SHERMAN HENRY FOSTER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED.
McCORD, C. J. and RAWLS, J., concur.
SMITH, J., specially concurs.
SMITH, Judge,
concurring:
Foster asserts that his speedy trial rights under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191 were violated by the State’s failure to retry him within 90 days after entry of a United States district court judgment granting his petition for habeas corpus and remanding him to state authorities. Subsection (g) of the rule provides in part:
“A person who is to be tried again shall be brought to trial within 90 days from . the date of receipt by the trial court of a mandate, order, or notice of whatever form from an appellate or other reviewing court which makes possible a new trial for the defendant . . ..”
While in my view a judgment in habeas corpus of a United States district court is “a mandate, order, or notice” of a “reviewing court which makes possible a new trial for the defendant,” within the meaning and application of the rule, the event which commences the time for new trial is not its entry but its receipt by the trial court. Verbal or other informal notice to the trial judge does not, under the rule, commence the period for retrial. Foster’s motion for discharge under the rule was therefore properly denied, but without prejudice to any claim for discharge he might have made on the principles of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). See State ex rel. Gentry v. Fitzpatrick, 327 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). I concur in the judgment.
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State v. Stevens, 354 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…e at night, or looking or pointing at policemen, or pulling out of a parking lot when the police come into view, with nothing more, is insufficient to justify an individual’s detention. Coladonato v. State, 348 So. 2d 326 (Fla.1977); Lower v. State, 348 So. 2d 410 (Fla.2d DCA 1977); Stanley v. State, 327 So. 2d 243 (Fla.2d DCA 1976); Vollmer v. State, 337 So. 2d 1024 (Fla.2d DCA 1976). In the present case, however, there were numerous factors which, when interpreted in the light of Officer Ludwig’s knowledge…
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McCLOUD v. State, 491 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…an automobile. The stop of the vehicle “must be predicated on a founded or reasonable suspicion which requires further investigation to determine whether its occupants have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime.” Lower v. State, 348 So. 2d 410, 411 (Fla.2d DCA 1977). See also sec. 901.151, Fla.Stat. (1975) (“stop and frisk”) and Terry. Later decisions of this court have framed the issue as, “whether the deputy had a well-founded suspicion that [the suspect] had been engaged in criminal ac…
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Levie Codie v. State, 406 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…r in the side parking lot of a closed filling station adjacent to a public highway at midnight is enough to give a passing deputy a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity. See McClure v. State, 358 So. 2d 1187 (Fla.2d DCA 1978); Lower v. State, 348 So. 2d 410 (Fla.2d DCA 1977).…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972)
- The State of Fla. on the relation of Richard Cade Gentry v. The Honorable Warren L. Fitzpatrick, 327 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)