COBB'S AUTO SALES, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
MELVIN COLEMAN, AS SHERIFF OF AND FOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA, THE SENTINEL STAR COMPANY, THE OUTLET COMPANY D/B/A WDBO CHANNEL 6, CENTRAL NINE CORPORATION, FLORIDA HEARTLAND TELEVISION, INC., ALL FLORIDA CORPORATIONS OPERATING AS A JOINT VENTURE KNOWN AS, CHANNEL NINE OF ORLANDO, COWLES FLORIDA BROADCASTING, INC. D/B/A WESH-TV, NBC CHANNEL 2, AND THE CITY OF ORLANDO, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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The court held that Florida Statute 768.28, which waives sovereign immunity, does not affect the absolute privilege defense available to a sheriff for statements made in connection with official duties.
[1] An executive officer enjoys an absolute privilege as to statements made incidental to official duties.
[2] The defense of privilege is distinct from sovereign immunity.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant, Cobb's Auto Sales, Inc., sued appellee, Melvin Coleman (a sheriff), for defamation. The sheriff asserted the defense of privilege, which th…
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ANSTEAD, Judge.
This is an appeal from the dismissal of a defamation action brought by the appellant, Cobb’s Auto Sales, Inc., against the appel-lee, Melvin Coleman. The issue is whether Florida Statute 768.28 relating to the waiver of sovereign immunity in tort cases affects the defense of privilege successfully asserted by the sheriff in the trial court.
As an executive officer the sheriff enjoys an absolute privilege as to any statements he makes incidental to his official duties. Hauser v. Urchisin, 231 So. 2d 6 (Fla.1970); McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So. 2d 428 (Fla.1966); Knight v. Starr, 275 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). The defense of privilege is a separate and distinct concept from sovereign immunity, the abrogation of which appellant relies on here to avoid the defense of privilege. The doctrine of sovereign immunity was a rule laid down by the ruling authority that he, because he was the ruler, could do no wrong and therefore was immune from any charges that he had done wrong. The legislature, by enacting Section 768.28, decided this common law doctrine should be removed from the law of Florida.
On the other hand the defense of absolute privilege is based on consideration of the public interest:
The public interest requires that statements made by officials of all branches of government in connection with their official duties be absolutely privileged. Under our democratic system the stewardship of public officials is daily observed by the public. It is necessary that free and open explanations of their actions be made.1
There is nothing in Section 768.28 to indicate that the legislature intended to take away the defense of absolute privilege. In fact, sheriffs were less affected than others by the passage of the statute because they had no sovereign immunity. Holland v. Mayes, 155 Fla. 129, 19 So. 2d 709 (1944).
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
ALDERMAN, C. J, and CROSS, J., concur. . Hauser v. Urchisin, 231 So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla.1970).
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Mueller v. THE Florida BAR, 390 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…la.1942); Saxon v. Knowles, 185 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966); Knight v. Starr, 275 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). We have previously distinguished absolute privilege from the concept of sovereign immunity. Cobbs Auto Sales, Inc. v. Melvin Coleman, 353 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Article V, Section 15, Florida Constitution (rev. 1972) provides: Attorneys; admission and discipline.-The supreme court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and the dis…
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Rumbough v. City OF Tampa, 403 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…J., and DANAHY, J., concur. . Several courts have already accepted the proposition that the statute pertains to torts other than those sounding in negligence. Weston v. State, 373 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Cobb’s Auto Sales, Inc. v. Coleman, 353 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); State ex rel. Division of Admin. v. Oliff, 350 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Florida Dep’t. of Revenue v. Norville, 321 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). . But see Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 92 S.Ct. 1899, 32 L.Ed.2d 499 (197…
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Freeman v. Valdez, 393 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…tatements made in relation to his official duties. Hauser v. Urchisin, 231 So. 2d 6 (Fla.1970); McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So. 2d 428 (Fla.1966); Danford v. City of Rockledge, 387 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 5th [*1174] DCA 1980); Cobb’s Auto Sales, Inc. v. Coleman, 353 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); and Knight v. Starr, 275 So. 2d 37 (Fla 4th DCA 1973). In granting the defendant-sheriff’s motion to dismiss, the trial court found: [I]t is clear from the face of the Complaint and all exhibits attached thereto that any remark…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McNAYR v. Kelly, 184 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1966)
- Hauser v. Urchisin, 231 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1970)
- Spessard L. Holland v. Mayes, 155 Fla. 129 (Fla. 1944)
- Washington v. State, 275 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Conner v. State, 275 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)