UNITED YACHT BROKERS, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
BETTY J. GILLESPIE, ROBERT J. MORTIMER AND SEYMOUR M. KLEIN, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE OF KEITH WOLD JOHNSON, AND ARTHUR SIEWERT AND EDGAR ANSTETT, APPELLEES
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United Yacht Brokers appealed from dismissals and summary judgment on claims challenging the validity of Florida Statute § 537.05 as unconstitutionally discriminatory against yacht brokers. The appellate court transferred the case to the Florida Supreme Court because the trial court's orders implicitly resolved the validity of a state statute, giving the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the appeal.
The appellate court concluded that although the trial judge did not explicitly mention § 537.05's validity, the dismissal and summary judgment orders implicitly resolved the statute's validity as a necessary element of the litigation. Therefore, the case involves a question of state constitutional validity that must be reviewed by the Florida Supreme Court.
[1] A state statute's validity is directly passed upon when a trial court's order implicitly upholds the statute by dismissing claims that challenge its constitutionality.
[2] A court's ruling on the validity of a statute is inherent in its decision to dismiss a complaint or grant summary judgment when the statute's validity is essential to the…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the plaintiff alleges that § 537.05 is unique in the field of regulatory legislation controlling the conduct of brokers. That no other form of brokerage business is subjected to such a requirement or to the consequential deprivation of the right of compensation where said statute is not complied with. The statute is, therefore, unfairly discriminatory against yacht brokers”
Sets forth the core constitutional challenge that the statute discriminates against yacht brokers in violation of equal protection principles.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceUnited Yacht Brokers filed a complaint alleging that § 537.05 uniquely regulated yacht brokers in a manner not applied to other forms of brokerage bus…
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ALDERMAN, Chief Judge.
This appeal is brought by the plaintiff following orders dismissing with prejudice Count I of its second amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action, dismissing the action as to certain defendants, and entering final summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants.
We conclude that the trial court initially and directly passed on the validity of a state statute, and that the Supreme Court of Florida has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. Both counts of the second amended complaint included or incorporated the following language:
[T]he plaintiff alleges that § 537.05 is unique in the field of regulatory legislation controlling the conduct of brokers. That no other form of brokerage business is subjected to such a requirement or to the consequential deprivation of the right of compensation where said statute is not complied with. The statute is, therefore, unfairly discriminatory against yacht brokers and the plaintiff herein and is violative of Article II of the Florida Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The trial judge did not specifically mention Section 537.05 nor its validity, “but this fact does not alter the effect of the decree as a negative disposition of all pertinent questions properly raised by appellant.” Evans v. Carroll, 104 So. 2d 375, 377 (Fla.1958). If Section 537.05 had been declared void by the trial court in concurrence with the plaintiff’s pleadings, neither dismissal nor summary judgment would have been appropriate because the parties may then have had a valid contract. The statutory issue was a genuine and essential element in the litigation, a decision on the validity of the statute was necessary to a determination of the cause, and therefore a finding of validity was inherent in the orders of the lower court from which this appeal is brought. P. G. Lissenden Co., Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Palm Beach County, 116 So. 2d 632 (Fla.1959); Harrell’s Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority, 111 So. 2d 439 (Fla.1959). This appeal is transferred to the Supreme Court of Florida pursuant to Fla.App. Rule 2.1, subd. a(5)(d).
DREW, E. HARRIS (Retired), and STET-TIN, HERBERT, Associate Judges, concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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United Yacht Brokers, Inc. v. Gillespie, 377 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1979)…OVERTON, Justice. This is a direct appeal transferred to us by the Fourth District Court of Appeal, United Yacht Brokers, Inc. v. Gillespie, 353 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), because the trial court inherently passed on the validity of section 537.05, Florida Statutes. We have jurisdiction.1 The statute requires licensed yacht brokers to obtain written authorization from their principal before engagi…
Authorities Cited
- Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 111 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1959)
- P. C. Lissenden Co., Inc. v. Bd. OF Cnty. Comm'rs OF Palm Beach Cnty., 116 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1959)
- Evans v. Carroll, 104 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1958)