POLAR ENTERPRISES, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION AND LUIS BERTOT, INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLANTS,
v.
JEROME M. SREDNICKI, D/B/A CLOCK & DECLOUX, APPELLEE
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Polar Enterprises and Luis Bertot appealed a default judgment entered against them after they failed to comply with a court order directing them to file an answer to an amended complaint within a specified time. The Florida appellate court affirmed the default, holding that while defendants generally have a right to have answers stand over under the civil rules, they must comply with specific court orders requiring timely filing.
The court held that the trial court properly entered the default judgment. While defendants generally have a right under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.190(a) to have answers stand over, they must comply with specific court orders directing timely filing of answers, and failure to do so justifies entry of a default.
[1] A trial court is justified in entering a default when a party fails to comply with a specific court order directing them to file an answer.
[2] A party's general right to have their answers stand over does not excuse their failure to comply with a direct court order to file an answer by a specific date.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The order specifically required the filing of an answer and the court was justified in entering a default when the defendants failed to abide by the court order.”
Establishes the court's core holding that compliance with explicit court orders directing answer filing is mandatory, and default is proper when such orders are violated.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court had previously set aside a default judgment and allowed the defendants to plead. The plaintiff subsequently moved to amend the complai…
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PER CURIAM.
In this case, the court had once set aside a default that permitted delinquent defendants to plead. Thereafter, the plaintiff sought an amendment to his complaint. In permitting the amendment because of prior confusion about pleadings, the trial judge directed (by court order) the defendants to file an answer by a day certain. This the defendants declined to do and, after the time for filing had expired, the plaintiff moved for a default based upon the defendants’ failure to comply with the court order. The judge entered the default. At no time did the defendants tender an answer to the amended complaint. Thereafter, final judgment was rendered on the default and this appeal ensued, contending that the trial court erred in the entry of the second default. We disagree, and affirm the action of the trial judge.
The order specifically required the filing of an answer and the court was justified in entering a default when the defendants failed to abide by the court order. Jordan v. John Ryan Company, 35 Fla. 259, 17 So. 73 (1895); Farish v. Lum’s, Inc., 267 So. 2d 325 (Fla.1972); cf. Synthetic Environmental Development Corp. v. Sussman, 275 So. 2d 291 (Fla.3d DCA 1973). The appellants contend they had a right to have their answers stand over, pursuant to Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.190(a), and Ortiz v. Nicolaides, 196 So. 2d 186 (Fla.3d DCA 1967); Rubenstein v. Richard Fidlin Corporation, 346 So. 2d 89 (Fla.3d DCA 1977). This is generally true; however, in the instant case there was an order directing them to file an answer and it was for this failure to comply with the court order that the subsequent default was entered.
Therefore, the final judgment here under review be and the same is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Cont'l Se. Land Corp. v. Raymond, 354 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Polar Enterprises, Inc. v. Srednicki, 354 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 3d DCA, opinion filed January 17, 1978).…
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Bonded Rental Agency, Inc. v. Conner, 359 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…fashion an amended answer (or in lieu thereof a legally recognized response) to the amended complaint; failure to do so constitutes prima facie grounds for the entry of a default judgment against the said party. Polar Enterprises, Inc. v. Srednicki, 354 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Ortiz v. Nicolaides, 196 So. 2d 186, 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); Craver v. Ramagli Realty Co., 109 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.190(a). Measured by these standards, it is clear that the defendant herein was entitled…
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Authorities Cited
- Farish v. Lum's, Inc., 267 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1972)
- Ortiz v. Nicolaides, 196 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Rubenstein v. Richard Fidlin Corp. & Richard Fidlin, 346 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Jordan v. John Ryan Co., 35 Fla. 259 (Fla. 1895)
- Synthetic Env't Dev. Corp. v. Sussman, 275 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)