THE MEADOWS OF BEAUTIFUL BRONSON, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
E. G. L. INVESTMENT CORP., A FLORIDA CORPORATION AND ERIC LIFSCHUTZ, JOINTLY AND INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLEES
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The Meadows of Beautiful Bronson appeals the denial of its motion to dismiss a breach of brokerage agreement complaint. The court reversed, holding that the brokerage contract was void as a matter of public policy because it required real estate brokerage services to be rendered by unlicensed and unregistered parties in violation of Florida real estate laws.
The court held that the brokerage agreement was void and unenforceable as a matter of public policy because it required real estate brokerage services to be rendered by unlicensed and unregistered parties in violation of Florida law. The appellees' failure to allege that all FISCO members and FISCO itself were licensed and registered brokers at the time of service rendition was fatal to their complaint.
[1] A contract requiring the rendition of real estate brokerage services in Florida by licensed brokers along with unlicensed individuals is void and unenforceable as a matte…
[2] A complaint seeking real estate brokerage commissions must allege that all parties to the brokerage agreement, including the entity and all members, were licensed and reg…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the agreement required by its terms the rendition of real estate brokerage services in Florida by appellees with others who were neither licensed nor registered real estate brokers or salesmen in Florida. Such a contract is, as a matter of public policy, void and unenforceable.”
Establishes the core holding that contracts requiring unlicensed parties to perform brokerage services violate public policy
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellees, two members of a group called FISCO, entered into a written brokerage agreement with appellant for the sale of its Florida realty. Appellee…
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KEHOE, Judge.
Appellant brings these consolidated interlocutory appeals from an order dated May 4,1977, entered by the trial court denying a motion to dismiss the amended complaint of appellees, plaintiffs below. For the reasons set forth below, we are of the opinion that appellant’s motion to dismiss should have been granted; therefore, the order appealed is reversed.
Appellees are two of eight parties, collectively called FISCO, who entered into a written brokerage agreement with appellant for the sale of its Florida realty. Ap-pellees sued appellant for among other things, money damages alleging in an amended complaint the breach of the brokerage agreement. The other six members of the FISCO group were not joined in this suit. Appellees alleged that only they, as licensed brokers, had the right and obligation to sell and receive commissions for the sale of appellant’s realty under the brokerage agreement and that the other six members of FISCO signed the agreement merely as guarantors.
Thereafter, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for, among other reasons, appellees’ failure to comply with the Florida real estate laws.
Appellant asserted in its motion that appellees failed to allege that they or all members of FISCO were licensed brokers or salesmen at the time the services under the agreement were rendered. Appellant also asserted that appellees failed to allege the registration of the name FISCO with the Florida Real Estate Commission or that the name was placed on their registration certificates at the time the services were rendered. Appellant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint was denied and these consolidated interlocutory appeals followed. Appellant contends, among other things, that the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss the amended complaint because appellees did not allege compliance with the registration requirements of the Florida real estate license laws, although they are seeking real estate brokerage commissions.
Our review of the agreement, herein under contention, reveals that all members of the FISCO group contracted to engage in and control the selling, marketing, advertising, and servicing of appellant’s Florida realty.
Thus, the agreement required by its terms the rendition of real estate brokerage services in Florida by appellees with others who were neither licensed nor registered real estate brokers or salesmen in Florida. Such a contract is, as a matter of public policy, void and unenforceable. Bradley v. Banks, 260 So. 2d 256 (Fla.3d DCA 1972); Harris v. McKay, 176 So. 2d 572 (Fla.3d DCA 1965); Pokress v. Tisch, 153 So. 2d 346 (Fla.3d DCA 1963); and Sections 475.01 and 475.41, Florida Statutes (1975).
Furthermore, appellees have not alleged that they, all other members of FISCO, and FISCO itself, were licensed and registered brokers at the time of the rendition of the services under the agreement. Such an allegation is essential to the validity of appellees’ complaint. Fort Orange Company v. O’Neal, 138 Fla. 325, 189 So. 685 (Fla.1939); Geneva Invest. Ltd. v. Trafalgar Developers, Ltd., 274 So. 2d 581 (Fla.3d DCA 1973); Boca Raton Housing Association, Inc. v. Marqusee, 177 So. 2d 370 (Fla.3d DCA 1965); and Sections 475.01 and 475.41, Florida Statutes (1975).
For the reasons set forth above, the order dated May 4, 1977, entered by the trial court denying appellant’s motion to dismiss appellees’ amended complaint is reversed. In light of this decision, it is unnecessary for us to discuss the other points raised on appeal by appellant.
Reversed.
NATHAN, J., dissents.
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Krieger v. Ocean Props., Ltd., 387 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…y relied on two cases: Paris v. Hilton, 352 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931 99 S.Ct. 2050, 60 L.Ed.2d 659 (1979) and Meadows of Beautiful Bronson, Inc., v. E.G.L. Investment Corp., 353 So. 2d 199 (Fla.3d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 360 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1978). Both cases dealt with the performance of real estate brokerage services in Florida by individuals not licensed or registered in Florida, and consequently the court found, as a matter of p…
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Winter v. Surfview Realty, Inc., 400 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…e of pleading and proof the broker is duly registered as a real estate broker defeats an action on a contract for a commission for the sale of real estate. The contract is unenforceable. Meadows of Beautiful Bronson, Inc. v. E.G.L. Investment Corp., 353 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 360 So. 2d 1248 (Fla.1978); Geneva Investment, Ltd. v. Trafalgar Developers, Ltd., 274 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. dismissed, 285 So. 2d 593 (Fla.1973); Florida Boca Raton Housing Ass’n v. Marquesee Associates, 177 S…
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Trum Corp. v. Satterfield, 421 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…e broker, rendered them invalid. In support of this argument, appellees cite Pearce v. Previews, Inc., 201 F. 2d 385 (5th Cir.1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 993, 73 S.Ct. 1132 (1953), and Meadows of Beautiful Bronson, Inc. v. E.G.L. Investment Corp., 353 So. 2d 199 (Fla.3d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 360 So. 2d 1248 (Fla.1978). We have carefully reviewed the Meadows opinion and cannot agree with appellees’ interpretation. The Court in Meadows held the contract unenforceable because, [T]he agreement required by i…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bradley v. Clyde M. Banks, 260 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Blue v. The Drackett Prods. Co., 153 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)
- Geneva Inv. v. Trafalgar Developers, Ltd., 274 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Fla. Boca Raton Hous. Ass'n, Inc. v. Marqusee Assocs. OF Fla., Inc., 177 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Harris v. McKAY, 176 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Fort Orange Co. v. O'Neal, 138 Fla. 325 (Fla. 1939)