DIAMANTE URGA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed Urga's conviction for abortion, holding that the trial court erred in striking defense counsel's impeachment testimony based on a prior witness interview transcript. The court upheld counsel's right to use such documents for impeachment without surrendering them to opposing counsel, distinguishing this case from situations involving confessions or declarations against interest.
The trial court committed reversible error in striking the testimony. Defense counsel has the right to use transcripts or memoranda of prior witness interviews for purposes of framing impeachment questions without producing the document to opposing counsel, provided the statements are not confessions or declarations against interest requiring safeguards.
“The propriety of referring to such document in framing questions for the purpose of impeachment, and counsel's right to refuse to surrender same to his adversary for use in redirect examination, has been settled and determined by a prior adjudication of this Court”
Establishes that the court had already ruled on counsel's right to use transcripts without surrendering them in a prior contempt case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceUrga was convicted of abortion following a jury trial. During cross-examination of the chief prosecuting witness, Urga's counsel attempted to use a tr…
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O’CONNELL, Justice.
The appellant contends, upon this appeal from a verdict and judgment of conviction for the crime of abortion, that the court below committed reversible error in striking certain testimony elicited by her counsel from the chief prosecuting witness with the aid of a transcript of a previous interview by counsel with such witness. The propriety of referring to such document in framing questions for the purpose of impeachment, and counsel’s right to refuse to surrender same to his adversary for use in redirect examination, has been settled and determined by a prior adjudication of this Court in an appeal from a contempt order against defense counsel in this cause. Whitaker v. Blackburn, Fla., 74 So. 2d 794.
In view of the latter ruling, and the conceded fact that the testimony stricken had a direct bearing upon the credibility of the witness and upon appellant’s defense in general, it would appear that the action of the court below was highly prejudicial, requiring reversal of the judgment and sentence against appellant, and that the cause be remanded for a new trial. The argument by the State, addressed to the soundness of the decision in the above cited case of Whitaker v. Blackburn, and its alleged conflict with the conclusion of the Court in Williams v. State, Fla., 74 So. 2d 797, released simultaneously, is not well taken. The opinion in the latter case shows clearly that the ruling, to the-'effect that the document there in question must be produced upon demand for inspection by opposing counsel, was expressly predicated on the nature of the particular extrajudicial statement involved as a declaration against in terest governed by the rules applicable to confessions, and the fact that if such'statements could be so used “the safeguards which have been built around the process of introducing extrajudicial.confessions in evidence could be circumvented by their purported use solely for impeachment.” Williams v. State, supra, 74 So. 2d at page 800. No such circumstance requires that the transcript of memoranda in this case, used only by counsel in framing inquiries' or cross, should be classed separately from any notes of counsel which may be made and kept privately in preparing for and conducting a' trial, under the rule adopted in the Whitaker case.
In1 view of the conclusion which we have reached on the first question it is unnecessary to consider the other question raised.
For the reasons above stated, this cause is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
DREW, C. J., and THOMAS and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Emmett Reeder v. Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc., 338 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)…ble it still must be shown that there was prejudicial error committed in not allowing H. T. Smith to testify for appellants. To be prejudicial, the error must violate a basic right, such as the introduction of material evidence, Urga v. State, Fla., 85 So. 2d 629 (1956). Smith’s proffered testimony was cumulative in nature and was no more important as rebuttal than the testimony of appellants prior witnesses, see Machin v. State, 213 So. 2d 499 (1968). Even so, the [*275] right to call a rebuttal witness sh…
Authorities Cited
- Williams v. State, 74 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1954)
- Whitaker v. Blackburn, 74 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1954)