C. A. DAVIS, INC., AND THE CITY OF MIAMI, APPELLANTS,
v.
K & R ELECTRIC, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND RAYBRO ELECTRIC SUPPLIES, INC., APPELLEES
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In a contract dispute over electrical wiring installation at City parks, the trial court entered judgment for Raybro Electric after the City of Miami filed an interpleader action. After the City improperly paid the disputed funds to C.A. Davis instead of depositing them in court, the trial court amended its judgment to award Raybro against both Davis and the City, which the appellants challenged on appeal.
The court affirmed the amended judgment, holding that the City had no right to file a unilateral dismissal under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420 after a final judgment had been entered on its interpleader crossclaim, and that Davis was not permitted to introduce evidence of a release on a motion for new trial when the release was known to Davis prior to trial.
[1] A party seeking interpleader must deposit the disputed funds into the court registry to be considered a disinterested stakeholder.
[2] A unilateral notice of dismissal under Rule 1.420 is generally unavailable after a final judgment has been entered on the dismissed claim.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We first doubt whether the City had the right to file a unilateral dismissal under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420, after a final judgment had been entered on its crossclaim for interpleader.”
Establishes that the City's attempt to dismiss after final judgment was improper and raises serious procedural questions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe City of Miami was a party-defendant in a contract dispute involving electrical wiring installation at City parks. The City filed a crossclaim in i…
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PER CURIAM.
In a contract dispute involving the installation of electrical wiring at City parks, the City of Miami was joined as a party-defendant. It filed an answer and cross claim in the nature of interpleader against numerous parties, including Raybro Electric Supplies, Inc. In said crossclaim, the City indicated it was a disinterested party in and to funds in the approximate amount of $18,-000.00; that the cross-defendants made adverse claims to the funds; and that the City stood ready, willing, and able to deposit the money in the registry of the court if the court deemed appropriate. At final hearing the trial court, being under the impression that the money had been deposited, entered a judgment for Raybro in the sum of $4,270.76 from the funds on deposit in the court registry as a result of the interpleader.
However, some time after entry of the order granting interpleader, the City paid the money direct to another cross-defendant, C.
A. Davis, Inc. (who had original contract with the City). Upon this becoming known to Raybro, it filed a motion to compel compliance with the final judgment by the City of Miami; this was met with a unilateral notice of dismissal under Fla.R. Civ.P. 1.420 by the City. Subsequently, Raybro filed a motion to amend the final judgment. Upon hearing, the trial judge amended the final judgment and granted Raybro a judgment against C.
A. Davis, Inc., and the City of Miami, Florida, in the sum of $4,270.76. Davis appealed; this appeal was joined in by the City.
We affirm.
We first doubt whether the City had the right to file a unilateral dismissal under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420, after a final judgment had been entered on its crossclaim for interpleader. In Re Adoption of Sizemore v. State Department of Public Welfare, 231 So. 2d 853 (Fla.2d DCA 1970); Equibank, N. A. v. Penland, 330 So. 2d 739 (Fla.1st DCA 1976); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420(a)(1). Further, at the time the trial court entered the final judgment, there was no dispute but that Raybro had supplied the materials and the judge was correct in entering the original final judgment. Subsequently, Davis attempted to bring into the action a purported release from Raybro to Davis, releasing it and the City’s surety from any claim for materials involved in the contract.
However, this release was not brought to the attention of the trial court timely even if it was applicable (which we do not here find) because it was not tendered to the trial court until the filing of the motion for new trial, and it was readily apparent that the release was known to Davis prior to the entry of the final judgment. Normally, a party will not be permitted to bring in evidence on a motion for new trial, which was known to them at the time of the trial. Vining v. American Bakeries Co., 121 Fla. 116, 163 So. 396 (1935); Deauville Realty Co., Inc. v. Tobin, 111 So. 2d 743 (Fla.3d DCA 1959).
Therefore, for the reasons above stated, the final judgment here under review be and the same is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Eugenia Vining v. Am. Bakeries Co., 121 Fla. 116 (Fla. 1935)
- Food Fair Stores OF Fla., Inc. v. Sommer, 111 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Deauville Realty Co., Inc. v. Tobin, 111 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- In re Adoption of Helen Ramona Sheffield v. State Dep't OF Pub. Welf., 231 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)
- Equibank, N.A. v. S. Perry Penland et ux., 330 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)