JEAN C. BEASLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Beasley appealed the denial of her motion to compel disclosure of a confidential informant's identity in a marijuana case, arguing the informant's testimony was necessary for her entrapment defense. The court held that while an in camera hearing may be required under certain circumstances, the defendant must at least swear to or verify the facts alleged in the motion to trigger such a hearing.
The court held that while an in camera hearing may be required when circumstances warrant disclosure of a confidential informant's identity, the defendant must at least verify or swear to the facts upon which the motion is based before such a hearing is required. Because Beasley's motion was unverified and unsupported by proof, the trial court did not err in denying it without an in camera hearing.
[1] Entrapment is not a defense to the crime of possession.
[2] A defendant seeking disclosure of a confidential informant's identity must at least swear to the facts upon which the motion is based.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“before the Munford requirement of an in camera hearing may be invoked, the defendant must at least swear to the facts upon which his motion is based”
Establishes the standard that an unverified motion is insufficient to trigger an in camera hearing requirement
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBeasley was charged with two counts of sale of marijuana and two counts of felony possession of marijuana. She filed a motion seeking disclosure of a …
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GRIMES, Acting Chief Judge.
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the appellant made a showing sufficient to require the court to conduct an in camera proceeding to determine whether the state should be required to disclose the name and address of an alleged confidential informant.
The appellant was charged with two counts of sale of marijuana and two counts of felony possession of marijuana. The appellant filed a motion seeking an order compelling the state to disclose the name and address of a confidential informant. The motion alleged that the informant was present at and arranged for each sale, that appellant had no other way of knowing the name of the informant, and that the testimony of the informant was necessary to the appellant’s theory of entrapment. The state would not stipulate to the facts alleged in the motion and no testimony was presented. The motion was denied, and the appellant later entered a nolo contendere plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion.
At the outset, we need not consider the issue as it relates to the two convictions for possession because entrapment is not a defense to possession. English v. State, 301 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
With respect to the two sale convictions, the allegations of fact in the motion were very similar to those in Munford v. State, 343 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), in which this court held that in response to a pretrial motion, the judge should have conducted an in camera hearing in order to decide whether the state would be required to disclose the identity of the confidential informant.
However, this case differs from Munford in one significant particular. In that case, the state stipulated to the facts alleged in the motion, whereas here there was no such stipulation. We do not go so far as to hold that there must be a stipulation of facts or even the presentation of testimony, but we do feel that before the Munford requirement of an in camera hearing may be invoked, the defendant must at least swear to the facts upon which his motion is based. Otherwise, we can visualize the possibility that our criminal courts would be unduly burdened with conducting in camera proceedings in response to what could well be spurious allegations of fact. Since appellant’s motion was unverified and there was no other proof of the pertinent facts, the court did not err in denying the motion without having held an in camera hearing.
As an ancillary point on appeal, we note that appellant correctly points out that the court imposed a single general sentence of probation for all four offenses contrary to the dictates of Darden v. State, 306 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
The judgments are affirmed, but the case is remanded for the purpose of resentencing.
RYDER and DANAHY, JJ., concur.
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State v. Zamora, 534 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…ses as follows: “To invoke an in camera hearing, a defendant must file a sworn motion or affidavit alleging facts concerning the informant’s involvement which, if true, would support the possibility of a specific asserted defense. Beasley v. State, 354 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). The defendant need not allege all the elements of the defense; it is sufficient that the defense is possible in light of the alleged facts. See, e.g., Munford v. State, 343 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), rev’d on other grounds, 35…
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State v. Acosta, 439 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…1st DCA 1970). . To invoke an in camera hearing, a defendant must file a sworn motion or affidavit alleging facts concerning the informant’s involvement which, if true, would support the possibility of a specific asserted defense. Beasley v. State, 354 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). The defendant need not allege all the elements of the defense; it is sufficient that the defense is possible in light of the alleged facts. See, e.g., Munford v. State, 343 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), rev’d on other grounds, 35…
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Marrero v. State, 493 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…f illegal drugs under the holdings of a line of cases from the second district: English v. State, 301 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), cert. dismissed, 312 So. 2d 747 (Fla.1975); State v. Smail, 337 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); and Beasley v. State, 354 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), see discussion infra n. 2. The prosecution against the defendant was proceeding on the basis that trafficking was established, under section 893.135(l)(a), by the defendant’s mere possession of the requisite amount of marijuana,…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Darden v. State, 306 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Munford v. State, 343 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- English v. State, 301 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)