CHARLES A. FINKEL, APPELLANT,
v.
SUN TATTLER COMPANY, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, ET AL., APPELLEES
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In this defamation appeal, the court held that the plaintiff, a former city attorney, qualifies as a public figure subject to the New York Times v. Sullivan "actual malice" standard. However, the court reversed summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether the defendant acted with actual malice, entitling the plaintiff to a trial on the merits.
The plaintiff is a public figure subject to the New York Times v. Sullivan "actual malice" standard due to his former status as city attorney and current related activities. However, summary judgment was improper because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the defendant acted with actual malice, requiring a trial on the merits.
[1] Libel and slander cases apply a dual standard: one for public officials or figures and another for private individuals.
[2] A former city attorney may be considered a public official or public figure for the purposes of libel law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it appears that the appellant is a public official or public figure by virtue of his former status as city attorney and his current activities relating thereto or emanating therefrom”
Establishes the court's classification of the plaintiff as a public figure, triggering the higher actual malice standard
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCharles Finkel, a former city attorney, brought a libel action against Sun Tattler Company, Inc. and other defendants. The defendants obtained summary…
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PER CURIAM.
It is undisputed and well settled that the Supreme Court of the United States has established a dual standard in libel and slander cases — one standard applicable to public officials or public figures — another standard applicable to private individuals. (New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964)).
No useful judicial purpose would be served to embark upon a discourse regarding the relative merits of such duality or the privileges resulting therefrom. Suffice it to say, such a distinction exists and we apply the applicable law relating thereto.
Accordingly, based upon our understanding of New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, and its progeny, it appears that the appellant is a public official or public figure by virtue of his former status as city attorney and his current activities relating thereto or emanating therefrom. See also Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966). Therefore the New York Times v. Sullivan “actual malice” standard is the applicable rule by which to measure accountability of appellee for any alleged libel.
Having so concluded, it does not necessarily follow that a summary judgment on this legal proposition is dispositive of the entire cause. In our opinion there exist genuine issues of material fact with respect to the presence or absence of malice on the part of the appellee which preclude the entry of summary judgment. See Firestone v. Time, 231 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 4 DCA 1970) cert. den. 237 So. 2d 754 (Fla.1970).
Under such circumstances, any litigant, whether public official or private individual, is entitled to a trial on the merits of his or her claim. Our traditional sense of justice and fair play demands no less, particularly where one’s reputation or good name is alleged to have been impugned. The free speech protections of the First Amendment and the right of access to our courts under the Florida and United States Constitutions can be properly recognized, balanced and preserved in the sunshine of a trial on the merits.
Affirmed, in part; reversed, in part, and remanded.
MAGER, C. J., and DAUKSCH, J., and KANEY, FRANK N., Associate Judge, concur.
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The Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Aurelio ANE, 423 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…a public figure libel action and although the court noted that defamation suits were governed by a dual standard for public and private individuals, it neglected to articulate what standard applied to private individuals. Finkel v. Sun Tattler Co., 348 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert, denied, 358 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978). Another district stated that under Gertz, private plaintiffs no longer need prove actual malice, but also failed to state which standard of fault would apply. See Helton v. United Press…
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Coleman v. Palmer W. Collins, 384 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…re, the case is governed by New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). Counsel for the plaintiff conceded this before the trial court, and the decision of this Court in Finkel v. Sun Tattler Company, Inc., 348 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. den., 358 So. 2d 135 (Fla.1978), so holds. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Early, 334 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), cert. den. 354 So. 2d 351 (Fla.1977), cert. den. 439 U.S. 910, 99 S.Ct. 277, 58 L.Ed.2d 255 (1978), traces…
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Wilkinson v. Fla. Adult Care Ass'n, 450 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…5, 91 S.Ct. 628, 28 L.Ed.2d 57 (1971) (town mayor as candidate for county tax assessor); Menendez v. Key West Newspaper Corp., 293 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (candidate for city commission); (3) to former officeholders: Finkel v. Sun Tattler Co., 348 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 358 So. 2d 135 (Fla.1978) (former city attorney); Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 101 Misc.2d 928, 422 N.Y.S.2d 552 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1979), modified, 73 A.D.2d 43, 425 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1980), aff'd, 52 [*1172] N.Y.2d 422,…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (U.S. 1964)
- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (U.S. 1974)
- Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (U.S. 1966)
- Firestone v. Time, Inc., 231 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)
- Rod-Lyn Corp. v. Clyde M. Banks, 237 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1970)
- State v. Franklin, 237 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1970)