DEBRA MACKEY, A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH CHARLES MACKEY, HER FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, APPELLANTS,
v.
RESERVE INSURANCE COMPANY AND ROSANN WHEELER, APPELLEES
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In this personal injury case, Debra Mackey and her father appealed a judgment awarding them $2,500 each (reduced by 50% due to comparative negligence) against an insured driver. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, finding that while the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the defendant's admission of guilt to a traffic infraction, the error was harmless because the jury already found the defendant negligent.
The trial court erred in excluding Wheeler's admission of guilt because Section 318.19 (governing mandatory hearing traffic citations) does not incorporate the exclusion policy of Section 318.14 (governing voluntary forfeitures). However, the error was harmless because the jury's verdict already found Wheeler negligent, and the admission only addressed whether she was negligent, not the degree of her fault.
[1] A statute providing that an admission of a traffic infraction shall not be used as evidence in other proceedings applies only to infractions where a mandatory hearing is…
[2] A defendant's admission of guilt to a traffic infraction requiring a mandatory hearing may be used as evidence in a civil proceeding.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Any person cited for the infractions listed in this section shall not have the provisions of § 318.14(2) and (4) available to him but must appear . . .”
Establishes that Section 318.19 explicitly excludes the protective provisions of Section 318.14, meaning admissions in mandatory hearing cases are not protected from evidence use
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDebra Mackey was injured in a traffic incident involving Rosann Wheeler. Wheeler was cited for a traffic infraction and, because the incident caused p…
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SMITH, Judge.
Debra Mackey, a minor, and her father appeal from a judgment in this personal injury case awarding each $2,500 on their claims against Wheeler and her insurer. By a special verdict the jury found each claimant damaged to the extent of $5,000, but reduced the amount of their recovery by half due to Debra’s own negligence. The Mackeys complain principally of the trial court’s exclusion from evidence, when offered by the Mackeys, of Wheeler’s admission of guilt of a traffic infraction in the incident.
Because the traffic incident caused personal injury to Debra, Wheeler was required by Section 318.19, Florida Statutes (1975) to attend a mandatory hearing on her traffic citation. She there pleaded guilty to or admitted the truth of the traffic charge. The trial court, excluding evidence of her admission, gave her the benefit of Section 318.14, which provides that a person not required to attend a mandatory hearing may respond to a traffic citation by paying the civil penalty by mail or in person within 10 days or by forfeiting any bond posted to secure appearance. Section 318.-14 further provides:
“If the person cited follows either of the above procedures, he shall be deemed to have admitted the infraction and to have waived his right to a hearing on the issue of commission of the infraction. Such admission shall not be used as evidence in any other proceedings.”
The trial court erred in excluding Wheeler’s admission. Section 318.19, prescribing procedures for the disposition of traffic citations requiring a mandatory hearing, states:
“Any person cited for the infractions listed in this section shall not have the provisions of § 318.14(2) and (4) available to him but must appear . . .”
The legislature evidently considered different treatment of more serious traffic offenses is appropriate. We need not specu late on whether the policy of excluding admissions of guilt under the provisions of Section 318.14(2) and (4) should reasonably be applied also in the case of more serious offenses handled under Section 318.19, for the legislature has clearly stated that the policy should not be so applied.
While we consider the trial court erred, the error was harmless in this case. The proffered admission went simply to the question of whether Wheeler was negligent, which the jury’s verdict found favorably to appellants. The admission did not, as contended by the Mackeys, bear on the question of Wheeler’s degree of fault contributing to the injury. Conceding that Florida’s comparative negligence doctrine makes the question more difficult, we conceive that, to warrant reversal, a successful plaintiff must show a clear relationship between the evidence erroneously excluded and the amount of plaintiff’s verdict. In this case that showing was not made. The favorable verdict rendered the error harmless to appellants. See Kuharske v. Lake County Citrus Sales, Inc., 61 So. 2d 495 (Fla.1952); Evans v. Kloeppel, 72 Fla. 267, 73 So. 180 (1916).
AFFIRMED.
RAWLS, Acting C. J., and ERVIN, J., concur.
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MacNEIL v. Singer, 389 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…en she was allowed out of the hospital . . . Earlier MacNeil filed a motion in limine to exclude the guilty plea from trial, but neither the motion nor the court’s ruling are part of the record on appeal. . See Mackey v. Reserve Insurance Company, 349 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). . Statements of third persons may also be admissible as “admissions” under circumstances indicating agency, vicarious liability, or privity, which are not involved in this case. .McArthur v. Cook, 99 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1957); Eg…
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Carter v. Musa Tony Rukab & S.C. Ins. Co., 437 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…l. Although under the provisions of Section 318.19(1) Mrs. Carter presumably could have been required to attend a mandatory hearing on her traffic citation, the fact is that she did not appear in court. Compare, Mackey v. Reserve Insurance Company, 349 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Instead, Mrs. Carter mailed in her fine and affidavit, apparently to avoid the hardship of a court appearance in her condition. We can find no basis upon which appellees can insist that although Mrs. Carter, possibly through som…
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Figueredo v. Keller Indus., Inc., 583 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…s truck driver had pled guilty by mail as to a traffic charge in which a personal appearance was required by section 318.19, Florida Statutes (1989). See Boshnack v. World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc., 195 So. 2d 216 (Fla.1967); Mackey v. Reserve Ins. Co., 349 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Even if — which we need not decide — we agreed with the majority rather than Judge Nimmons’s well-reasoned dissent in Carter v. Rukab, 437 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the facts of this case do not invoke the exception to the…
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- Evans v. Kloeppel, 72 Fla. 267 (Fla. 1916)