TEMPERANCE WRIGHT, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Temperance Wright was convicted of sale and possession of cocaine. The appellate court affirmed her conviction on both counts and the 15-year sentence for sale, but reversed the 5-year sentence for possession as it arose from the same transaction and violated the rule against cumulative sentencing for different phases of the same offense.
The court affirmed the convictions on both counts and the 15-year sentence plus $5,000 fine for sale of cocaine, but reversed the 5-year sentence for possession of cocaine. When a defendant is convicted of two phases of the same transaction, he may only be sentenced for the higher offense.
[1] A trial court is not required to hear a proffer of testimony outside the jury's presence when the defense could have called the witness to testify before the jury and the…
[2] The jury, not the trial judge, is responsible for assessing the credibility of witnesses.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It was the duty of the jury, not the trial judge, to assess the credibility of witnesses and such testimony from the witness should have been addressed to the jury.”
Establishes that credibility determinations are exclusively for the jury, not the trial court, so the proffer outside the jury's presence was properly rejected.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWright was charged by information with two counts: sale or delivery of cocaine and possession of cocaine in violation of Florida Statutes. She was con…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Sale Of Controlled Substance cases and more on FLexlaw
HUBBART, Judge.
This is a criminal prosecution in which the defendant was charged by information in two counts with sale or delivery of a controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, and possession of a controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, in violation of Sections 893.13(l)(a) 1, 893.13(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1975), before the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida. The defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to fifteen years in prison plus a $5,000 fine on the sale count and five years imprisonment on the possession count, the sentences on each count to run concurrently.
We find no merit in the defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in refusing to take a defense proffer of testimony from a witness outside the jury’s presence which allegedly showed that a prior witness called by the state had not told the truth on a particular point before the jury. The state had made the witness available to the defense during the trial when it first learned of such testimony. Nothing prevented defense counsel from calling the witness to testify before the jury, but counsel declined to do so. There was no reason for the trial court to hear such testimony as a proffer outside the jury’s presence. It was the duty of the jury, not the trial judge, to assess the credibility of witnesses and such testimony from the witness should have been addressed to the jury. See Bryan v. State, 41 Fla. 643, 661-662, 26 So. 1022 (1899); McDonald v. United States, 282 F. 2d 737 (9th Cir. 1960); McGuinn v. United States, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 286, 239 F. 2d 449 (1956). We accordingly, affirm the convictions for sale or delivery of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance.
We find no merit in the defendant’s further contention that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence on the sale of cocaine count. The fifteen year sentence plus the $5,000 fine imposed was within the statutory maximum set by the legislature for sale of a controlled substance, to wit: cocaine. Section 893.13(l)(a) 1, 775.-082(3)(c), 775.083.(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1975). We find no abuse of discretion in imposing the sentence on this count. Brown v. State, 152 Fla. 853, 13 So. 2d 458 (1943); Infante v. State, 197 So. 2d 542 (Fla.3d DCA 1967); Cole v. State, 262 So. 2d 902 (Fla.3d DCA 1972).
The five year sentence on the possession of cocaine count must be reversed because it arises from the same transaction or occurrence as the sale of cocaine. Because the defendant was convicted of two facets or phases of the same transaction, he could only be sentenced for the higher of such offenses, to wit: the sale of cocaine. Jackson v. State, 311 So. 2d 811 (Fla.lst DCA 1975); Orange v. State, 334 So. 2d 277 (Fla.3d DCA 1976); Caivano v. State, 276 So. 2d 245 (Fla.2d DCA 1973); Jackson v. State, 270 So. 2d 30 (Fla.4th DCA 1972); Gonzalez v. State, 268 So. 2d 552 (Fla.3d DCA 1972); Jones v. State, 265 So. 2d 514 (Fla.4th DCA 1972); Carr v. State, 264 So. 2d 871 (Fla.1st DCA 1972); Hunt v. State, 264 So. 2d 855 (Fla.lst DCA 1972); Shaw v. State, 264 So. 2d 95 (Fla.lst DCA 1972).
Affirmed as to the judgments of conviction; affirmed as to sentence and fine on the sale of cocaine count; reversed as to the sentence on the possession of cocaine count.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Rozmestor v. State, 381 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…en up by the last three years of the prior sentence before the final two years commence to run. Unless there is specific statutory authority to impose a sentence, it cannot stand. Brown v. State, 152 Fla. 853, 13 So. 2d 458 (1943). Wright v. State, 348 So. 2d 633, 634 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977). And the language susceptible of differing constructions shall be construed most favorably to the accused. § 775.021(1), Fla.Stat. (1979). A defendant convicted of two or more offenses not charged in the same information sha…
-
Drayton v. State, 372 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…ary on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. The record shows that appellant was convicted for the sale and possession of the same substance. This was improper. See, e. g., Yost v. Wright, 360 So. 2d 1309 (Fla.3d DCA 1971); Wright v. State, 348 So. 2d 633 (Fla.3d DCA); and Orange v. State, 334 So. 2d 277 (Fla.3d DCA 1976). Accordingly, the sentences imposed are reversed, and the cause is remanded for proper sentencing in the light of this opinion. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded wit…
-
Norman v. State, 360 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…ndant was convicted of two facets or phases of the same transaction, he could only be sentenced for the higher of such offenses, that of delivery of heroin. Harris v. State, 358 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 4th DCA, opinion filed May 16, 1978); Wright v. State, 348 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Jones v. State, 265 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). Accordingly, since no other reversible error has been demonstrated, the judgments as to the two counts are affirmed, but the sentence for possession of a controlled substance i…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (17 total)
- Brown v. State, 152 Fla. 853 (Fla. 1943)
- Gadsden D. Bryan v. State, 41 Fla. 643 (Fla. 1899)
- Infante v. State, 197 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Cole v. State, 262 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Caivano v. State, 276 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- McGUINN v. United States, 239 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
- Orange v. State, 334 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- McDONALD v. United States, 282 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1960)
- Jackson v. State, 311 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
- Jones v. State, 265 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)