VINCENT L. GARCIA, APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES M. MCLEAN AND RUTH L. MCLEAN, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this adverse possession dispute, the court affirmed that a seven-year statute of limitations barred the appellant's ejectment action against the appellees who had built a fence on the appellant's land. The court held that the appellant's prior unsuccessful suit in equity to quiet title did not toll the statute of limitations because it was dismissed without resulting in a judgment for the plaintiff.
The court held that unsuccessful suits do not break the continuity of adverse possession or toll the statute of limitations. Because the equity suit was dismissed and no appeal was taken, the subsequent ejectment action constituted a new cause of action for which the statute of limitations had already run.
[1] An unsuccessful suit to try title to real estate does not suspend or toll the running of the statute of limitations in an independent action.
[2] Dismissal of an equity suit seeking to quiet title, without a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, does not toll the statute of limitations for adverse possession.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is a well-established rule that an unsuccessful suit does not break the continuity of adverse possession”
Establishes the governing legal principle that unsuccessful litigation does not toll the statute of limitations for adverse possession
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn late 1960, appellees built a fence on part of appellant's Walton County land. In 1966, appellant filed a suit in equity to quiet title, but the cou…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Suit To Quiet Title cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant contests here the trial court’s finding that his ejectment action against appellees was barred by the seven-year statute of limitations for adverse possession of land. The record reveals that appellees built a fence on part of appellant’s Walton County land late in 1960. In 1966, before the running of the limitation period, appellant brought a suit in equity seeking to quiet title in the land. On appellees’ motion, however, the court dismissed that suit (without prejudice) and quashed process in the cause. Appellant then brought this ejectment action at law against appellees in October of 1968, well after the running of the limitation period. The trial court held that because the court had dismissed the earlier suit in equity and quashed process, the statute of limitations had not been tolled by that suit and therefore appellees had established their claim to adverse possession at the time of this second suit.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment. It is a well-established rule that an unsuccessful suit does not break the continuity of adverse possession, 51 Am.Jur.2d 808, Limitation of Actions, § 301. Where as here an action to try title to real estate fails or does not result in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, it does not have the effect of suspending or tolling the running of the statute of limitations in an independent action. 3 Am.Jur.2d 175, Adverse Possession, § 92. Deas v. Burnham, 65 So. 2d 297 (Fla.1953), cited by appellant, is not to the contrary. There the court had transferred the equity suit to the law side of the docket pursuant to a motion by the plaintiff. The Florida Supreme Court held that the subsequent proceedings at law were a continuation of the original suit so that the statute of limitations had been tolled at the time the original process was served. The situation is different here. Under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.040 there are no longer two forms of action — law and equity, but only one form known as “civil action.” Had appellant desired to amend his original complaint to quiet title and allege a suit in ejectment, he should have requested leave to do so. But since that suit was dismissed and thereafter became final, no appeal having been taken, appellant’s subsequent ejectment suit was a completely new cause of action for which the statute of limitations had already run. The lower court is
AFFIRMED.
McCORD, C. J., BOYER, J., and McLANE, RALPH M., Associate Judge, concur.