DOROTHY B. BROWN, NOW DOROTHY B. BOCK, APPELLANT,
v.
ERNEST C. BROWN, APPELLEE
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In this Florida divorce modification case, the Supreme Court affirmed a Chancellor's order reducing child support from $400 to $100 per month after the former wife remarried. The court held that while a father's financial ability is a substantial factor in setting child support, it is not the sole consideration; the actual needs of the child and his station in life must also be weighed.
The court affirmed the modification, holding that while the father's financial ability is a substantial factor, it is not the sole element in fixing child support. The court must also consider the child's actual needs, the advisability of spending beyond a certain amount, and the child's general living conditions and station in life. The Chancellor did not abuse his discretion, and the mother may seek modification in the future if the amount proves inadequate when properly applied.
“While the father's financial ability is undoubtedly a substantial factor, there are other elements, such as, the actual needs of the child, the advisability of spending more than a certain amount in the maintenance of the Child, the general living conditions available to the child and his station in life.”
Establishes that child support is determined by multiple factors, not solely parental income
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties divorced in August 1947, with the decree requiring the father (Brown) to pay $400 monthly for alimony and maintenance of their minor son. …
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THORNAL, Justice.
Appellant, who was defendant below, seeks reversal of an order of the Chancellor modifying the provisions* of a divorce decree with reference to a maintenance allowance for the minor son of the parties.
By decree of divorce entered August 4, 1947, appellee Brown was granted a divorce from appellant Bock with a provision in the decree directing Brown to pay to Mrs. Bock, then Mrs. Brown, the sum of $400 per month as permanent alimony and for the maintenance of the minor son of the parties. In July, 1949, the former Mrs. Brown remarried and became Mrs. Bock. By agreement between the parties, alimony and child maintenance payments were reduced to $300 per month. There were various subsequent reductions, either by agreement or by appellee Brown on his own initiative, until October, 1953, when he filed a petition to modify the original decree alleging the remarriage of his former wife as the sole ground for modification.
After hearing the testimony, the Chancellor decided that the decree should be modified and he eliminated the alimony-provisions and required that Brown pay to his former wife the sum of $100 per month for the maintenance of their 13-year old son. Mrs. Bock appeals contending that she needs $300 per month to take care of the child, and that the amount allowed by the Chancellor is not sufficient in view of the fact that the child’s father has an approximate income before taxes estimated to be $17,000 to $20,000 per year. The record in no place contains an itemization of the needs of the child.
Appellant seeks reversal primarily, if not entirely, on the proposition that the father can afford to pay more than the Court allowed for the maintenance of the boy and that he should, therefore, be required to do so. We do not feel that this is the sole element to be considered in fixing the amount that a father should pay to a divorced wife for the support of a minor child in the custody of the mother. While the father’s financial ability is undoubtedly a substantial factor, there are other elements, such as, the actual needs of the child, the advisability of spending more than a certain amount in the maintenance of the Child, the general living conditions available to the child and his station in life.
When all of the related factors are considered on the basis of the record now before us, we cannot conclude that the Chancellor abused the discretion accorded to him in entering the order from which the appeal was taken. If it should develop that the amount allowed by the Chancellor when properly handled by the mother is inadequate to support the minor in a fashion to which he has been accustomed in the light of his father’s ability to make provision for him, then a showing can be made accordingly and the Chancellor, after hearing the facts to be presented, may modify his decree in a fashion that will recognize the welfare and best interest of the minor. The decree appealed from is affirmed.
DREW, C. J., and THOMAS and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
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Steinhauer v. Lossie S. Steinhauer, 252 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)…n a living, the needs of the wife and the children and the husband’s capacity to meet such needs are all relevant material factors in determining the wife’s need for alimony. McGarry v. McGarry, Fla.App.1971, 247 So. 2d 13; Brown v. Brown, Fla.1965, 84 So. 2d 311; Platt v. Platt, Fla.App. 1958, 103 So. 2d 253; see also 10 Fla.Jur., Divorce, pp. 569-571. In the case sub judice, the court specifically found that the wife’s income and assets presently exceeded those of the husband. It would appear therefore tha…
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Platt v. Platt, 103 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958)…as is claimed by appellant. For the foregoing reasons the decree appealed from must be and the same is hereby affirmed. STURGIS, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD K., J., concur. . Bredin v. Bredin, Fla.1956, 89 So. 2d 353. . Brown v. Brown, Fla.1956, 84 So. 2d 311; Yandell v. Yandell, Fla.1949, 39 So. 2d 554; Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 102 Fla. 1123, 137 So. 5. . Chastain v. Chastain, Fla.1954, 73 So. 2d 66.…
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Boyle v. Boyle, 164 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)…which was originally fixed by the chancellor ($35 a week) would appear to be an ample award “to support the minor in a fashion to which he has been accustomed in the light of his father’s ability to make provision for him.” Brown v. Brown, Fla.1956, 84 So. 2d 311; Heckes v. Heckes, 129 Fla. 653, 176 So. 541. If, for some circumstance undisclosed on this record, the needs of the wife were changed prior to December 1962 so as to require an increase in child support, she made no showing of such need or of the…
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