IMPERIAL POINT COLONNADES CONDOMINIUM, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
FREEDOM PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, MARY MAGDALENE HEUGEL, A SINGLE WOMAN, AND KENNETH EUGENE HEUGEL, APPELLEES
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A condominium association appealed a summary judgment that denied enforcement of a provision requiring a 1% contingency reserve fee upon sale of apartment units. The court reversed, holding that because the sale occurred before a statute limiting transfer fees became effective, the 1% assessment was lawful and enforceable under the Declaration of Condominium.
The court held that the 1% assessment was lawful and enforceable because the sale became effective on September 6, 1974, before the limiting statute took effect on October 1, 1974, and Florida law presumes statutes operate prospectively unless clear legislative intent for retroactive application is expressed.
[1] A statute operates prospectively unless the intent that it operate retrospectively is clearly expressed.
[2] A condominium association may enforce a provision in its Declaration of Condominium requiring written approval for the sale of a unit, including a fee, if the sale occurr…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A statute is not operative as law until the date at which it takes effect...and it operates prospectively unless the intent that it operate retrospectively is clearly expressed.”
Establishes the fundamental rule that statutes apply prospectively unless legislative intent for retroactive application is clear.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceImperial Point Colonnades Condominium's Declaration of Condominium, recorded in 1965, required apartment owners to obtain written approval before sell…
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KANEY, FRANK N., Associate Judge.
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment denying Appellant, who was the Plaintiff below, all the relief it sought. The appellant is a condominium association vested with the authority and responsibility for the administration of the condominium including the enforcement of the Declaration of Condominium.
Article XII, Section G of the Declaration of Condominium speaks to the conveyance of apartment units. This section required that an apartment owner obtain written approval from Appellant for the sale of the apartment unit. This was to be accomplished by notifying Appellant of the sale and its terms, submission of the prospective purchaser to an interview with Appellant, and paying an investigation or transfer fee for credit information. Section G(5) of Article XII assesses a sum equal to 1 per cent of the agreed purchase price which must be paid into a Contingency Reserve Fund, pri-or to the Appellant approving the sale of any apartment unit.
This Declaration of Condominium was recorded in the Broward County public records in 1965.
On September 6, 1974, the Appellees, Heugel, transferred their apartment in Imperial Point to the Appellee, Freedom Properties International. No effort was made by any of the Appellees to comply with Section G of Article XII of the Declaration of Condominium.
On October 1, 1974, some twenty-four days after the sale by Appellees, Florida Statute Section 711.08(2) became effective. This statute provided that no fee shall be charged in connection with a transfer or approval in excess of the expenditures reasonably required for credit report expenses and this charge could not exceed $50.00. Prior to this statute, there was no limitation on expenses or fees that could be charged.
It was not until March of 1975, that Appellant discovered the Appellees’ transfer of property. After failing to secure voluntary compliance with Article XII, Section G, Appellant filed suit seeking either compliance or voidanee of the transfer. At the joint motion for Summary Judgment the trial court ordered Appellee to comply with the requirements of Subsection G except the payment of the 1 per cent fee to the Contingency Reserve Fund. The Circuit Court found that this was a transfer fee in excess of $50.00 and thus barred by F.S.A., Section 711.08(2). We disagree and reverse.
Because of our determination on other grounds, we do not address the question of whether this is a transfer fee or not.
The sale by the Heugels to Freedom Properties International took place and became effective twenty-four days before there was any law in Florida limiting transfer fees or other approval expenses. The fact that Appellees concealed the sale for some six months does not alter the fact that the 1 per cent assessment became due on September 6, 1974.
A statute is not operative as law until the date at which it takes effect. Neisel v. Moran, 80 Fla. 98, 85 So. 346 (Fla.1919), and it operates prospectively unless the intent that it operate retrospectively is clearly expressed. Springer v. Colburn, 162 So. 2d 513 (Fla.1964).
There is no clear intent that F.S.A., Section 711.08(2) operates retrospectively and thus Section G(5), Article XII, of the Declaration of Condominium was a lawful and enforceable provision on September 6,1974.
There is another matter which needs to be addressed by this Court. Appellees did not favor this Court with a brief and of course did not participate in oral argument. Such conduct is a distinct disservice not only to this Court but also to the trial court which ruled in their favor. This is a practice which should be soundly condemned by the Bar. This cause is reversed with instructions to enter an order requiring compliance with Section G(5), Article XII, of the Declaration of Condominium for voidanee of the transfer. REVERSED, with directions. MAGER, J., concurs.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs in conclusion only.
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Lewis OIL Co., Inc. v. Alachua Cnty., 496 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…nding final decision on the county’s administrative petition. It is elementary that a statute or ordinance is not operative as law until the date at which it takes effect. Imperial Point Colonnades Condominium, Inc. v. Freedom Properties Inti, Inc., 349 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). The effective date of a duly enacted statute or ordinance may be made contingent upon the occurrence of stated conditions in the future, but in that event the statute or ordinance does not become effective until such conditions h…
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Hahn v. Hahn, 42 So. 3d 945 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…A statute is not operative as law until the date at which it takes effect[,] and it operates prospectively unless the intent that it operate retrospectively is clearly expressed.” Imperial Point Colonnades Condo., Inc. v. Freedom Props. Int’l, Inc., 349 So. 2d 1194, 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (citations omitted); see also Horn v. Florida Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Abel, 752 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (“ ‘This rule applies with particular force to those instances where retrospective operation of the law wou…
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Katy Bachman v. McLINN, 65 So. 3d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…rative as law until the date at which it takes effect [,] and it operates prospectively unless the intent that it operate retrospectively is clearly expressed.” Id. at 947 (quoting Imperial Point Colonnades Condo., Inc. v. Freedom Props. Int'l Inc., 349 So. 2d 1194, 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)). This is particularly true because there are instances where retrospective operation of the law would act to impair or destroy existing rights. Id. (citing Horn v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Abel, 752 So. 2d 687, 688 (F…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Neisel v. Moran, 80 Fla. 98 (Fla. 1919)
- Springer v. Sherwood Colburn, 162 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1964)