JOSEPH DAMIANO, TRUSTEE, APPELLANT,
v.
NATHAN WEINSTEIN AND STANLEY DAVIDSON, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1978-02-07
No. 77-1021
Before HAVERFIELD, C. J., and BARK-DULL and NATHAN, JJ.
355 So. 2d 819 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1978) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A seller appealed a judgment finding his title to real estate unmarketable due to a defect arising from a 1944 tax foreclosure proceeding. The court affirmed, holding that the title defect could not be cured because the fee owner was not named as a defendant in the original foreclosure action.


Holding

The court affirmed the trial court's finding that the title was not marketable. The master's deed was void ab initio because Josephine Power was not named as a defendant in the tax foreclosure proceeding, and this defect could not be cured under the Marketable Record Title Act.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court's determination of title marketability, based on expert testimony, will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by competent substantial evidence.

[2] A master's deed may be void ab initio if the fee owner was not named as a defendant in the tax foreclosure proceeding.

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Key Quotes

“the master's deed appears to be void ab initio in that Josephine Power was not named as a defendant in the tax foreclosure proceeding and, therefore, this defect could not be cured under the Marketable Record Title Act”

Establishes the core holding that the title defect was incurable under Florida law

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Facts & Procedural History

In June 1974, Damiano (seller) and Davidson (buyer) entered a real estate contract with a $5,000 deposit. Davidson's attorney discovered that in 1944,…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals a final judgment in this action for breach of a real estate contract.

On June 15, 1974 Joseph Damiano, as seller, and defendant Stanley S. Davidson, as buyer, entered into a contract for the purchase of a certain parcel of realty. Davidson deposited the sum of $5,000 with the broker and Damiano delivered an abstract of title to Davidson’s attorney who after a title search notified Damiano’s attorney that in 1944 a tax foreclosure proceeding was instituted against Marie Louise Dana, a widow, the sole heir at law of Josephine Power, the fee simple title holder who was allegedly dead at the time. This proceeding resulted in a master’s deed to the subject realty being issued to J.

M. Goodwin, a predecessor in title to Damiano, plaintiff-seller. Davidson contended that the master’s deed was void ab initio for the fee owner, Josephine Power, was not named as a party defendant in the foreclosure action and further there was no certificate of death produced to prove that she was, in fact, dead at the time; there was only the bare allegation to that effect in the foreclosure complaint and, thus, there was a defect in title. Damiano contended that there was no defect; however, he did institute a quiet title suit against Josephine Power, Marie Louise Dana and each of their spouses, devisees, legatees, etc. A guardian ad litem and attorney ad litem was appointed for Dana. This suit resulted in a judgment for Damiano on November 11, 1974. Davidson continued to take the position that the title was not marketable and the quiet title action was defective because no guardian ad litem was appointed for the heirs of Josephine Power in the 1944 foreclosure suit and for Josephine Power in the quiet title suit. Davidson refused to close and Damiano instituted the present action. The cause proceeded to a non-jury trial and the parties stipulated that the issues were whether or not Damiano made tender of good and marketable title and whether the quiet title suit did, in fact, cure any defect in the title within the time limit for sale. Both Dami-ano and Davidson presented expert testimony supporting their respective positions as to the marketability and insurability of the title. At the conclusion of trial, the judge found that the title still had defects and was not marketable; and entered judgment for Davidson and ordered return of the $5,000. Damiano appeals therefrom.

The issue of the marketability was for the trial judge, as the trier of the facts, to resolve. His determination that the title was not marketable was based upon the expert witness testimony presented on behalf of Davidson. There being competent substantial evidence in support thereof, we will not disturb this determination on appeal. See 2 Fla.Jur. Appeals § 340, et seq. (1963). Additionally, we note that the master’s deed appears to be void ab initio in that Josephine Power was not named as a defendant in the tax foreclosure proceeding and, therefore, this defect could not be cured under the Marketable Record Title Act. Section 712, Florida Statutes (1973). See Wernle v. Bellemead Development Corporation, 308 So. 2d 97 (Fla.1975).

Affirmed.


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Cited By

  • Thornburg v. Pursell, 476 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
    …3d DCA 1965). The trial court therefore erred in affirming the cost judgment entered in favor of the defendants in the first trial because the judgment upon which it was predicated was reversed on appeal. Standard Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Geeting, 355 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). The trial court also erred in denying the plaintiffs’ motion to tax costs incurred in the first trial because, upon remand, the plaintiffs were the prevailing party in the action. § 57.041, Fla.Stat. (1983). The plaintiffs next…
  • Fraser-Watson v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., 849 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
    …erse the judgment for costs. See Mulato v. Mulato, 734 So. 2d 477, 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(“[W]here the judgment on which a cost judgment is predicated is reversed, the original cost judgment also cannot stand.”); Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Geeting, 355 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)(reversing a cost judgment and remanding to trial court for further consideration where underlying judgment was reversed prior thereto). REVERSED and REMANDED. STEVENSON, TAYLOR and MAY, JJ., concur.…
  • Lewison v. Gabros Constr. Corp., 371 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
    …les of appeals, the judgment appealed is affirmed. See Rice Window Manufacturing Co. v. Evans, 71 So. 2d 164 (Fla.1954); Phillips v. Sanchez, 35 Fla. 187, 17 So. 363 (1895); Pilafin v. Cherry, 355 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Damiano v. Weinstein, 355 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); McGuire v. Consolidated Electrical Supply, Inc., 329 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Deltona Corporation v. Indian Palms, Inc., 323 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Glusman v. Lieberman, 285 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); Emery v.…

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