JOE PHILLIPS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Joe Phillips was convicted of involuntary sexual battery based on testimony from a 13-year-old victim. The appellate court reversed because the state improperly introduced evidence of collateral crimes (a pattern of homosexual advances by Phillips toward other minors) solely to prove his propensity to commit such acts, which violates the Williams rule.
The court held that the evidence of collateral crimes was improperly admitted because its singular purpose was to prove the defendant's bad character and propensity to commit homosexual acts. The conviction is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.
[1] Evidence of collateral crimes is inadmissible to prove a defendant's bad character or propensity to commit a homosexual act.
[2] A conviction for involuntary sexual battery may be reversed when the state improperly introduces evidence of collateral crimes to prove the defendant's character.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A review of this record leads us to the inescapable conclusion that the singular purpose of injecting this collateral crime into the trial by the state was to prove the bad character of defendant and his propensity to commit a homosexual act.”
The court's holding that the collateral crime evidence violated the Williams rule by being introduced solely to establish propensity
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePhillips was accused of sexually assaulting a 13-year-old boy who came to his home to retrieve a lost wallet. The victim testified that Phillips forci…
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RAWLS, Judge.
In the name of “Williams”,1 the state adduced evidence of collateral crimes in procuring appellant’s conviction of committing the crime of involuntary sexual battery. We reverse.
The alleged victim2 of the crime testified that he went to the home of appellant to locate a wallet that he had misplaced there earlier in the day. After procuring the wallet, the victim swore that, over his resistance, appellant grabbed him; dragged him throughout the house locking the doors; took him into a bedroom; pulled his pants down; slung him onto a bed; and proceeded to perform fellatio upon him. At the conclusion of the homosexual act, appellant released the victim and permitted him to ride his motorcycle home. Some three hours after he returned home, the victim told his father of the alleged attack. Appellant, in strenuously denying the victim’s testimony, testified that the victim appeared angered when he refused to allow the victim to ride his (appellant’s) motorcycle. At this point, we view a clear case of “one on one” — a classic factual dispute that our system of jurisprudence submits to a jury for resolution.
But the state was not satisfied. Over appellant’s objection, the state proffered testimony of a 15-year old witness, who stated he had voluntarily submitted to appellant’s sexual advances. This witness testified on direct examination that he had known appellant for more than a year; had visited in appellant’s home about 30 times; had a minor male friend, 16 years old, who lived in appellant’s home; and that during the witness’ visits, appellant would show the boys pamphlets that depicted “boys sucking each other off”. This witness further testified that on 10 to 15 occasions appellant grabbed him between the legs, and in response to appellant’s promise to take him on trips and to let him ride appellant’s motorcycle, he. consented to appellant’s advances on two occasions in appellant’s home. Defense counsel restricted his cross examination of this witness upon the two incidents that he testified occurred in appellant’s home and as to the witness’ voluntary consent to engage in the sexual acts. Upon re-direct, in response to the state’s inquiry as to any homosexual advances by appellant without his consent, the witness testified about a trip that he and appellant had taken to Columbus, Georgia; that appellant bought him a lot of beer, got him drunk, and “found him feeling me”.
Squarely in point is this court’s opinion in Banks v. State, 298 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); As stated therein:
“. . .A review of this record leads us to the inescapable conclusion that the singular purpose of injecting this collateral crime into the trial by the state was to prove the bad character of defendant and his propensity to commit a homosexual act.”
The judgment appealed is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
McCORD, C. J., and SMITH, J., concur. . Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1959).
. The victim was 13 years old at the time of the alleged offense.
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Dixon v. State, 430 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…purpose of highlighting the defendant’s bad character. This being in violation of Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959), we reverse on this point as well. See also Phillips v. State, 350 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Harris v. State, 183 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). Because of this disposition, we need not reach the other contentions raised by the defendant. Reversed and remanded for a new trial.…
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Maddry v. State, 585 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…e both directly and by innuendo, the bad character or propensity of the Appellant.” He argues that K.S. had the capacity to consent to sexual activity, so that her testimony was inadmissible where the issue was not consent, citing Phillips v. State, 350 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), and Banks v. State, 298 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. den., State v. Banks, 308 So. 2d 538 (Fla.1975). He distinguishes Cal-loway on its facts, which he asserts bore a much greater similarity to the crime charged, and ar…
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Guthrie v. State, 637 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…tempting to interject it into a trial is to prove the bad character of a defendant or his propensity to commit a homosexual act. Banks v. State, 298 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert, denied, 308 So. 2d 538 (Fla.1975). See also Phillips v. State, 350 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). In this case, however, the appellant was not charged with any homosexual act and the evidence was relevant to establish motive. Furthermore, if evidence is admissible for a particular purpose,, the fact that it would be otherwis…
Authorities Cited
- Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959)
- Howard Banks v. State, 298 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)