FRANK BEGEL, APPELLANT,
v.
IRA HIRSCH, APPELLEE
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Frank Begel appealed an interlocutory order granting a temporary injunction that prohibited him from advertising his bail bond business under his own name in Dade and Broward Counties, and also appealed the denial of his motion for a protective order against an overly broad discovery notice. The appellate court affirmed the injunction but reversed the denial of the protective order, finding the discovery notice sought irrelevant and overly broad documents.
The court affirmed the temporary injunction, finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision. However, the court reversed the denial of the protective order, holding that the discovery notice was improper to the extent it sought irrelevant documents spanning too long a period (1971 forward rather than 1973 onward), covered geographic areas outside Dade and Broward Counties, and was too vague and overbroad in its request for production.
[1] A temporary injunction prohibiting a party from advertising a business name in specific counties is affirmed when no reversible error is found.
[2] A trial court errs in denying a motion for a protective order when a notice to produce seeks irrelevant documents.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court erred in denying Begel's motion for a protective order to the extent that the notice to produce sought production of documents on irrelevant matters.”
Establishes the reversible error—the discovery notice improperly sought irrelevant documents
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFrank Begel sold his bail bond business in Dade and Broward Counties to Ira Hirsch in 1973. Since 1976, Begel began operating a competing bail bond bu…
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ALDERMAN, Chief Judge.
This is an interlocutory appeal by Frank Begel, the defendant in the trial court, from an order granting a temporary injunction which enjoined him from advertising the name “Frank Begel Bail Bonds” in either Dade or Broward Counties. He was allowed to continue writing bail bonds, but was prohibited from advertising in those counties unless he used a fictitious name. He also appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for a protective order against a notice to produce.
We affirm the temporary injunction and reverse the order denying the motion for a protective order. In reference to the temporary injunction, Begel raises eight points on appeal. We have considered each of these and find no reversible error. Begel’s last point, which does not involve the temporary injunction, has merit. The plaintiff, Ira Hirsch, served a notice to produce at deposition which lists, in very broad terms, nineteen categories of items to be produced. The notice recites that the documents sought pertain to the operation of any business by Frank Begel where bonds were written or sold or transacted between 1971 and the present. Some of the items sought are not relevant to the subject matter of this lawsuit, which involves the 1973 sale of Begel’s bond business in Dade and Broward Counties to Hirsch, the operation of a competing business by Begel since 1976, and the alleged injuries caused to Hirsch’s business by Begel.
The trial court erred in denying Begel’s motion for a protective order to the extent that the notice to produce sought production of documents on irrelevant matters. Leonhardt v. Cammack, 327 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Hoogland v. Dollar Land Corporation, Ltd., 330 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). The period from 1971, covered by the notice to produce, is too long. The business was not sold to Hirsch until 1973.
Furthermore, the documents sought pertain to the operation of any business by Begel where bonds were written, sold, or transacted. This would include business outside Dade and Broward Counties. Also, even if the documents sought were limited to Be-gel’s bonding business in Dade and Broward County during the appropriate time period, the notice to produce is too broad and lacks sufficient specificity. To fully comply, Be-gel would have to produce every scrap of paper which was in any way related to his bond business, even if it were not relevant to the subject matter of the lawsuit. The order denying Begel’s motion for protective order is reversed and upon remand the trial court is directed to enter an appropriate protective order consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part.
ANSTEAD and LETTS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Dade Cnty. Med. Ass'n v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
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Graphic Assocs., Inc. v. Riviana Rest. Corp., 461 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…983). Also, by way of framing the issue to be subsequently discussed, we remind that only matters relevant to the subject matter of the litigation are discoverable. Hoogland v. Dollar Land Corp., 330 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Begel v. Hirsch, 350 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 830 (Fla.1978). Additionally, Rule 1.280(b)(1) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure requires that matters sought to be discovered be relevant to the subject matter of the action. We defined relevancy…
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Caribbean Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Sec. Control Sys., Inc., 486 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…ings, plus they are an unwarranted intrusion of the defendant’s business, as well as burdensome.2 Palmer v. Servis, 393 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 5th DCA [*656] 1981); Argonaut Insurance Company v. Peralta, 358 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Begel v. Hirsch, 350 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The purpose of modern discovery is to disclose items that may lead to evidence on the issues as framed by the pleadings. City of Miami v. Fraternal Order of Police, 346 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Reynolds v. Hofmann, 305 So…
Authorities Cited
- Hoogland v. Dollar Land Corp., Ltd., 330 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Leonhardt v. Cammack, 327 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)