DADE COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
HONORABLE RHEA P. GROSSMAN, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, LAWRENCE RODGERS, AND ESSIE MAE GREEN, RESPONDENTS

Fla. 3d DCA | 1978-01-24
No. 77-1352
Before HENDRY and HUBBART, JJ., and CHARLES CARROLL (Ret.), Associate Judge.
354 So. 2d 131 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1978) Positive Treatment
Cited by 16 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Dade County challenged a trial court order requiring it to pay attorney's fees and costs for a court-appointed attorney representing an indigent defendant in a civil insurance subrogation suit to which the county was not a party. The appellate court held that attorney's fees cannot be awarded absent statutory authority or agreement, and found no statute authorizing such an award against the county.


Holding

The trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by ordering Dade County to pay attorney's fees and costs. Attorney's fees may only be awarded when specifically authorized by statute or agreement between the parties, and no such statute authorizes a county to absorb such costs in a civil insurance subrogation matter to which it is not a party.


Headnotes

[1] Certiorari is the proper method for reviewing an order taxing costs and attorney's fees against a county in a suit to which it was not a party.

[2] Attorney's fees may not be awarded in Florida unless specifically authorized by statute or agreement between the parties.

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Key Quotes

“It is well settled in Florida, that attorney's fees may not be awarded in any matter unless specifically authorized by statute or agreement between the parties.”

Establishes the fundamental legal principle governing attorney's fee awards in Florida.

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Facts & Procedural History

Herdisene Latanya Griffin, on behalf of Shelby Mutual Insurance Company, sued Essie Mae Green for subrogation of an insurance claim. Dade County was n…

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Opinion of the Court
HENDRY, Judge.

HENDRY, Judge.

Dade County, by petition for writ of certiorari, seeks review of a final judgment which ordered it to pay attorney’s fees and costs to a court-appointed attorney in a civil suit.

The subject suit, Herdisene Latanya Griffin, f/u/b/o Shelby Mutual Insurance Company v. Essie Mae Green, Case No. 74-22599, in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, alleged a cause of action for subrogation of an insurance claim paid by Shelby and alleged due and owing through said subrogation from Green. Dade County, the petitioner herein, was not a party to the lawsuit.

Pursuant to an ore tenus motion from Ms. Green, the court determined that while she did not qualify for representation by Legal Services, she was nonetheless “indigent in terms of being able to afford the services of a private lawyer.” In response to said motion, counsel was appointed to represent Ms. Green in the subrogation action. By order, attorney’s fees and costs were to be paid by the county.

The lawsuit was subsequently settled by stipulation of counsel and final judgment entered by the court directing the county to pay attorney’s fees and costs to Green’s attorney. It is this final judgment which is now under review.

Initially, we note that certiorari proceeding is the proper method for review of, an order taxing costs and attorney’s fees entered against the county in a suit to which it was not a party. Dade County v. Baker, 237 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); Dade County v. McCrary, 260 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). With that in mind, our attention is now focused on the only question that need be addressed by this court, to-wit:

Whether the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in taxing the county for costs and fees in a civil action (insurance subrogation) to which it was not a party.

For the reason that follows, we hold that the court did so depart from the essential requirements of law and quash the judgment.

It is well settled in Florida, that attorney’s fees may not be awarded in any matter unless specifically authorized by statute or agreement between the parties. Phoenix Indemnity Company v. Union Finance Company, 54 So. 2d 188 (Fla.1951); In Re Field’s Estate, 121 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960). As there was no agreement on behalf of the county to pay attorney’s fees herein, it was incumbent upon the court to base the award of fees and costs upon statutory authority. Dade County v. McCrary, supra. We find no such statutes authorizing the county to absorb court costs and legal fees in a civil insurance subrogation matter to which it was not made a party. See Bower v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, 347 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).

Accordingly, after carefully reviewing the record, briefs and arguments of counsel, it is our opinion that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law and therefore, certiorari is hereby granted and the judgment of the trial court quashed.

It is so ordered.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Dade Cnty. Med. Ass'n v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
    …gest, to postpone determination of the significant issues involved in this case until the DCMA is held in contempt for failure to produce the documents in question. Joldersma v. Stewart, 370 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); see Dade County v. Grossman, 354 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); compare Strain v. Miami Transfer Co., 155 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963), cert. denied, 161 So. 2d 216 (Fla.1964). . As the petitioner cogently argues, since the statute immunizes the records from discovery in a malpractice case,…
  • Dade Cnty. v. Goldstein, 384 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
    …rtiorari to review an order of the trial court awarding counsel fees to two court-appointed attorneys in a criftiinal case which the petitioner Dade County is required to pay. We have jurisdiction to entertain this petition. Dade County v. Grossman, 354 So. 2d 131 (Fla.3d DCA 1978); Dade County v. McCrary, 260 So. 2d 543 (Fla.3d DCA 1972); Dade County v. Strauss, 246 So. 2d 137 (Fla.3d DCA 1971), cert. denied 253 So. 2d 864 (Fla.1971), cert. denied 406 U.S. 924, 92 S.Ct. 1793, 32 L.Ed.2d 125 (1972). The cent…
  • Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Norbert J. Stein, 384 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
    …provisions calling for attorney’s fees. Therefore, under the applicable authority [Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1967); Campbell v. Maze, 339 So. 2d 202 (Fla.1976); Meyerson v. Cohen, 348 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Dade County v. Grossman, 354 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)], there being no contract or statute applicable prior to July 1, 1978, no attorney’s fees should have been awarded for services rendered prior to this date. The trial judge recognized he could not award attorney’s fees without a s…

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