RONNIE JAMES LEWIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Right To Remain Silent cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED.
DOWNEY, J., and DEAN, ROY E., Associate Judge, concur. ANSTEAD, J., dissents, with opinion.
ANSTEAD, Judge,
dissenting:
I would reverse for a new trial. During cross-examination of a state’s witness, Detective Winger, defense counsel elicited the following testimony:
“Q. And after you advised him that you were not going to ask him any questions, he didn’t say anything, did he?
A. No.”
Shortly thereafter, on redirect examination by the prosecutor, the following took place:
“Q. Did he ever give you any explanation whatsoever as to a shooting?
A. No, sir.”
At this point defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the grounds that this exchange constituted an improper comment on the defendant’s right to remain silent. The trial court denied the motion but, the next morning, gave the jury a lengthy instruction to disregard such testimony. The trial court recognized the error and did his best to correct it by the detailed instruction to the jury.
On appeal the state contends that the error was harmless, in view of the question asked by the defense. I cannot agree. The Florida Supreme Court has ruled that the harmless error doctrine should not be applied to these situations. Bennett v. State, 316 So. 2d 41 (Fla.1975). And, even if such doctrine could be applied, I cannot accept the state’s argument that the questions by the defense and the state were the same. Obviously, the implication of the state’s question was that the defendant had an obligation to give an explanation of the incident involved and that he never gave such an explanation. This is reversible error by the state. Farese v. State, 328 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Cont'l Mortg. Invs. v. Sailboat KEY, Inc., 395 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1981)…on of Florida law on the basis of public policy and a finding by the trial court that the parties’ choice of Massachusetts law was made in bad faith and was an effort to avoid Florida usury laws. Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 354 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). II. Conflict of Laws: Usury A. Public Policy As with most shibboleths, the invocation of strong public policy to avoid application of another state’s law is unwarranted in this case. Although a few jurisdictions do attach such…1 / 2
-
Morgan Walton Props., Inc. v. Int'l City Bank & Tr. Co., 404 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1981)…is today of little practical value since these contacts are so easily manipulated in our mobile society.” Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d 507, 510 (Fla.1981). In Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 354 So. 2d 67 (Fla.3d DCA 1977), the district court of appeal held that Florida’s usury law was applicable to a financing agreement between a Florida corporation and a Massachusetts business trust, even though the contract designated Massachusetts law as controll…
-
N. Am. Mortg. Invs. v. Cape SAN Blas Joint Venture, 378 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1979)…the lawful rate of interest is an essential element in proving usury where a broker’s commission is collected and retained by the agent of the principal. The cross-petition asserts conflict with Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 354 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), as to the proper penalty to be assessed against a lender who violates the provisions of chapter 687, Florida Statutes (1975), in a loan transaction with a corporate borrower where the obligation exceeds $500,000. The trial court…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bennett v. State, 316 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1975)
- Farese v. State, 328 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)