LEE WOODS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Lee Woods appealed his conviction for delivery of heroin, challenging the trial court's denial of his pretrial discovery motion to obtain the name and address of the State's confidential informant. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that disclosure of the informant's identity was essential to a fair determination of the case.
The trial court erred in denying the discovery motion. The court held that disclosure of the informant's identity was essential to a fair determination of the case because: (1) the State referred to the informant in its case in chief; (2) the informant was present during and may have substantially participated in the criminal transaction; (3) Woods's defense was misidentification and alibi; and (4) the only evidence against Woods was a single police officer's testimony, making the informant's testimony potentially crucial.
[1] Disclosure of a confidential informant's identity is required when the informant's testimony is relevant and helpful to the defense or essential to a fair determination o…
[2] The privilege against disclosing a confidential informant's identity must yield when the informant's testimony is necessary for a fair trial.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where disclosure of an informer's identity is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of the cause, the privilege must give way.”
Establishes the controlling legal test for when the State's privilege against disclosing an informant's identity is overcome in favor of the defendant's right to fair trial.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWoods was charged with delivery of heroin. The State presented its case relying on testimony from a confidential informant who was present during at l…
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DOWNEY, Judge.
In this appeal from a conviction and sentence for delivery of heroin seven points are presented for reversal. We have carefully considered all points presented and find only one constitutes reversible error. That point involves the action of the trial court in denying appellant’s-pretrial discovery motion to produce the name and address of the confidential informant.
The cases seem to indicate that the primary test controlling the right of a defendant to be advised of the name and address of a confidential informant is one of fairness. Is the name and address of the informant essential to a fair determination of the case? If so, the State’s privilege against disclosure must give way. Richert v. State, 338 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). In the most recent case on the subject the Supreme Court of Florida, in State v. Hassberger, 350 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1977), confirmed that test once again, stating:
“Where disclosure of an informer’s identity is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of the cause, the privilege must give way. State v. Matney, 236 So. 2d 166 (Fla.1st DCA 1970); Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957).” Id. at 2.
In the oft cited case of Treverrow v. State, 194 So. 2d 250 (Fla.1967), the Florida Supreme Court suggested some of the guidelines or factors which should be considered in determining when the privilege against disclosure is dissipated, after first noting that the problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense. Those factors are:
1) “whether it was necessary for the prosecutor to refer to the informer in the presentation of the case, or whether the informer’s existence was first brought out on cross-examination by the defendant;
2) “whether the informer was an ‘active participant’ in the offense with which the defendant is charged or is a ‘mere informer’ who supplies a ‘lead’;
3) “whether the accused admits or does not deny guilt;
4) “and whether there is independent evidence of the accused’s guilt.” Id. at 252.
Without detailing the facts in this case, we note that the State referred to the confidential informant in presenting its case in chief. The informant was present at least to some extent during all or a part of the criminal transaction with which appellant is charged. The exact extent of his participa tion or knowledge is not totally clear, but it may well have been substantial. The appellant’s defense was misidentification and alibi. The only evidence against appellant is the testimony of one police officer. Suffice to say that as we view this case and its substantial conflicts the testimony of the informant could have been very helpful to appellant’s case. Had the informant corroborated appellant’s contention it may well have led to an acquittal. In other words, this case seems to meet all the criteria necessary to dissipate the privilege against disclosure.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and sentence appealed from and remand the cause for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ANSTEAD, J., and SCHWARTZ, ALAN R., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Zamora, 534 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…notary public on the subject motion are, in fact, blank. We nonetheless treat the subject motion as the equivalent of a sworn motion as it was based on the sworn deposition testimony of the undercover police officer in this case. . Woods v. State, 355 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (the defendant asserted an otherwise viable misidentification and alibi defense to a delivery of heroin charge; the confidential informant was present during all or part of the charged criminal transaction and could testify wheth…
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McCANTS v. State, 363 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)…So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), the informer’s identity here was material in determining the guilt or innocence of defendant, who took the stand and denied his guilt. The following statement by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Woods v. State, 355 So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), is instructive: “[H]ad the informant corroborated appellant’s contention it may well have led to an acquittal.” And, as in Woods, only the informant could have corroborated appellant’s testimony that he was not involved in…
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State v. Chamblin, 418 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…ez, supra. To effect an exception to the nondisclosure policy, the one seeking disclosure has the burden to show that disclosure is essential to his defense. U. S. v. Toombs, 497 F. 2d 88 (5th Cir. 1974). The test is one of fairness. Woods v. State, 355 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 4th [*1155] DCA 1978); McCants v. State, 363 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). The motion for disclosure or the evidence must show that the informant’s testimony is relevant and material to the establishment of the defense which the defendant ha…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (U.S. 1957)
- Westberry v. Daves Auto Parts, 194 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1967)
- State v. Hassberger, 350 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1977)
- State v. Matney, 236 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970)
- Richert v. State, 338 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)