The purpose of the statute is to make criminal those acts which create an unreasonably great risk of harm to others. The degree of punishment for such acts depends on whether injury is inflicted. If so, the crime is a misdemeanor of the first degree; if not, a misdemeanor of the second degree. The statute follows:
“784.05 Culpable negligence
(1) Whoever, through culpable negligence, exposes another person to personal injury shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084. (2) Whoever through culpable negligence inflicts actual personal injury on another shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084.”
In defense of the trial court order Greene argues that the members of the public cannot be expected to understand the meaning of “culpable negligence” and therefore cannot know what acts are proscribed by the statute. The state counters that, although difficult to define, the term is one in common use and no more susceptible to a “vagueness” attack than many legal terms employed throughout the statutes of this State.
In Russ v. State, 140 Fla. 217,191 So. 296 (1939), culpable negligence was defined by this Court as the omission of an act which a reasonably prudent person would do or the commission of an act which such a person would not do. To establish the crime of culpable negligence, however, the Court required a degree of negligence higher than the minimum degree necessary to sustain recovery of compensatory damages.
“This Court is committed to the rule that the degree of negligence required to sustain imprisonment should be at least as high as that required for the imposition of punitive damages in a civil action. The burden of proof authorizing a recovery of exemplary or punitive damages by a plaintiff for negligence must show a gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless disregard of human life or of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous effects; or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of indifference to consequences; or such wantonness or recklessness or grossly careless disregard of the safety and welfare of the public, or that reckless indifference to the rights of others, which is equivalent to an intentional violation of them.” 191 So. at 298.
Thus, reckless indifference or grossly careless disregard of the safety of others is necessary to prove “culpable negligence.” Whether members of the public would describe reckless acts which create a great risk of danger to others as culpable negligence or not, they know that such acts are criminally outlawed.
The statute is constitutional. The cause is remanded to the County Court, in and for Lee County, for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, C. J., and ADKINS, SUND-BERG, HATCHETT and KARL, JJ., concur. ENGLAND, J., dissents.
. Ch. 74-383, § 21, Laws of Florida.
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Eller v. Shova, 630 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1993)…sdemeanor occurs when a person, through culpable negligence, inflicts actual personal injury on another. Culpable negligence has been defined through case law as "reckless indifference” or "grossly careless disregard” of human life. State v. Greene, 348 So. 2d 3 (Fla.1977). Gross negligence, on the other hand, is defined as an act or omission that a reasonable, prudent person would know is likely to result in injury to another. Glaab v. Caudill, 236 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). . Appellants state, in req…
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In re Standard Jury Instructions IN Crim. Cases-Report NO. 2007-10, 997 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 2008)…. 2d DCA 2007). We authorize publication and use of the instruction as modified. In its proposal amending instruction 8.9, Culpable Negligence, the Committee suggested language that appears to not be in accord with our decision in State v. Greene, 348 So. 2d 3 (Fla.1977). In Greene, we upheld the constitutionality of the culpable negligence statute, section 784.05, Florida Statutes, stating that “reckless indifference or grossly careless disregard of the safety of others is necessary to prove ‘culpable ne…
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Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2000)….04(2) on this basis. As we recently concluded in upholding Section 784.05, Florida Statutes (1975), the culpable negligence statute, the term “culpable negligence” does not suffer from the constitutional infirmity of vagueness. See State v. Greene, 348 So. 2d 3 (Fla.1977).... The requirement of willfulness (scienter) or culpable negligence in Section 827.04(2), therefore, avoids the infirmity found in Winters with respect to Section 827.05 that unintentional acts or conduct which is not the product of culp…1 / 2
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- Amon H. Russ v. State, 140 Fla. 217 (Fla. 1939)