DEWEY LIGHTSEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Dewey Lightsey was convicted of grand larceny after a jury trial and sentenced to three years in prison. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial because the state violated criminal procedure rules by failing to disclose a witness's name until trial day, and the trial court failed to inquire whether this violation prejudiced the defendant.
The trial court's failure to conduct an adequate inquiry into whether the defendant was prejudiced by the state's non-disclosure of a witness violated the defendant's right to a fair trial. The non-disclosure was not harmless error because the witness's testimony corroborated a codefendant's testimony, and a codefendant's uncorroborated testimony must be treated with special caution.
[1] A trial court must conduct an adequate inquiry into whether a defendant was harmed or prejudiced by the state's noncompliance with discovery rules before allowing an undi…
[2] The state's failure to disclose a witness's name until the day of trial, despite a defense demand, constitutes a violation of criminal procedure rules.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Despite a defense demand for the names of all witnesses, made pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.220, the state did not disclose the name of Gerald Lewis until the day of the trial. This was a clear violation of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; and so before allowing Lewis to testify, it was the duty of the trial court to make an adequate inquiry to determine whether the appellant was harmed or prejudiced by the state's noncompliance.”
Establishes the trial court's duty to inquire into prejudice when the state violates disclosure rules
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLightsey was charged with grand larceny of an airboat owned by the DeSoto County Sheriff's Department. Despite a defense demand for witness names unde…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Dewey Lightsey, was charged by information with grand larceny of an airboat owned by the DeSoto County Sheriff’s Department. He was tried by a jury and convicted. The trial judge adjudged him guilty and sentenced him to three years in state prison. On this appeal, appellant complains that his case was prejudiced by the state’s failure to disclose the name of one of its witnesses until the day of trial. We agree and reverse for a new trial.
Despite a defense demand for the names of all witnesses, made pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.220, the state did not disclose the name of Gerald Lewis until the day of the trial. This was a clear violation of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; and so before allowing Lewis to testify, it was the duty of the trial court to make an adequate inquiry to determine whether the appellant was harmed or prejudiced by the state’s noncompliance. Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla.1971); Johnson v. State, 312 So. 2d 231 (Fla.2d DCA 1975). The court made no such inquiry. While it did look into the circumstances surrounding the state’s failure to disclose, it did not investigate the effect of that failure upon defendant’s case. Thus, unless the court’s error was harmless, and we do not believe that it was, we must reverse. Johnson v. State, supra.
Gerald Lewis’ testimony was the only testimony which corroborated that of the state’s main witness John Howell who was a codefendant in the case. Consequently although Lewis failed positively to identify the appellant, his testimony was prejudicial to appellant since the uncorroborated testimony of a codefendant is to be treated with special caution by the jury. Dupree v. State, 195 So. 2d 1 (Fla.2d DCA 1967). This was particularly so in this case because there was evidence to show that Howell named appellant as a codefendant only after investigators told him that they believed there were two people involved in the crime and that they were prepared to arrest Howell’s wife if he did not name a second person.
The judgment and sentence are reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.
McNULTY, A. C. J., and GRIMES and OTT, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Baker v. State, 438 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…e defendant in a criminal proceeding was harmed or prejudiced by the state’s noncompliance and that the trial court’s failure to do so requires a reversal unless the error is harmless. See Smith v. State, 372 So. 2d 86 (Fla.1979); Lightsey v. State, 350 So. 2d 824 (Fla.2d [*908] DCA 1977). In my opinion the statements of the trial judge noted in this opinion clearly disclose that an adequate hearing on the issue of prejudice which would permit an undisclosed witness to testify without sanctions was not conduc…
Authorities Cited
- Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971)
- Dupree v. State, 195 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- Johnson v. State, 312 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)