ROSE G. ROWELL, APPELLANT,
v.
FRANK E. ALL AND LOIS E. ALL ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1977-11-22
No. FF-235
MILLS, Acting C. J., and ERVIN, J., concur.
352 So. 2d 905 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1977) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Rose Rowell sued remote grantors for breach of a covenant of title warranty after discovering in 1974 that the State of Florida held a highway easement on her property acquired in 1950. The court reversed a dismissal based on the statute of limitations, holding that the limitations period runs from when the grantee discovers the government's undisclosed interest, not from when the covenant was made.


Holding

The statute of limitations for breach of a covenant of warranty covering an undisclosed government interest does not begin to run until the grantee becomes aware of the sovereign's theretofore undisclosed interest, not from the date the covenant was made. Plaintiff's action was therefore timely filed in 1974.


Headnotes

[1] A breach of a covenant of warranty occurs when the government's paramount interest in the property is undisclosed at the time of conveyance.

[2] The statute of limitations for a breach of a covenant of warranty, caused by an undisclosed government interest, begins to run when the grantee becomes aware of that inte…

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Key Quotes

“When the grantor's covenant of warranty is breached by the existence of an undisclosed interest in the government, the grantee may maintain an action on the covenant notwithstanding that the government has not evicted the possessor.”

Establishes that actual eviction by the government is not required for an actionable breach of warranty when the government's interest is undisclosed.

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Facts & Procedural History

Defendants conveyed property by warranty deed to Rowell's grantor in 1964, who conveyed to Rowell in 1965. In 1974, when the State began highway const…

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Opinion of the Court
SMITH, Judge.

SMITH, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals from a final judgment granting defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint because the pleading reveals on its face that the action is barred by the five-year statute of limitations, Section 95.11(2), Florida Statutes (1975). Plaintiff sued defendants, the remote grantors of plaintiff’s Leon County home, for breach of a covenant of title warranty. Defendants conveyed the property by warranty deed in 1964 to plaintiff’s grantor, who conveyed to plaintiff in 1965. In 1974, when the State of Florida began highway construction across plaintiff’s yard, plaintiff discovered that in 1950 the State had acquired a highway easement by quitclaim from an owner still more remote in the chain of title.

The circuit court held that defendants’ breach of warranty occurred in 1964 at the instant of defendants’ conveyance and that the statute of limitations then began to run because the easement, though invisible and undisclosed in fact, was held by the sovereign whose presumed assertion of right is presumed to have constructively evicted the possessor. A legal fiction, useful enough in a proper context, appears here to have overrun its usefulness. When the grantor’s covenant of warranty is breached by the existence of an undisclosed interest in the government, the grantee may maintain an action on the covenant notwithstanding that the government has not evicted the possessor. 7 G. Thompson, Real Property 372 (1962 repl. vol.).

The usual requirement is that the covenantee show his eviction by the holder of the paramount interest. Id., §§ 3196-3200. But the sovereign is said to assert its paramount but undisclosed interest at all times; and the possessor cannot but yield and so is constructively evicted.

Thus actual dispossession by the sovereign is not required before the grantor’s action on the covenant of warranty. See generally 20 Am.Jur.2d Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 59 (1965).

When the government’s paramount interest is visible or disclosed at the time the covenant of warranty is made, the grantee is regarded as having contracted mindfully of that interest, and there is no breach of the grantor’s covenant. Van Ness v. Royal Phosphate Co., 60 Fla. 284, 53 So. 381 (1910).

But where as here the government’s paramount interest is undisclosed until later, there is an actionable breach of the covenant of warranty. Brewster v. Wegman, 199 So. 2d 337 (Fla.2d DCA 1967).

Some courts have held that the fiction which justifies the grantee’s action at the time he discovers the government’s interest, though there is no eviction, requires also that the statute of limitations be held to run from the instant the grantor’s covenant was breached, that is to say, when it was made. Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 913, 942 (1964).

By that reasoning the defendants’ covenant of warranty, running to their grantee and to his assigns, was both made and breached in 1964, and Section 95.11(2) foreclosed plaintiff’s action on it after 1969.

There being no Florida precedent requiring that ruling, we decline to run the statute of limitations against a grantee in possession who is unaware of the sovereign’s undisclosed interest and of his own constructive eviction. Rather, we adopt the view of cases holding that the statute of limitations for such a breach of the covenant of warranty does not begin to run until the grantee becomes aware of the sovereign’s theretofore undisclosed interest. Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 913, 943-45 (1964). The constructive awareness provided the grantee by the recording of an otherwise undisclosed interest does not foreclose his reliance on the grantor’s covenant of warranty. See Brewster, supra.

Plaintiffs action in this case is predicated on the covenant of warranty of her remote grantor, not that of her immediate grantor. We do not consider at this time whether the immediate grantor’s discovery of the sovereign’s easement, before conveying to plaintiff, would start running of the statute of limitations.

REVERSED.

MILLS, Acting C. J., and ERVIN, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. AIR Flow Indus., Inc., 432 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
    …upon them respectively by their express promises and by those which arose by operation of law. Southern Crane Rentals, Inc. v. City of Gainesville, 429 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (“[A] custom cannot prevail over a legal right.”); Rowell v. All, 352 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (grantee may rely on grantor’s warranty notwithstanding constructive awareness of contrary interest); Adams v. Seymour, 191 Va. 372, 61 S.E. 2d 23 (1950) (grantee may rely on express covenant notwithstanding actual notice of encu…
  • …auses of action based on breach of an express warranty begins to run when plaintiff discovers or should have discovered, the breach of the express warranty. See, e. g., Kelly Tractor Co. v. Gurgiolo, 369 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Rowell v. All, 352 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). This indicates that the analysis previously discussed applies and appellee’s failure to disclose the date of the waiver agreement, in response to appellant’s request on April 3, 1974, for complete information on the loan and th…

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