JOHNNIE JONES (WILLIE FELTON), APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION AND LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF OFFENDER REHABILITATION, APPELLEES
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Florida appellate court reversed parole revocation where the Commission relied solely on hearsay evidence without any non-hearsay evidence to support the violation finding, holding that parole revocation requires some valid legal evidence beyond hearsay despite relaxed evidentiary rules.
Parole revocation cannot be based solely on hearsay evidence; some valid legal evidence must be adduced before hearsay testimony may be admitted.
[1] Parole revocation proceedings, though not bound by strict rules of evidence, require some valid legal evidence to be adduced before hearsay testimony may be admitted to s…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[W]e are not bound by any rules of evidence . . .”
Statement made by a commissioner at the outset of the revocation hearing, demonstrating the Commission's disregard for evidentiary standards.
Appellant Jones was found by the Parole and Probation Commission to have violated parole terms by participating in a robbery. The Commission's revocat…
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RAWLS, Acting Chief Judge.
This appeal is from the trial court’s order denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus directed to appellees, Florida Parole and Probation Commission and Louie L. Wainwright, Director of Offender Rehabilitation. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the Commission found that appellant Jones had violated the terms of his parole by participating in the robbery of certain named individuals.
Necessitating a reversal is the lack of evidentiary climate present in the course of the revocation hearing, which was cogently summed up at the outset of same by one of the commissioners who stated: “ . . . [W]e are not bound by any rules of evidence . . ..” The transcript of the proceedings confirms this statement. In the order denying the petition, the trial judge correctly found that revocation of parole may not be based solely on hearsay. Hampton v. State, 276 So. 2d 497 (Fla.3rd DCA 1973). He incorrectly held that a sworn statement which had been given by appellant’s alleged girlfriend was not of hearsay character, and thus sufficient to sustain the action of the Commission. The record in this proceeding does not reflect one iota of evidence that is not hearsay. We are fully cognizant that a revocation hearing is-not a traditional adversary criminal trial, and evidentiary proof is not required to follow strict rules of evidence. Singletary v. State, 290 So. 2d 116 (Fla.4th DCA 1974). Yet, some valid legal evidence must be adduced prior to hearsay testimony being admitted.
Reversed and remanded without prejudice to the Commission to conduct further proceedings upon the alleged violation.
SMITH and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Peters v. State, 984 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 2008)…ceedings retain other distinctions from criminal trials. A parole revocation hearing “is not a traditional adversary criminal trial, and eviden-tiary proof is not required to follow strict rules of evidence.” Jones v. Fla. Parole & Probation Comm’n, 348 So. 2d 681, 682 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (citing Singletary v. State, 290 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)). Moreover, the exclusionary rule does not [*1237] apply in parole revocation hearings. Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 359, 118 S.Ct. 201…
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Merritt v. Crosby, 893 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…evidence to support the Commission’s finding of guilt consisted of the deputy’s recitation of Pauldon’s hearsay statement, but hearsay alone is not sufficient to sustain the revocation of parole. See Jones v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 348 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); see also § 120.57(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004). Implicitly recognizing this, the Commission argues that Pauldon’s statement falls within either the “excited utterance” or “spontaneous statement” exception to the hearsay rule, and th…
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Vila v. State, 375 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…PER CURIAM. The appellant’s probation was revoked only upon “hearsay” evidence, with no other legal competent evidence before the trial court. This was error. Jones v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 348 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Jones v. State, 348 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Combs v. State, 351 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The order revoking probation is reversed and set aside, with directions to reinstate the appellant to probation.…
Authorities Cited
- Singletary v. State, 290 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
- Hampton v. State, 276 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)