MAE HELEN EARNEST, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that the statutory requirement of a three-year minimum sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of certain crimes does not extend to aiders and abettors who do not personally possess the firearm. The court vacated Earnest's sentence because the statute's language does not unequivocally include vicarious possession.
The statute's requirement of a three-year minimum sentence for those 'who had in his possession' a firearm does not clearly encompass vicarious possession. Because the term 'possession' is ambiguous and a criminal statute must be construed strictly in favor of the accused, vicarious possession does not trigger the mandatory minimum sentence.
[1] Criminal statutes must be strictly construed, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the accused.
[2] A statute requiring a minimum jail sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of certain crimes does not apply to an aider and abettor who did not persona…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The statute being a criminal statute, the rule that it must be construed strictly applies. Nothing is to be regarded as included within it that is not within its letter as well as its spirit; nothing that is not clearly and intelligently described in its very words, as well as manifestly intended by the Legislature, is to be considered as included within its terms”
Establishes the strict construction rule applied to the firearm possession statute
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMae Helen Earnest was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to a mandatory three-year minimum sentence under Florida's firearm possession statute. …
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ENGLAND, Justice.
The First District Court of Appeal has certified to us its recent decision1 concerning Florida’s statute requiring a three year minimum jail sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of certain specified crimes,2 indicating that in construing the statute to encompass aiders and abettors who are principals in the first degree to those crimes the court has passed on a question of great public interest.3
Section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1975), prescribes a three year minimum term of imprisonment for any person convicted of robbery (and other enumerated crimes) “who had in his possession” a firearm. Petitioner was sentenced under this provision after a conviction for armed robbery “not predicated on her personal possession of the firearm but rather on her active and knowing aid to him who did possess it”.4 The district court affirmed her sentence on the basis that vicarious possession of a firearm is punishable under Section 775.087(2).
Petitioner’s challenge to her sentence is predicated on an asserted ambiguity in the phrase “in his possession”. She suggests that the phrase may or may not include vicarious possession, and argues that for this precise reason we are obliged to construe the statute strictly — to exclude vicarious possession — in favor of the accused. She basically relies on Section 775.021(1), Florida Statutes (1975),5 and on State v. Wershow, 343 So. 2d 605 (Fla.1977). In Wershow we reiterated the principle expressed in Ex Parte Amos, 93 Fla. 5, 112 So. 289 (1927):
“ ‘The statute being a criminal statute, the rule that it must be construed strictly applies. Nothing is to be regarded as included within it that is not within its letter as well as its spirit; nothing that is not clearly and intelligently described in its very words, as well as manifestly intended by the Legislature, is to be considered as included within its terms i >i 6
We agree that the term “possession” does not clearly encompass vicarious possession,7 and we agree that petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. The Legislature has not unequivocally expressed an intention to require three year minimum sentences for all persons who participate in one of the enumerated criminal adventures.8 Accordingly, petitioner’s sentence is vacated and the case is remanded to the district court with instructions to remand to the trial judge for an appropriate sentence in accordance with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, C. J., SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. KARL, J., dissents.
. Earnest v. State, 342 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
. § 775.087(2), Fla.Stat. (1975).
. We accept jurisdiction pursuant to Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const. .342 So. 2d at 1025.
. § 775.021(1), Fla.Stat. (1975), states:
“The provisions of this code and offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly construed; when the language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the accused.”
. 343 So. 2d at 608.
. Cases which have construed the term “possession” on review of marijuana and other drug possession convictions have no direct bearing on our construction of the term for purposes of this sentencing statute. See, for example, State v. Eckroth, 238 So. 2d 75 (Fla.1970); Arant v. State, 256 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); Frank v. State, 199 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967); Spataro v. State, 179 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965).
.We note that the statute as originally enacted provided a minimum sentence for conviction of certain felonies “involving” a firearm. § 775.-087(2), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1974). That language was changed to “possession” of a firearm at the next session of the Legislature. Ch. 75-298, Laws of Florida.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (57 total)
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Alphonso Alvarez v. State, 358 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1978)…nite to be understood and applied. Cf. State v. Wershow, 343 So. 2d 605 (Fla.1977). When confronted with a vagueness challenge, courts are required to resolve any reasonable doubt concerning the enactment in favor of the defendant. Earnest v. State, 351 So. 2d 957 (Fla.1977); State v. Wershow, above. Moreover, if the net effect of a penal statute is to provide an indefinite term of imprisonment, the law is at odds with Article 1. Section 17 of the Florida Constitution.4 I am unable to square the language of…
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Ferguson v. State, 377 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1979)…he rule that criminal statutes must be strictly construed, nothing not clearly and intelligently described in a statute’s very words, as well as manifestly intended by the legislature, shall be considered included within its terms. Earnest v. State, 351 So. 2d 957 (Fla.1977). Under the state’s expansive reading of section 849.01, an individual would be guilty of a felony for a single instance of allowing his friends to bet one dollar at a ball game they were viewing at his home, as would the individual’s wife…
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Whitehead v. State, 446 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…session of a firearm is insufficient to impose the mandatory three year minimum jail sentence under Section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1981). Brown v. State, 358 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 364 So. 2d 881 (Fla.1978); Earnest v. State, 351 So. 2d 957 (Fla.1977). A finding of actual possession may be based upon circumstantial evidence. Bradley v. State, 413 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Neither the victim, Jerabek, nor any other witness observed appellant in the possession of a firearm after l…
Previewing 3 of 57 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Frank v. State, 199 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967)
- Ex Parte: Ernest Amos, 93 Fla. 5 (Fla. 1927)
- Spataro v. State, 179 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- State v. Wershow, 343 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1977)
- Arant v. State, 256 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- State v. Eckroth, 238 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1970)
- Earnest v. State, 342 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)