BOBBY GORDON SHEFFIELD, PETITIONER,
v.
THE HONORABLE ERWIN FLEET, CIRCUIT JUDGE, OKALOOSA COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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A defendant sought prohibition against a trial court judge for alleged violation of the speedy trial rule under Florida criminal procedure. The appellate court denied the petition, finding that the defendant's circumstances were analogous to a prior case where waiver of speedy trial protections was found rather than the case the defendant relied upon.
The court held that the petition for writ of prohibition should be denied. The facts of the case were more analogous to State v. Kelley (which permitted waiver of speedy trial protections) than to State v. Ansley (which held that mere silence is not a waiver).
[1] Mere silence by a defendant or counsel at a proceeding where a trial date is set beyond the speedy trial period does not constitute a waiver under Fla.R.Crim.P. …
[2] Waiver of speedy trial rights may be found without a written stipulation when defense counsel orally stipulates to a delay in open court, and the stipulation is preserved…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“mere silence alone on the part of a defendant or his counsel at a proceeding in which trial date is set beyond the speedy trial period is not a waiver pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(d)(2)(i)”
Establishes the holding from State v. Ansley regarding what does NOT constitute a waiver of speedy trial rights
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePetitioner Bobby Gordon Sheffield filed a suggestion for writ of prohibition alleging violation of Florida's speedy trial rule, Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191. T…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioner, Bobby Gordon Sheffield, filed herein a suggestion for writ of prohibition alleging violation of the “speedy trial rule”, Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191. We issued Rule Nisi to which respondent has filed his return. We have also carefully considered the briefs filed by able counsel. Petitioner relies heavily upon a recent case from this court, State v. Ansley, 349 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). A careful examination of that case reveals that we there only held that mere silence alone on the part of a defendant or his counsel at a proceeding in which trial date is set beyond the speedy trial period is not a waiver pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(d)(2)(i). In that case, immediately prior to stating our holding, we said:
“The requirements of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(d)(2)(i), requiring that an extension or waiver of the speedy trial time be in writing and be signed in proper person or by counsel, by the party against whom the stipulation is sought to be enforced, have been modified considerably by judicial interpretation. Waiver has been found without the required writing where defense counsel orally stipulated to the delay in open court and where same was preserved for the record by certified transcript of the proceedings; or where there was either a passive or active acknowledgment on the part of the defense that a stipulation (in court or out, oral or written) had been entered into by which the parties agreed that the trial would be set beyond the speedy trial period; or where there was an acknowledgment by the court or one of the parties of a speedy trial issue followed by the defense’s acquiescence in a trial date set beyond the speedy trial period. State v. Kelley, 322 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Stuart v. State, 339 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976); State v. Earnest, 265 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); and Eastwood v. Hall, 258 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1972). However, none of these circumstances has occurred in the instant case.” (349 So. 2d 838, 839)
Respondent, on the other hand, heavily relies upon State v. Kelley, 322 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) which, it will be noted from the above quotation, was cited and approved by us in State v. Ansley, supra. An examination of the facts of this case reveals them to be more analogous to those in State v. Kelley than in State v. Ansley.
Accordingly, our rule nisi is vacated and the petition for writ of prohibition is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
McCORD, C. J., and BOYER and MELVIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- State v. Earnest, 265 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- Eastwood v. Hall, 258 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)
- State v. Kelley, 322 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
- State v. Ansley, 349 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Ollie v. Whitener, 339 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Alphonso Stuart v. State, 339 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)