PATRICK L. ANDRESS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Patrick Andress was convicted of marijuana possession and given probation without adjudication of guilt. The appellate court reversed and remanded because the trial court erroneously shifted the burden of proving a warrantless search was invalid to the defendant, and because the trial court denied a proper jury instruction on the defendant's knowledge that the material was marijuana.
Once a defendant makes a prima facie showing of a warrantless search, the burden shifts to the State to justify the search. A jury instruction on scienter must inform the jury that the defendant must have known the material was marijuana, but need not require proof that the defendant knew the specific weight of the contraband.
[1] Once a defendant makes a prima facie showing of a warrantless search, the burden of sustaining the search shifts to the State.
[2] A court may take judicial notice of the absence of a warrant in its file.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it was held the burden of sustaining the search shifted to the State once the defendant presented a prima facie showing of a warrantless search”
Establishes the proper legal standard for burden of proof on suppression motions, citing State v. Hinton
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAndress was charged with possession of marijuana in excess of five grams. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence based on an alleged warrantl…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Possession Of Marijuana cases and more on FLexlaw
NEWELL, EMERY J., Associate Judge.
Defendant was charged in a one count information with possession of marijuana in excess of five (5) grams. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress tangible evidence which was denied by the trial judge. The case proceeded to trial by jury, culminating in a guilty verdict. Subsequently, and after post-trial motions were denied, the Court entered its order withholding adjudication of guilt and placing defendant on probation for four years.
At the pre-trial hearing on the motion to suppress evidence, the defendant alleged a warrantless search and contended that this was sufficient to place the burden of producing evidence to justify that search upon the State. The trial court rejected this argument stating it was the defendant’s motion and his obligation to proceed. No evidence was presented by the State or the defendant at this motion hearing.
This specific question was considered in State v. Hinton, 305 So. 2d 804 (Fla.4th DCA 1975), wherein it was held the burden of sustaining the search shifted to the State once the defendant presented a prima facie showing of a warrantless search. See, too, Bicking v. State, 293 So. 2d 385 (Fla.1st DCA 1974), and Mann v. State, 292 So. 2d 432 (Fla.2d DCA 1974). The Hinton case further held it was not necessary for defendant to introduce testimonial or documentary evidence with respect to the nonexistence of a warrant in the court file— that the court is able to take judicial notice of this fact. It was, therefore, a mistake for the trial court to rule that the defendant had the burden of proving that the warrantless search was invalid. Because of this mistake, the trial court should, upon remand, hold another hearing on the motion to suppress. Mann v. State, supra.
Defendant further alleges error on the part of the trial judge in denying his requested jury instruction on scienter or knowledge. The denied instruction was:
“That he knew he had possession of cannabis; that he knew the material he possessed was cannabis, and that he knew the cannabis was in excess of five grams by weight.”
We agree defendant was entitled to an instruction that an essential element of the offense was knowledge by the defendant that the material he possessed was marijuana. See Cohen v. State, 125 So. 2d 560 (Fla.1960); Hilding v. State, 291 So. 2d 111 (Fla.4th DCA 1974); Rutskin v. State, 260 So. 2d 525 (Fla.1st DCA 1972) and Schaufele v. State, 269 So. 2d 400 (Fla.4th DCA 1972). Though Cohen involved the sale of obscene material, it was held that the defendant must have had knowledge of the obscene character of the periodical.
We are not persuaded, however, that a proper instruction on scienter should include knowledge of the weight of the contraband marijuana. Appellant does not argue this specific point in his brief nor does he offer any citations. We believe an analogy may be drawn between the value of property in larceny cases (of which there are many reported) and the weight of marijuana. Clearly the State must prove the value of stolen property to be $100.00 or more in order to sustain a verdict of grand larceny; but we are aware of no authority for the proposition that the defendant must know the value of the stolen goods at the time of taking. Is there any more reason that it must be shown he knows the weight of marijuana possessed? We think not and conclude that the jury instruction was too broad as requested and should have been given only with respect to defendant’s knowledge of the material possessed.
Accordingly, the order under review is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
CROSS and DOWNEY, JJ., concur.
PER CURIAM.
On May 20,1977, we published an opinion reversing the judgment and sentence of the trial court upon the ground that the wrong burden of proof had been applied during a suppression hearing. However, the opinion went on to point out that the trial court should have instructed the jury that in order to convict a person of possession of cannabis it was necessary for the state to prove the defendant knew the substance was, in fact, cannabis.
Upon Petition for Rehearing the State has convinced us that we should withdraw that part of our opinion having to do with knowledge that the substance possessed was cannabis. On the record presented to us we conclude that appellant’s second point on appeal fails to demonstrate error. Accordingly, the Petition for Rehearing is granted. This court’s opinion of May 20, 1977, is modified so as to eliminate therefrom that part of the opinion beginning on page 350 with the fourth full paragraph and continuing through the end of the opinion on page 351.
We also believe the proper disposition of the case is to reverse the judgment and sentence appealed from and remand the cause for a new suppression hearing and a new trial. Land v. State, 293 So. 2d 704 (Fla.1974).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
CROSS and DOWNEY, JJ., and NEW-ELL, EMERY, J., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Setzler, 667 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…sa-Ruiz, 559 So. 2d 1180, 1181 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 574 So. 2d 143 (1990); Morales v. State, 407 So. 2d 321, 325 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Black v. State, 383 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 392 So. 2d 1371 (Fla.1980); Andress v. State, 351 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Pineda v. State, No. 92-06-AP (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. March 19, 1993). The defense has the burden to prove standing, where standing is at issue. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969); Jones v. S…
-
Zeinida Morales v. State, 407 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…fts to the state to establish that an exception to the search warrant requirement was applicable in the subject case and that the search and seizure was, in fact, a reasonable one. Raffield v. State, 351 So. 2d 945, 947 (Fla.1977); Andress v. State, 351 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); State v. Hinton, 305 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Bicking v. State, 293 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); State v. Lyons, 293 So. 2d 391, 393 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Mann v. State, 292 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). A Ordinarily,…
-
Miles v. State, 953 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…ake an initial showing that the search was invalid. When that prima facie showing is made, however, the burden shifts to the state to prove that the search is valid. Black v. State, 383 So. 2d 295, 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). See also Andress v. State, 351 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Palmer v. State, 753 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); State v. Setzler, 667 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). In Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 3, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995), the court recognized that the exclusionary rul…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Hinton, 305 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Land v. State, 293 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1974)
- Sol I. Cohen v. State, 125 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1960)
- Bicking v. State, 293 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Rutskin v. State, 260 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- Mann v. State, 292 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Schaufele v. State, 269 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- Hilding v. State, 291 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)