DENNIS R. NEVELS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Dennis Nevels was convicted of second-degree murder and appealed, arguing improper prosecutorial remarks and constitutional error in the admission of testimony that he invoked his Miranda rights. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding both errors harmless in light of Nevels' voluntary admission to his girlfriend that he committed the killing.
Although both errors occurred, neither constituted reversible error. The trial judge's prompt admonition rendered the prosecutorial error harmless, and the constitutional error in admitting testimony of invocation of Miranda rights was rendered harmless by the defendant's voluntary subsequent statement to his girlfriend. The overwhelming evidence of guilt left no reasonable possibility that either error contributed to the conviction.
[1] Improper remarks by a prosecutor during opening statements concerning the victim's family are rendered harmless by a prompt admonition and charge to the jury by the trial…
[2] It is unconstitutional error for the state to present testimony that a defendant invoked their Miranda rights and refused to answer questions.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is error of unconstitutional proportion for the state to present testimony that, when the defendant had been advised of his Miranda rights, he claimed the benefit of such rights and refused to answer questions, or to make a statement.”
Establishes the constitutional violation but also introduces the harmless error analysis that ultimately saves the conviction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceNevels was charged with second-degree murder. After being advised of his Miranda rights, he declined to make a statement to a police captain. However,…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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MELVIN, Judge.
Appellant-defendant seeks reversal of a judgment and sentence imposed upon him for the crime of murder in the second degree.
Appellant urges reversible error for: 1) alleged improper remarks by the state attorney, and 2) alleged error that is said to flow from the testimony of a police captain to the effect that when appellant was advised of his Miranda rights and asked if he wished to make a statement, “. . .he told me, no, he didn’t wish to talk to me.” We discuss these in the order presented.
It was error for the state attorney, in his opening remarks, to call the jurors’ attention to the fact that the deceased was married and had a 13-year-old daughter. This error, however, was rendered harmless by the prompt admonition and charge to the jury by the trial judge in sustaining the objection of defense counsel.
It is error of unconstitutional proportion for the state to present testimony that, when the defendant had been advised of his Miranda rights, he claimed the benefit of such rights and refused to answer questions, or to make a statement. See Bennett v. State, 316 So. 2d 41 (Fla.1975); Martin v. State, 334 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); and Shannon v. State, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1976). Under the facts of this case, however, the statement of the officer was rendered harmless by a “blurted out” statement of the defendant to his girlfriend. The record reveals that a few minutes after his interview by the officer, the defendant met his girlfriend in a nearby office and voluntarily stated to her: “I killed the son of a bitch and I would do it again if I had to.” It is our view that defendant’s voluntary statement, unrelated in point of time to his saying to the officer he did not wish to make a statement, rendered any error in the trial court’s ruling to be harmless.
The evidence established overwhelmingly the guilt of the defendant. There is no reasonable possibility that the officer’s statement complained of might have contributed to the conviction, Bennett v. State, supra, at 44.
In State v. Young, 283 So. 2d 58, 60 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973), this Court held:
“In any prosecution there are, of course, two parties involved; the State of Florida as the plaintiff and the person accused of crime as the defendant. They each stand before the Bar of Justice upon level ground. The defendant is entitled to a fair and an impartial trial. By the same token, the State of Florida, representing its citizenry, is likewise entitled to a fair and impartial trial. Neither the State of Florida nor any defendant may, within reason, expect to receive a perfect trial in any tribunal in which mortals preside. In nearly every adversary proceedings, some technical error may be found. Unless error reaches to and affects in a prejudicial manner the rights of a party to a fair and impartial trial, such error is harmless and does not infect the validity of the proceedings.
“One of the stated purposes of those who put together the fabric of the Constitution of the United States was to ‘establish justice ’ and insure ‘domestic tranquility. [Emphasis supplied.] Such noble purposes were not reserved just to those accused of crime. They spread as a mantle of protection for the citizenry in general.”
The appellant having failed to demonstrate reversible error, the judgment and sentence are
AFFIRMED.
McCORD, C. J., and BOYER, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Tsavaris v. Scruggs, 360 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1977)
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Tacoronte v. State, 419 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)….1981); State v. Cumbie, 380 So. 2d 1031 (Fla.1980); Darden v. State, supra; Zamot v. State, 375 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Johnson v. State, 348 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Frierson v. State, supra. As the court explained in Nevels v. State, 351 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977): “In any prosecution there are, of course, two parties involved; the State of Florida as the plaintiff and the person accused of crime as the defendant. They each stand before the Bar of Justice upon level ground. The defen…
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State v. McNEIL, 362 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)…ariably requires reversal. See our opinion in Gillian v. State, Case No. FF-59, opinion filed August 18, 1977, (ruling on petition for rehearing stayed pending the Supreme Court of Florida’s ruling in Clark v. State) 363 So. 2d 331; Nevels v. State, 351 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1 DCA 1977); our opinion in Reynolds v. State, Case No. GG-128, opinion filed January 31, 1978, (mandate stayed pending disposition by Supreme Court in Clark v. State and State v. Bostic, 363 So. 2d 331). This point is now solidified by the Su…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shannon v. State, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976)
- Bennett v. State, 316 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1975)
- Martin v. State, 334 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- State v. Young, 283 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)