KEITH F. ISAACS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Keith Isaacs appeals his probation sentence, arguing that a seven-year probationary period exceeded the statutory maximum of five years for third-degree felony breaking and entering. The court modified the sentence to reduce the probation term to five years while affirming all other conditions imposed.
The court held that the seven-year probationary period exceeded the statutory maximum of five years for a third-degree felony and therefore modified the sentence. The court affirmed all other probation conditions, finding them to be reasonable and authorized.
[1] The maximum probationary period for a third-degree felony is five years.
[2] Conditions of probation requiring no contact with specific individuals are permissible.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Since the offense to which appellant entered his negotiated plea was a third degree felony breaking and entering, the maximum probationary period allowable by law is five years.”
Establishes that the trial court violated statutory limits by imposing seven years probation for a third-degree felony
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Keith Isaacs entered a negotiated plea to third-degree felony breaking and entering. The trial court imposed a seven-year probationary sente…
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DOWNEY, Judge.
Only one of the three points appellant poses for our consideration has merit. In that point appellant contends that the order, under review, which placed him on probation for a period of seven years, is not authorized by law. Since the offense to which appellant entered his negotiated plea was a third degree felony breaking and entering, the maximum probationary period allowable by law is five years. See, e. g., Holmes v. State, 343 So. 2d 632 (Fla.4th DCA 1977).
Although it has no merit, the point which concerns several conditions of probation imposed by the trial court warrants discussion. Appellant contends that the following conditions are unreasonable: a) appellant must have no contact with Bruce Arnold, Michael Smith, Billy Arnold, or Howard Isaacs (appellant’s brother); b) the court retains custody over the person of the appellant and authorizes any probation supervisor and any law enforcement officer to search, at any time, the appellant and all vehicles and premises concerning which he has legal standing to give consent to the search; and c) appellant must submit to physical or chemical examinations upon the request of any probation supervisor or law enforcement officer to determine systemic presence of controlled substances or unlawfully acquired drugs. We reject appellant’s contention and approve those conditions of probation. Steve v. Heath, 343 So. 2d 13 (Fla.1977); Pace v. State, 350 So. 2d 1075 (Fla.4th DCA 1977), Case No. 76-2010.
For the foregoing reasons the order under review is modified to reflect a probationary period of five years; in all other respects it is affirmed.
AFFIRMED as modified.
LETTS, J., concurs.
DAUKSCH, J., dissents, with opinion.
DAUKSCH, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
As I predicted in Pace v. State, 350 So. 2d 1075 (Fla.4th DCA, Case No. 76-2210, Opinion filed June 24, 1977, see also dissent upon denial of rehearing, Opinion filed October 11, 1977), a very insidious, to me, trend was developing. Under Pace, supra, the probationer was required to submit to search, with or without probable cause or even suspicion, by any law enforcement officer at any time.
Now the standard is that the probationer must submit himself or herself to physical or chemical examination at anytime by any law enforcement officer. I feel it unnecessary to reiterate but reaffirm my convictions stated in Pace, supra.
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Grubbs v. State, 373 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1979)…Supervisor and any law enforcement officer to search, at any time, the probationer and all vehicles and premises concerning which he has legal standing to give consent to search.” The district court held the condition proper, citing Isaacs v. State, 351 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), and Pace v. State, 350 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The question of the validity of warrant-less searches of a probationer’s person or place of residence has produced varying views in state and federal jurisdictions. Clearl…
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Isaacs v. State, 373 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1979)…PER CURIAM. This is a petition for writ of certiorari from the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reported at 351 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). We issued the writ and have- heard argument of the parties. The case was initially consolidated with Pace v. State, 350 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Sanders v. State, 351 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Keller v. State, 351…
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Grubbs v. State, 362 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…dition of his probation which requires that he consent to a search of himself or any vehicle or premises under his control, at any time, by [*397] any law enforcement officer. We have previously held that such a condition is lawful. Isaacs v. State, 351 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Pace v. State, 350 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). However, we feel this question is of great public interest and accordingly the following question is hereby certified to the Supreme Court: Is a condition of probation requiri…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Heath, 343 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1977)
- Holmes v. State, 343 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Pace v. State, 350 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)