NORMAN KAPLAN, APPELLANT
v.
PETER S. ROTH, APPELLEE
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Peter Roth sued Norman Kaplan for damages from an automobile accident allegedly caused by Kaplan's employee George Mendel. The trial court awarded Roth $7,845 based partly on Mendel's out-of-court admissions of fault made to police. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that such admissions were inadmissible hearsay under established precedent prohibiting use of criminal convictions and accident reports in civil trials.
The out-of-court admissions by Mendel were inadmissible in the civil action. The judgment must be reversed based on Stevens v. Duke and related precedent establishing that admissions regarding criminal convictions and accident reports cannot be used in civil trials, and Section 317.17 of the Florida Statutes forbids use of accident reports as evidence in civil or criminal trials.
“The admissions of Mendel were uncontradicted and were admitted in evidence over the objection of defendant. They were not made in Kaplan's presence and were beyond the scope of the agent's (Mendel's) authority.”
Establishes that the problematic evidence was Mendel's out-of-court admissions made without the defendant's presence and outside the agent's authority.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn automobile accident occurred in which Roth was injured. Mendel, an employee and agent of defendant Kaplan, was the driver of Kaplan's vehicle. Duri…
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TERRELL, Justice.
Appellee instituted this action against appellant to recover damages for personal injuries received in an automobile accident. It is charged that the accident was caused by the negligence of George Mendel, an employee and agent of defendant. The answer denied negligence on the part of defendant or his agent and alleged that the sole proximate cause of the accident and injury was the negligence of the plaintiff. At the trial a verdict and judgment for $7,-‘845-was secured. This appeal is from that judgment.
In the course of an investigation of the accident by police officers, Mendel, the driver of defendant’s automobile, admitted that he was at fault for the accident. Later at a hearing in the police court in Miami Beach, Mendel again admitted responsibility for the accident and pleaded guilty to a charge of reckless driving. Mendel died before this action matured and Kaplan was not present when any of these proceedings took place. The admissions of Mendel were uncontradicted and were admitted in evidence over the objection of defendant. They were not made in Kaplan’s presence and were beyond the scope of the agent’s (Mendel’s) authority.
-To reverse the judgment, appellant relies on Stevens v. Duke, Fla.1949, 42 So. 2d 361, where we approved the rule that a judgment of conviction in a criminal case should not be introduced as evidence in a civil action to establish the truth of the facts on which it was brought. In Moseley v. Ewing, Fla.1955, 79 So. 2d 776, this rule was extended to include any questions which-were directed to defendant during the course of the civil trial relative to his conviction in the criminal case growing out of the accident. See also Myrick v. Lloyd, 158 Fla. 47, 27 So. 2d 615.
The controversy centers around the interpretation of these cases, including Sec. 317.17, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. We are of the view however, that the judgment must be reversed on authority of the cases cited. See also Herbert v. Garner, Fla.1955, 78 So. 2d 727. Section 317.17, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., forbids the use in evidence at any trial, civil or criminal, of reports of an accident made by the person involved to the Department of Public Safety. We cannot escape the conclusion that the doctrine of the cited cases and the cited statute was violated.
It is also contended that the verdict was excessive but since the cause is reversed for other reasons, it becomes unnecessary to discuss this question.
The judgment is, therefore, reversed and a new trial awarded.
Reversed.
DREW, C. J., HOBSON, J., and STANLY, Associate Justice, concur.
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Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Ellsworth, 129 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)…sistently applied this latter statute to exclude from the evidence at a trial statements made by a defendant to an investigating officer. Stevens v. Duke, Fla.1949, 42 So. 2d 361; Herbert v. Garner, Fla.1955, 78 So. 2d 727; Kaplan v. Roth, Fla.1956, 84 So. 2d 559; Ippolito v. Brener, Fla.1956, 89 So. 2d 650. But appellee urges that the second report given to officer Fontana was not an “accident report” within the meaning of the statute. He argues that the statement given to officer Fontana was not for the p…
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Ellsworth v. Nash Miami Motors, Inc., 142 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1962)…lict with a decision of another district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same point of law, and may issue writs of certiorari to commissions established by law.” .Ippolito v. Brener, Fla.1956, 89 So. 2d 650; Kaplan v. Both, Fla.1956, 84 So. 2d 559; Herbert v. Garner, Fla.1955, 78 So. 2d 727; Stevens v. Duke, Fla.1949, 42 So. 2d 361. . See Pinkerton-Hays Dumber Co. v. Pope, Fla.1961, 127 So. 2d 441; McBurnette v. Playground Equipment Corp., Fla.1962, 137 So. 2d 563. . Note 2, supra.…
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Mitchell v. State, 227 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)…officer or officers after the accident, forming the basis for the officer’s report to the Department, sufficiently discharges the statutory duty of the driver under § 317.-131(1) as to the written report required. See also Kaplan v. Roth, Fla. 1956, 84 So. 2d 559 and Ippolito v. Brener, Fla.1956, 89 So. 2d 650. Stevens held that the immunity provided by § 317.171 applies to participants or witnesses to a motor vehicle accident who give information to a “law enforcement officer who in the regular course of h…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Stevens v. Duke, 42 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1949)
- Herbert v. Garner, 78 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1955)
- Moseley v. Ewing, 79 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1955)
- Myrick v. Lloyd, 158 Fla. 47 (Fla. 1946)