FORD MOTOR COMPANY, A FOREIGN CORPORATION, AUTHORIZED TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES MICHAEL AVERILL, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1978-02-24
No. HH-35
McCORD, C. J., and MASON, ERNEST E., Associate Judge, concur.
355 So. 2d 220 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1978) Positive Treatment
Cited by 7 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Ford Motor Company appealed an interlocutory order denying its motion to dismiss counts two and three of a complaint, claiming the order involved jurisdiction over the person. The appellate court initially denied the appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal due to insufficient record, but upon full briefing and perfection of the appeal, determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider the interlocutory appeal because the order did not fall within the enumerated categories permitting interlocutory review.


Holding

The appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review the interlocutory order because it was not one of those enumerated by Florida Appellate Rule 4.2(a) as permitting interlocutory appeal. The court dismissed the appeal sua sponte for want of jurisdiction.


Headnotes

[1] An appellate court may dismiss an appeal sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding.

[2] An appellate court's prior order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction may be vacated and set aside upon further review of the record.

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“We, of course, have no authority to assume jurisdiction when there is none. We therefore have the duty and responsibility at any stage of the proceeding at which we discover jurisdiction lacking to immediately cease exercising same.”

Establishes the appellate court's fundamental obligation to dismiss appeals when it determines it lacks jurisdiction, regardless of prior procedural posture

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Ford Motor Company, as defendant in the trial court, sought interlocutory appeal of an amended order granting a motion for rehearing and denying Ford'…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
BOYER, Judge.

BOYER, Judge.

Appellant, defendant in the trial court, filed this interlocutory appeal seeking review of an amended order granting a motion for rehearing and denying a motion to dismiss counts two and three of the plaintiff’s complaint. Prior to the filing of any briefs and prior to the filing of any record as required by Rule 4.2 d, but after this court has entered an order granting a motion extending the time for the filing of same, appellee filed herein a motion to dismiss the appeal on the basis that appellant’s brief had not been timely filed and on the further ground that the interlocutory appeal “is not authorized by Florida Appellate Rule 4.2 because the order is not a final order nor is it an order relating to venue or jurisdiction over the person.” Appellant filed a response to the motion to dismiss pointing out that this court had entered an order extending the time for the filing of appellant’s brief and alleging that the basis for the interlocutory appeal related to an issue as to jurisdiction over the person and was therefore authorized by said Fla.App. Rule 4.2. There was at that time, as above stated, no record nor certified copies of the appeal papers by which this court could determine its jurisdictional basis for the appeal; therefore, accepting the allegations of appellant’s response as true, the motion to dismiss was denied.

Upon the appeal being perfected by the compliance with Fla.App. Rules 4.2 d and 4.2 e the ease was set for oral argument in accordance with Fla.App. Rule 4.2 f. Only then, after the appeal had been perfected, were we in a position to ascertain whether the order sought to be reviewed was within the ambit of Fla.App. Rule 4.2 a which is the basis of this court’s jurisdiction.

Notwithstanding our prior order denying appellee’s motion to dismiss at a time when there was insufficient record before us to establish our lack of jurisdiction, we have now carefully reviewed the order here sought to be interloeutorily appealed in the light of the briefs and the balance of the record and find that said order is not one of those enumerated by the rule for the vesting of jurisdiction in this court. We, of course, have no authority to assume jurisdiction when there is none. We therefore have the duty and responsibility at any stage of the proceeding at which we discover jurisdiction lacking to immediately cease exercising same.

Accordingly, determining, as we do, that we are without jurisdiction we do not meet the merits of the case. Our prior order denying appellee’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is hereby vacated and set aside and this interlocutory appeal is sua sponte dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

McCORD, C. J., and MASON, ERNEST E., Associate Judge, concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • …e of Appellate Procedure 9.130. Although the jurisdiction of this court was not questioned by any party, it is our duty to sua sponte dismiss any appeal where it is clear we lack appellate jurisdiction under the rules. Ford Motor Company v. Averill, 355 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). In their brief, DPR and Johnson argue that the denial of their motions to dismiss determined the court’s personal jurisdiction over them. DPR argues it is not a “person” under the definition of Chapter 934,2 and therefore, it c…
  • Wharton v. DuBOSE, 458 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
    …the trial court’s order granting a motion for rehearing because it is an interlocutory appeal of which this court lacks jurisdiction. The First District Court of Appeal dismissed a similar appeal on the same ground in Ford Motor Company v. Averill, 355 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). We are aware of no change in the law since the Averill decision that would affect the outcome. Appellant contends that an order granting a motion for rehearing either is a final order and thus immediately appealable, or is the…
  • Taylor v. Siebert, 615 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
    …).1 See, e.g., Cook v. Wells, 493 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). An appellate court is under an obligation to consider jurisdictional defects in a case at any stage in the proceedings, even when not raised by the parties. Ford Motor Co. v. Averill, 355 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). REVERSED and REMANDED with directions to the trial court to dismiss appel-lee’s motion to expand visitation rights. SMITH and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. . The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Sections 61.1302 through 61.13…

Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw