FRANCES L. LINDQUIST, APPELLANT,
v.
ELMER W. LINDQUIST, APPELLEE
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The court held that the husband's use of separate funds to purchase property titled in both names creates a presumption of a gift to the wife, which was not rebutted in this case.
The husband used his separate funds to purchase a mobile home and titled it in both his and his wife's names shortly after their marriage. The parties…
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GRIMES, Acting Chief Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment of dissolution. The only point which merits discussion concerns the disposition of a mobile home.
The parties were married on January 11, 1975. Shortly thereafter, the husband used $6,000 of his own funds to purchase a mobile home and caused it to be titled in the names of himself and his wife. The parties separated several months later, and a suit for dissolution was filed on September 8, 1975. In the final judgment the court awarded the mobile home to the husband.
This court recently held that where a wife’s separate funds were used to purchase property held as tenants by the entirety subsequent to the adoption of Florida’s 1968 Constitution but before the Supreme Court’s opinion in Ball v. Ball, 385 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1976), there existed a presumption that a gift had been made.1 While there has been a split of authority in the case of a wife’s separate funds,2 until the Supreme Court rendered its Ball opinion the use of a husband’s separate funds to acquire property held as tenants by the entirety has always resulted in the presumption of a gift.3
This suit was filed prior to the date of the Ball opinion. Therefore, since the record is totally devoid of any evidence to rebut the presumption of a gift, the judgment must be reversed insofar as it deprives the wife of her one-half interest in the mobile home. See Section 689.15, Florida Statutes (1975). Otherwise, the judgment is affirmed.
RYDER, J., and McNULTY, JOSEPH P. (Ret.), Associate Judge, concur. . Powell v. Powell, 349 So. 2d 841 (Fla.2d DCA 1977).
. Compare Davis v. Davis, 282 So. 2d 655 (Fla.4th DCA 1973), with Hegel v. Hegel, 248 So. 2d 212 (Fla.3d DCA 1971).
. Powell v. Metz, 55 So. 2d 915 (Fla.1952); Strauss v. Strauss, 148 Fla. 23, 3 So. 2d 727 (1941); Anderson v. Anderson, 153 So. 2d 24 (Fla.3d DCA 1963).
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Deortha A. Moore v. Moore, 401 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…Wright, 388 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Marsh v. Marsh, 399 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (Cowart, J., dissenting). . Atkins v. Atkins, 326 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). . Lieber v. Lieber, 40 So. 2d 111 (Fla.1949); Lindquist v. Lindquist, 351 So. 2d 391 (Fla.2d DCA 1977); Maryea v. Maryea, 320 So. 2d 882 (Fla.2d DCA 1975).…
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Sudholt v. Sudholt, 389 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…We conclude that the trial court was correct and affirm the denial of the special equity. The wife contends that in view of Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1976), Merrill v. Merrill, 357 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), and Lindquist v. Lindquist, 351 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), the denial of the special equity “does not comport with Florida law nor with logic and reason.” (Brief for Appellant at 7.) We believe that appellant seeks to extend Ball even further than the supreme court intended.1 In Ball, th…
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Lorita J. Hagin v. Hagin, 353 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)…of the husband and wife, creating an estate by the entireties, it has long been presumed that a gift to the wife is intended as to her undivided half interest therein. See Strauss v. Strauss, 148 Fla. 23, 3 So. 2d 727 (1941); Lindquist v. Lindquist, 351 So. 2d 391 (Fla.2d DCA, filed November 4, 1977). Upon dissolution of marriage, the former spouses automatically become tenants in common as to this personalty by operation of Section 689.15, Florida Statutes (1975). See Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fl…
Authorities Cited
- Strauss v. Strauss, 148 Fla. 23 (Fla. 1941)
- Powell v. Metz, 55 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1952)
- Anderson v. Anderson, 153 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)
- Hegel v. Hegel, 248 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Davis v. Elanine A. Davis, 282 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)
- Curry A. Powell v. Powell, 349 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- Sol W. Meyerson v. Texsol, Inc., 385 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)