HENRY GONSOVOWSKI, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court affirmed the revocation of probation but vacated the prison sentence for a mentally disordered sex offender. It held that the trial court improperly sentenced the appellant to prison before he received mandatory treatment under Chapter 917, Florida Statutes.
Yes, the trial court erred. The statute mandates commitment for treatment before any further proceedings or sentencing can occur after an adjudication as a mentally disordered sex offender.
[1] A trial court lacks authority to sentence a defendant to prison before the defendant receives treatment after being adjudicated a mentally disordered sex offender.
[2] Upon adjudging a person convicted of an offense to be a mentally disordered sex offender, a trial judge must commit the person to the custody of the Department of Offende…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Having determined appellant to be a mentally disordered sex offender, the trial court was without authority to sentence him to prison before he received treatment pursuant to Chapter 917.”
Establishes the core legal error made by the trial court.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was convicted of receiving stolen property and placed on probation. His probation was revoked due to a lewd act with a child. The court then…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant was convicted in 1975 of buying, receiving, or aiding in the concealment of stolen property contrary to Section 811.-16, Florida Statutes (1973), and was placed on three years probation.
In February 1977, the trial court properly revoked appellant’s probation on proof that he committed a lewd and lascivious act in the presence of a child under the age of fourteen years. At that point the trial court, after psychiatric examination and hearing, adjudged appellant to be a mentally disordered sex offender pursuant to Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1975). Appellant was then sentenced to five years in prison with the stipulation that he would be transferred to the Florida State Hospital for treatment and be returned to prison upon completion of such treatment.
Having determined appellant to be a mentally disordered sex offender, the trial court was without authority to sentence him to prison before he received treatment pursuant to Chapter 917.
Under Section 917.19, upon adjudging a person convicted of any offense to be a mentally disordered sex offender, the trial judge is required to commit him to the custody of the Department of Offender Rehabilitation for care, treatment and rehabilitation. Further proceedings against such person are suspended pending his return therefrom. Upon return of such person to the court, under Section 917.20, if the trial court, following another hearing, determines such person has recovered and is not a menace to others, the court shall recommence the proceedings and may then impose any sentence alternative available to the court for the crime for which such person was initially convicted. If, on the other hand, the court concludes such person is in need of further treatment, he must recommit him as provided in Section 917.20.
The procedure outlined above was not followed here.
Accordingly, the judgment revoking probation is affirmed but the sentence is vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and McNULTY and SCHEB, JJ., concur.