D. A. SALLS AND PEARL J. SALLS, HIS WIFE,
v.
JOHN W. MARTIN
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In this ejectment action arising from a property sale at a tax foreclosure, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's directed verdict for the plaintiff and rejected the defendant's defenses based on adverse possession and a statutory bar to the action.
The court held that the defendant had no valid defense of adverse possession because the property was not returned for taxation as required by statute, and therefore the statutory four-year bar under Section 196.06 was unavailable to the defendant. The plaintiff's action was not barred by the statute because the bar applies only where adverse possession exists in law.
“Plaintiff challenges the right of defendant to plead adverse possession because he was unable to show a return and payment of taxes as required by Section 95.17 and 95.18, Fla. Stats. 1941. This challenge was sustained by the circuit judge and in this he was correct.”
Establishes that the statutory requirements for return and payment of taxes are prerequisites for adverse possession.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohn W. Martin purchased real estate at a master's sale in a tax foreclosure proceeding and subsequently filed an ejectment action for possession. The…
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John W. Martin purchased certain real estate at master’s sale wherein a foreclosure was prosecuted on state and county tax certificates. Thereafter he filed an ejectment action to get possession of the property. Pleas of not guilty were filed; seven years’ adverse possession and also that plaintiff’s action was not commenced within four years of the date of his deed as required by Section 196.06, Fla. Stat. 1941. All pleas, except the one of not guilty, went out on demurrer. At the trial the court directed a verdict for the plaintiff and defendant appeals.
Plaintiff challenges the right of defendant to plead adverse possession because he was unable to show a return and *625payment of taxes as required by Section 95.17 and 95.18, Fla. Stats. 1941. This challenge was sustained by the circuit judge and in this he was correct.
The defendant, likewise, challenges the right of plaintiff to prosecute his action on a tax deed because the action was not brought within four years from the date of the deed as provided by Section 196.06, supra. We hold this challenge without merit because the prohibiting part of the statute is available only where there is in law an “adverse possession” and from what we have held above there was no adverse possession in law inasmuch as the property was not returned for taxation. This conclusion does not run counter to the principle that the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own case rather than the weakness of his adversary because Section 196.06 is a bar within four years only where there is adverse possession. For a defendant to invoke the statute he must show that he is within the class of persons having a defense of adverse possession.
It is not necessary for us to determine here whether the plaintiff’s deed is a “tax deed” as contemplated by the several statutes. We have resolved all questions on this appeal adverse to appellant without the necessity of passing upon the character of the deed and what we have said may not be construed as a determination of whether plaintiff’s deed is a “tax deed.”
All other questions have been duly considered and found without merit.
The decree is affirmed.
CHAPMAN, C. J., TERRELL and BUFORD, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Indian Rocks Beach South Shore v. Ewell, 59 So.2d 647 (Fla. 1952)…n, before such taxes become delinquent; except that this provision shall not be applicable to suits pending on June 5, 1939." The above section remained in full force and effect until the Legislative session of 1945. In the case of Salls v. Martin, 156 Fla. 624, 24 So. 2d 41, the Chancellor in the Court below upheld the validity of this Statute and on appeal to this Court his decision was affirmed in the following language: "Plaintiff challenges the right of defendant to plead adverse possession because h…
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Holley v. MAY, 75 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1954)…om the answer that there has been compliance with the statute requiring return for taxation, by proper legal description, of property adversely possessed under the circumstances present. Section 95.19, Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A.; Salls v. Martin, 156 Fla. 624, 24 So. 2d 41; Palmer v. Greene, 159 Fla. 174, 31 So. 2d 706. In view of the preceding conclusion as to lack of “acquiescence,” the case is clearly distinguishable from Euse v. Gibbs, Fla., 49 So. 2d 843, where the ruling of the court with reference…
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Palmquist v. Johnson, 41 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1949)…ds as against the record title owners. Counsel for appellees contend that the appellant is not entitled on the record to the benefits and protection of the several provisions of Section 196.06, F.S.A., because of: (1) our ruling in Salls v. Martin, 156 Fla. 624, 24 So. 2d 41; (2) Section 1 of Chapter 19253, Acts of 1939, Laws of Florida, Section 95.16, F.S.A., viz.: "95.16. Real actions; adverse possession under color of title; requirements. — Whenever it shall appear that the occupant, or those under who…1 / 2
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