ANNIE EISEN AND ISAAC EISEN, HER HUSBAND, APPELLANTS,
v.
SPORTOGS, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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The Florida Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for a corporation in a negligence action brought by a wife injured in the corporation's store. The court held that the wife was a licensee or gratuitous visitor, not a business invitee, and therefore the defendant owed her a lower duty of care.
The court held that the wife was a licensee or gratuitous visitor, not a business invitee. She was not expressly or impliedly invited by the corporation or its proprietor (her son); she went on her own account as an accommodation to her husband, and once she completed her delivery and went off on an independent errand to the balcony, her status was plainly that of a licensee.
“The appellant-wife was not expressly or impliedly invited to the place by the appellee, Sportogs, Inc., or by her son, the proprietor. In all the circumstances, we think it cannot be said that she was a business visitor.”
Establishes the court's finding that absence of express or implied invitation defeats business invitee status.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAnnie Eisen went to her son's shirt-manufacturing and retail business (Sportogs, Inc.) to return some unfinished shirts that her husband (the son's em…
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THOMAS, Justice.
The appellants, husband and wife, lost in their action against the appellee to recover damages suffered when the wife stumbled and fell in the store of the appellee, a so-called “one man” corporation dominated, operated and controlled by appellants’ son.
The salient facts are simple. Evidently the appellee’s place of business consisted of a shop where shirts were made and a store where the products of the shop were sold. The appellant-husband had taken to his home some shirts “in embryo-” for the purpose of working on them in the evening. The next morning he forgot to take them back to the store. When the appellant-wife discovered the oversight she proceeded to return the shirts to the store and to deliver them to her husband in the shop. While there,'she decided to' go to a rest room located on a balcony. As she was ascending the stairs her foot caught on the worn carpet covering the steps, she fell and was injured.
The appellants take the position that Annie Eisen was a business invitee; the appellee contends she was a mere licensee; the court sided with the appellee and entered a summary final judgment in its favor. Apparently the appellant-husband' and -wife and the son derived a livelihood from the business, and the appellant-wife had had for many years the run of the premises inasmuch as the business had been operated by the appellant-husband before the son took over. Considering the relationship of the parties, the nature of the appellant-wife’s errand and the common interest of all the patties in the business, we are impelled to the view that the circuit judge made no mistake when he ruled in appellee’s favor. The appellant-wife was not expressly or impliedly invited to the place by the appellee, Sportogs, Inc., or by her son, the proprietor. In all the circumstances, we think it cannot be said that she was a business visitor. She went to the store on her own account as an accommodation to her husband who was, in effect, her son’s employee.
None of the facts was in dispute and we fail to find any fact that may be construed as an invitation from appellee to appellant-wife to enter the place. She gratuitously went there and apparently had no thought but to make the delivery to her husband. We think that she was a gratuitous visitor when she entered, and that after she delivered the shirts to her husband and set off on her independent mission to the balcony, any doubt about her status at the time she entered the store was dispelled for from that moment on she was plainly a licensee. Napier v. First Congregational Church of Portland, 157 Or. 110, 70 P. 2d43; Freeman v. Levy, 60 Ga.App. 861, 5 S.E. 2d 61.
The judgment should be and it is—
Affirmed.
DREW, C. J.,- ROBERTS,' J., and PRUNTY, Associate Justice, concur.'
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Essie Steinberg and Louis Steinberg v. Irwin Operating Co., 90 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1956)…of the invitation, he ceases to be an invitee. His status then changes to that of a licensee or even a trespasser. He is entitled to the status of an invitee only to the extent justified by the implied invitation. Eisen v. Sportogs, Inc., Fla.1956, 87 So. 2d 44; Freeman v. Levy, 60 Ga.App. 861, 5 S.E. 2d 61; Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, Vol. 4, Sec. 779, p. 1787; Noyes v. Fisher, 118 Fla. 494, 159 So. 666. On the general relationship between a hotel operator and visitors of a guest, see Williams v.…
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Seigle v. Hageman, 132 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See McNutly v. Hurley, Fla.1957, 97 So. 2d 185, 188; Eisen v. The Sportogs, Inc., Fla. 1956, 87 So. 2d 44. ALLEN, Acting C. J., and KANNER and WHITE, JJ., concur.…
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Bullard v. Robin Constr. Corp., 171 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)…inal defendant, was granted a directed verdict at tlie conclusion of plaintiffs’ case, and no issue was raised as to the propriety of that action. . Quinnelly v. Southern Maid Syrup, 164 So. 2d 240 (Fla.App.2d 1964). . See Eisen v. Sportogs, Inc., 87 So. 2d 44 (Fla.1956); City of Boca Raton v. Mattef, 91 So. 2d 644 (Fla.1956); Cochran v. Abercrombie, 118 So. 2d 636, 79 A.L.R.2d 986 (Fla.App.2d 1960). . 23 Fla.Jur., Negligence, § 57. . 35 Am.Jur., Master and Servant, § 540. . Douglas v. Railway Express…