ROSCELL LOUIS, AS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MATTIE LOUIS, AND ROSCELL LOUIS, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ROSCELL LOUIS, AS NEXT FRIEND OF DONNA LOUIS AND DEBRA LOUIS, APPELLANTS,
v.
SOUTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT F/A/O/B/O MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, ET AL., APPELLEES
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Plaintiffs filed suit against a hospital within the statute of limitations but then amended their complaint to name a different legal entity as defendant after the limitations period expired. The court affirmed summary judgment dismissing the case, holding that the amendment did not relate back to the original filing because it brought a new party into the suit rather than merely correcting a misnomer.
The court held that summary judgment was properly entered against the defendant because the action was instituted after expiration of the statute of limitations. An amendment that merely corrects a misnomer may relate back to the original filing date, but the relation back rule does not apply where the amendment brings a new party into the suit.
[1] An amendment to a complaint that seeks to bring in new parties after the statute of limitations has run does not relate back to the original filing date.
[2] Filing a complaint within the statute of limitations tolls the statute only as to the specific defendant named in the original complaint.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Clearly, however, the limitations statute was only tolled as to the particular defendant named in the original complaint.”
Establishes that the statute of limitations tolling applied only to the specifically named defendant, not to other entities.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiffs filed suit two days before the applicable two-year statute of limitations expired, tolling the statute under Florida Rule of Civil Procedur…
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BERANEK, JOHN R., Associate Judge.
Plaintiffs/appellants filed suit two days before the applicable statute of limitations ran. Pursuant to Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.050, the action against appellee was therefore “commenced” and the statute of limitations was tolled. Clearly, however, the limitations statute was only tolled as to the particular defendant named in the original complaint. Plaintiffs did not attempt service of process for approximately eight months. The defendant/appellee was in fact available for service of process at all times. When process was attempted, it was not effected on the defendant actually named in the complaint but was instead made on a different legal entity. A motion to dismiss was made and at the hearing there was agreement that the defendant named in the initial complaint was not in fact a legal entity. Plaintiffs’ initial complaint was dismissed with leave to amend and to effect new service of process.
Thereafter plaintiff amended the complaint and a new amended summons was issued.. This amended summons named yet a third defendant, and the amended complaint and summons were filed substantially beyond the running of the original statute of limitations. Subsequently, on motion for summary judgment, the case against appellee was dismissed on the ground that the action had been filed against this defendant after the running of the applicable two-year statute of limita tions. There was confusion in regard to the name of the defendant, but we consider this confusion to have been substantial. The original complaint named “HOLLYWOOD MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF WEST HOLLYWOOD.” The summons issued pursuant to the original complaint named “HOLLYWOOD MEMORIAL HOSPITAL . . . NORTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT.” The amended summons and complaint named “SOUTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT.” The North and South Broward Hospital Districts were listed in the different summonses at entirely different addresses. Here the trial court was correct in entering summary judgment for the defendant, “SOUTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT,” on the ground that the action was instituted subsequent to the running of the applicable statute of limitations. We do not reach nor consider the issue of whether summary judgment may be entered against a plaintiff who unreasonably delays service of process for eight months beyond the running of the statute of limitations in an action filed within the statute of limitations. This issue was not necessarily addressed by the trial court because here the actual identity of the party defendant was changed. An amendment which merely corrects a misnomer might well relate back to the date the complaint was originally filed but this relation back rule is inapplicable where the effect is to bring new parties into the suit. Galuppi v. Viele, 232 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970), and 3 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1515. Summary judgment below is hereby AFFIRMED.
DOWNEY and DAUKSCH, JJ., concur.
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R.A. Jones & Sons, Inc. v. Holman, 470 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…ited States, 405 F. 2d 234, 237 (5th Cir.1968). See Johnson v. Taylor Rental Center, Inc., 458 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (relation back rule inapplicable where effect is to bring new parties into suit); Louis v. South Broward Hospital District, 353 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) dismissed, 359 So. 2d 1217 (Fla.1978) (same). However, addition of a party is permitted if it can be said that the new and former parties have an identity of interest so as not to prejudice the opponent by the addition. Williams…
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Schwartz v. Wilt Chamberlain's OF Boca Raton, Ltd., 725 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…nt. See Kozich v. Shahady, 702 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Troso v. Florida Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 538 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Lindsey v. H.H. Raulerson Jr. Mem’l Hosp., 505 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Louis v. South Broward Hosp. Dist., 353 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). Exceptions to this general rule are made, however, where the amendment is merely the correction of a misnomer. See Francese v. Tamarac Hosp. Corp., 504 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (amendment allowed where the plaintiff first…
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Johnson v. Taylor Rental Ctr., Inc., 458 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…ompany and are represented by the same attorney, these facts do not change the relationship. The rule which permits the relation back of amended pleadings does not apply where an entirely new party is added. Louis v. South Broward Hospital District, 353 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), dismissed, 359 So. 2d 1217 (Fla.1978). Moreover, the issuance of a receipt in the name of “Taylor Rental Center” is insufficient, by itself, to provide a basis for extending the statute of limitations. Hence, the amendment seeki…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mrs. Betty Galuppi v. Viele, 232 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)