DANIEL E. BLANCO, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Daniel Blanco appeals his conviction for sale or delivery of a controlled substance, arguing the trial court improperly restricted cross-examination by preventing inquiry into a paid informant's pending criminal charges and present address. The appellate court reverses, holding that a defendant has an absolute right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses about pending charges and a qualified right to learn their addresses unless actual safety threats are demonstrated.
The trial court committed reversible error on both issues. A defendant has an absolute right to cross-examine a prosecution witness about pending or threatened criminal charges to establish potential bias or motive. A defendant also has a qualified right to obtain a witness's address for impeachment purposes unless the prosecution demonstrates an actual (not implied) threat to the witness's personal safety in camera, with the defendant given opportunity to show special need for the information.
[1] A defendant has an absolute right to elicit on cross-examination the fact that a prosecution witness is presently or recently under actual or threatened criminal charges…
[2] A witness's present address may be withheld from a defendant on cross-examination if there is a demonstrated, actual threat to the witness's personal safety, provided cro…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When the credibility of a witness is in issue, the very starting point in 'exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth' through cross-examination must necessarily be to ask the witness who he is and where he lives. The witness' name and address open countless avenues of in-court examination and out-of-court investigation. To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.”
Establishes the fundamental importance of obtaining a witness's name and address for effective cross-examination.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDaniel Blanco was convicted of sale or delivery of a controlled substance. The prosecution's case relied heavily on testimony from a paid informant. D…
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HAVERFIELD, Judge.
Daniel E. Blanco, defendant-appellant, seeks a new trial and reversal of his conviction for sale or delivery of a controlled substance.
Defendant for his first point on appeal contends the trial court erred in limiting his right to cross-examination by (1) not allowing defense counsel to make inquiry with regard to pending criminal charges against the prosecution’s principal witness (a paid informant), and (2) failing to allow inquiry into the present address of this same witness for impeachment purposes.
With respect to the second issue raised under the above contention, the controlling principle of law as set out in Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131, 88 S.Ct. 748, 750, 19 L.Ed.2d 966 (1968) is: “When the credibility of a witness is in issue, the very starting point in ‘exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth’ through cross-examination must necessarily be to ask the witness who he is and where he lives. The witness’ name and address open countless avenues of in-court examination and out-of-court investigation. To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.”
Nevertheless, defendant’s right to a witness’ background information1 is not absolute. Where there has been some real threat to the personal safety of the witness because of his willingness to testify in that proceeding, the present address of the witness may "be withheld from the defendant as long as the cross-examination is otherwise vigorous, full and effective. See U. S. v. Alston, 460 F. 2d 48 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 871, 93 S.Ct. 200, 34 L.Ed.2d 122 (1972). However, prior to effectively invoking this “personal safety” exception, the prosecution must demonstrate an actual, not implied, threat to the witness or his family and must disclose to the trial judge in camera the information sought to' be withheld from the defendant who must be allowed to show any special need for the information requested. Then the trial judge must determine whether the facts must be disclosed in order not to deny effective cross-examination to the defendant and this determination is reviewable on appeal. State v. Hassberger, 350 So. 2d 1, 4 (1977). In addition, our Supreme Court in Hassberger, supra, hastened to point out that this exception is exceedingly narrow and all doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused’s 6th and 14th amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.
In the case at bar the paid informant, whose address defense counsel desired to elicit on cross-examination, was the prosecution’s chief witness upon whose testimony practically the entire case against the defendant depended. Nevertheless, the record reflects that the prosecution failed to demonstrate the existence of an actual threat to the personal safety of this witness. We, therefore, find that the trial judge erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to elicit from this chief prosecution witness his address on cross-examination.
Turning now to the first issue raised above, we also conclude the trial judge committed reversible error in not permitting defense counsel to make inquiry with regard to pending charges against this same witness. The law is clear that if a prosecution witness is presently or recently under actual or threatened criminal charges or investigation leading to such charges, the person against whom the witness testifies in a criminal case has an absolute right to bring those circumstances out on cross-examination or otherwise so that the jury will be fully apprised as to the witness’ possible motive or self-interest with respect to the testimony he (or she) gives. Morrell v. State, 297 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Stripling v. State, 349 So. 2d 187, 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) and cases cited therein.
The defendant’s final point concerning prejudicial remarks of the prosecutor during closing argument is without merit and no reversible error has been made to appear. See Oliva v. State, 346 So. 2d 1066, 1068-69 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
The conviction of defendant is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
. So that the defendant may have the opportunity to place the witness in his proper setting and put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to the test.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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Moreno v. State, 418 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…08, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Fulton v. State, 335 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1976); D.C. v. State, 400 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Cowheard v. State, 365 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1979); Blanco v. State, 353 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Crespo v. State, 344 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Lee v. State, 318 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Morrell v. State, 297 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). The Sixth Amendment right of confrontation of witnesses requires that a d…
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Cowheard v. State, 365 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…other pending criminal charges. This impeachment is not permitted, as in the case of an actual conviction, in order to affect his general credibility, but rather to demonstrate the witness’s bias or motive. In the latest such case, Blanco v. State, 353 So. 2d 602, 604 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), this court stated: [*193] “Turning now to the first issue raised above, we also conclude the trial judge committed reversible error in not permitting defense counsel to make inquiry with regard to pending charges against thi…
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Livingston v. State, 678 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…ony. Phillips v. State, 572 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). A well recognized area of cross examination is how pending criminal charges may have influenced a witness’ cooperation with the state and the content of in-court statements. Blanco v. State, 353 So. 2d 602, 604 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Garey v. State, 432 So. 2d 796, 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). To explore even more subtle motivations, where a witness has already been sentenced, a defendant may cross examine concerning any continuing relationship between the w…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (U.S. 1968)
- Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (U.S. 1968)
- United States v. Alston, 460 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1972)
- Morrell v. State, 297 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Stripling v. State, 349 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- State v. Hassberger, 350 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1977)
- Masters v. Harris, 409 U.S. 871 (U.S. 1972)
- Alston v. United States, 409 U.S. 871 (U.S. 1972)
- Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Dade Cnty. Emps., 346 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)