ROBERT REVITZ, PETITIONER,
v.
GEORGE J. BAYA AND MARY PHILLIPS BAYA, RESPONDENTS

Fla. | 1977-11-10
No. 51789
ADKINS, Acting C.. J., and ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.
355 So. 2d 1170 Florida Supreme Court (1977) Caution
Cited by 16 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court declined to review a certified question regarding whether a separate action for abuse of process lies for appealing a nonappealable consent judgment. The Court found it lacked jurisdiction because the District Court of Appeal expressly declined to address the certified question.


Holding

The Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review the certified question because the District Court of Appeal expressly stated it found it unnecessary to pass upon the question, despite certifying it. The District Court's holding that taking an appeal presenting justiciable issues is not an abuse of process made the certified question moot.


Headnotes

[1] An appeal presenting justiciable issues, decided after full consideration by the appellate court, does not constitute abuse of process under Florida common law.

[2] An appellate court's denial of a motion to quash an appeal indicates that the appeal presented a proper issue for determination.

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Key Quotes

“We reverse upon a holding that the question of whether the partition judgment was, in fact, a consent judgment was a proper basis for appeal. We, therefore, do not reach the question of whether it is an abuse of process to appeal any consent judgment, nor do we discuss the damage issue.”

District Court's explicit statement that it was not addressing the certified question, forming the basis for the Supreme Court's jurisdictional dismissal.

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Facts & Procedural History

Robert Revitz appealed a partition judgment in an earlier case (Baya v. Revitz). The District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that whether the parti…

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Opinion of the Court
KARL, Justice.

KARL, Justice.

This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to the District Court of Appeal, Third District, to review its decision in Baya v. Revitz, reported at 345 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977). The District Court of Appeal has certified the following question to this Court:

“Will a separate action for abuse of process lie for the taking of an appeal from a nonappealable consent judgment?”

However, in the decision of the District Court under review, that court expressly stated:

“We reverse upon a holding that the question of whether the partition judgment was, in fact, a consent judgment was a proper basis for appeal. We, therefore, do not reach the question of whether it is an abuse of process to appeal any consent judgment, nor do we discuss the damage issue.

“The appeal from the final judgment in partition presented two issues. The first was whether partition was a lawful remedy under the facts in that record. This was a justiciable issue properly raised in the trial court and determined in an opinion written by this court. In addition, the record of that appeal, as well as the present record, show that a motion to quash the appeal was filed by the appel-lee. This court, upon a consideration of the motion and upon examining the record and the briefs, found that a proper issue for determination on appeal existed and denied the motion to quash, then set the cause for hearing before the court and, after a full consideration of the briefs, oral argument and record, determined that issue. The second question presented on the appeal from the partition judgment was whether or not a certain stipulation entered into in the trial court after the denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss was a stipulation rendering the judgment thereafter entered a consent judgment. The issue was one this court found arguable and, upon consideration of the argument, the court found that the stipulation did, in fact, render the judgment a consent judgment. Nevertheless, the question of whether a consent judgment existed was such that the appellee’s contentions required the consideration of this court and the question was finally determined only after the holding of this court and the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court of Florida.

“We hold, therefore, that the taking of an appeal which presents to the appellate court justiciable issues decided after a full consideration hereof upon the briefs, oral argument and record, as a matter of law is not an abuse of process under the elements of the common law action as they exist in the State of Florida. . . ” (Emphasis supplied.)

Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, provides,-in pertinent part, that the Supreme Court “[m]ay review by certiorari any decision of a district court of appeal . that passes upon a question certified by a district court of appeal to be of great public interest . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)

Since, sub judice, the District Court specifically found it unnecessary to pass upon the question now certified to this Court, we are without jurisdiction to consider and decide the question.1 Accordingly, the writ of certiorari is hereby discharged.

It is so ordered.

ADKINS, Acting C.. J., and ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Nelson, 26 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 2010)
    …ue because the district court did not pass upon the issue and it is thus outside the scope of the certified ques-lion. See art. V, § 3(b)(4); Fla. R.App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v); Gee v. Seidman & Seidman, 653 So. 2d 384, 384 (Fla.1995); Revitz v. Baya, 355 So. 2d 1170, 1171 (Fla.1977). . In Stewart, the First District Court of Appeal certified the following question of great public importance: "If the state files a felony charge against the defendant and the defendant moves for a continuance more than 90 days bu…
  • Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1999)
    …385 (Fla.1995), which held that jurisdiction had been improvidently granted because “the question certified by the district court d[id] not reflect the issue actually ruled upon by the court.” This case can also be distinguished from Revitz v. Baya, 355 So. 2d 1170, 1171 (Fla.1977), where we discharged jurisdiction because “the District Court specifically found it unnecessary to pass upon” the question certified. (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the Second District was bound by our precedent in Bobbitt to r…
  • Powell v. State, 969 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
    …Corp. v. Jensen, 777 So. 2d 973, 974 (Fla.2001); see also Gee v. Seidman & Seidman, 653 So. 2d 384, 385 (Fla.1995) (dismissing the case because the district court did not address the issue contained in the certified question); accord Revitz v. Baya, 355 So. 2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 1977); Boler v. State, 678 So. 2d 319, 320 (Fla.1996) (explaining that "[w]e do not have jurisdiction to answer a certified question of great public importance under article V, section 3(b)(4) where there is no district court decision fo…

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