GLORIA WHITE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1977-07-22
No. 76-1796
BOARDMAN, C. J., and HOBSON and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
348 So. 2d 382 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1977) Positive Treatment
Cited by 13 cases

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Holding

A sentence for a first-degree misdemeanor cannot exceed one year, even if the defendant is convicted of multiple counts.


Facts & Procedural History

Appellant was convicted of resisting an officer with violence on two counts and resisting an officer without violence on a third count. The sentence f…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was charged in a single information with three counts of resisting an officer with violence, a third degree felony. She was convicted as charged on counts one and three, but was found guilty of the lesser included offense of resisting an officer without violence on count two. She was given concurrent sentences of six to eighteen months on each count.

Resisting an officer without violence is a first degree misdemeanor. Section 843.02, Florida Statutes (1975). The maximum prison sentence for a first degree misdemeanor is one year. Section 775.082(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1975). Therefore appellant’s sentence on count two exceeds the legal maximum.

Appellant’s convictions on all three counts and the sentences on counts one and three are affirmed. The sentence on count two is vacated, and the cause is remanded for imposition of a sentence of six months to one year on that count. Appellant need not be present for this purpose.

BOARDMAN, C. J., and HOBSON and GRIMES, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …he pleadings as may be necessary to define clearly all of the issues prior to retrial. DOWNEY, J., concurs. ANSTEAD, J., dissents without opinion. . See Tingle v. Dade County Board of County Comm'rs, 245 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1971); Keathley v. Larson, 348 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 358 So. 2d 131 (Fla.1978). . There were actually three guarantors. The third guarantor, who was represented by counsel, had filed a notice of bankruptcy. The court file reflects notice of the trial being sent to su…
  • Raymond v. Zumstorchen Inv., Ltd., 488 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
    …ecessor’s rulings on issues of law. Yet, a successor judge has the obligation to correct any error in a prior interlocutory ruling on matters of law. Tingle v. Dade County Board of County Commissioners, 245 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1971); Keathley v. Larson, 348 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 358 So. 2d 131 (Fla.1978); see also Canney v. Canney, 453 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Here, the judge erred in failing to correctly apply these principles. The question before us, however, is whether Raymond’s se…
  • Canney v. Canney, 453 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
    …an interlocutory order but is no longer assigned to the case, a successor judge has jurisdiction to vacate that order while the case is still pending. Tingle v. Dade County Board of County Commissioners, 245 So. 2d 76 (Fla.1971); Keathley v. Larson, 348 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 358 So. 2d 131 (Fla.1978). An order entering a default is interlocutory in character. Therefore, the successor judge has jurisdiction to hear a motion to set it aside and should consider it on its merits. Diligence…

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