MARLIN CONNER AND OTELIA CONNER, HIS WIFE, FARMERS AND DEALERS BANK OF LAKE BUTLER, APPELLANTS,
v.
F. R. COGGINS, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Appellants sought to foreclose a mortgage and Conner challenged the action as barred by the statute of limitations. The court affirmed the foreclosure, holding that under Florida law, the limitations period for mortgage foreclosure runs from the maturity date of the final installment when the mortgage secures an installment obligation without an acceleration clause.
The foreclosure action is not barred by the statute of limitations. When a mortgage secures an obligation payable in installments and the maturity date of the final installment is ascertainable from the recorded mortgage, the limitations period runs from the maturity date of the final installment, not from the original mortgage date or earlier defaults.
[1] The statute of limitations for foreclosing a mortgage is five years from the maturity date of the final installment if that date is ascertainable from the recorded mortga…
[2] When a mortgage secures an obligation payable in installments, and the maturity date of the final installment is ascertainable from the record of the mortgage, the five-y…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If the record of the mortgage shows that it secures an obligation payable in installments and the maturity date of the final installment of the obligation is ascertainable from the record of the mortgage, the time shall run from the maturity date of the final installment.”
This statutory provision establishes that the limitations period for mortgage foreclosure runs from the final installment's maturity date, not the original mortgage date.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceConner obtained a mortgage that secured an obligation payable in installments without an acceleration clause. The foreclosure action was filed more th…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Continuing Contract cases and more on FLexlaw
McCORD, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal from final judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage. Appellant contends the action is barred by the statute of limitations. We disagree and affirm.
The final judgment contains the following finding:
“That the defense of the running of the Statute of Limitations is not available to the Defendants in this case because Florida Statutes § 95.11(2)(c) setting forth a five (5) year period must be read in pari materia with Florida Statutes § 95.281(3) which provides: ‘If the record of the mortgage shows that it secures an obligation payable in installments and the maturity date of the final installment of the obligation is ascertainable from the record of the mortgage, the time shall run from the maturity date of the final installment.’ The Court finds that the Mortgage is of record. The Court finds that the maturity date of the final installment is ascertainable from the recorded Mortgage.”
Neither the mortgage nor the installment contract were made a part of the record on this appeal. It is incumbent upon the appellant to bring to this court such parts of the record as are necessary to support his contentions on appeal. Howell v. State, 337 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1 DCA 1976); Chipola Nurseries, Inc. v. Division of Adm. Dept. of Tr., 294 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1 DCA 1974).
Appellant not having included the mortgage in the record, we must conclude that the facts contained in the above finding are correct.
From the briefs, it does not appear that there is any dispute that this suit was filed more than five years from the date of the mortgage and more than five years from the date of default, but within five years of the maturity date of the final installment; and that the instruments did not contain an acceleration clause in the event of default. We must assume from the above quoted findings of the trial court (which are undisputed by the record before us) that the maturity date of the final installment is ascertainable from the recorded mortgage.
§ 95.11, Florida Statutes (1975), provides that an action to foreclose a mortgage shall be commenced within five years. § 95.281, Florida Statutes (1975), provides that if the final maturity of an obligation secured by a mortgage is ascertainable from the record of it, the lien of the mortgage encumbering real property shall terminate five years after the date of maturity. That statute also provides that if the record of the mortgage shows that it secures an obligation payable in installments and the maturity date of the final installment of the obligation is ascertainable from the record of the mortgage, the time shall run from the maturity date of the final installment. When we consider the foregoing statutes in pari materia, it is apparent that this suit was filed within the five years allowed by the statute of limitations in that it was filed within five years from the maturity date of the final installment.
Since the mortgage and the installment contract for which it was security did not contain an acceleration clause, the contract did not fully mature until there was a default in payment of the final installment. Appellee at his option could have foreclosed earlier upon a previous default, but had he done so, he would have lost the security for subsequent unmatured payments. This was a continuing contract which did not fully mature until default in payment of the final installment.
Affirmed.
BOYER and MILLS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (18 total)
-
Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Americas v. Beauvais, 188 So. 3d 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)…rity from a proper distinguishing of Singleton, and causes the majority effectively to overrule cases that Singleton does not mention, much less disrupt. Examples abpund. B. What Singleton Does Not Do Singleton does not overrule Conner v. Coggins, 349 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), Locke v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 509 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), or Monte v. Tipton, 612 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Singleton does not stand for the proposition that a lender’s acceleration is irrelevant to the…1 / 2
-
U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Bartram, 140 So. 3d 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)…tate Farm, Fire & Cas. Co., 509 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (holding that because lender had not exercised its optional right to accelerate until it filed its foreclosure complaint, the statute of limitations had not yet run); Conner v. Coggins, 349 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (rejecting argument that statute of limitations barred foreclosure action where suit was filed within five years of the maturity date of the final installment; noting there was no acceleration clause). The Bank admits that dicta…
-
Monte v. Tipton, 612 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…is not ascertainable from the record of it. Section 95.281(l)(b). The statute of limitations on a mortgage foreclosure action does not begin to run until the last payment is due unless the mortgage contains an acceleration clause. Conner v. Coggins, 349 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Mrs. Tipton did not exercise her right to accelerate until she demanded the total principal balance and interest by letter dated March 12, 1991, less than two months prior to filing suit. Section 7 of the mortgage agreement prov…
Previewing 3 of 18 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Chipola Nurseries, Inc. v. Division of Administration, 294 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Howell v. State, 337 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)