FRANCISCO LEONARDO GOMEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's denial of a motion to disqualify the judge because the court failed to rule on the motion within thirty days as required by Florida law. The court also vacated rulings on other pending motions that were made while the disqualification motion was pending and remanded for reassignment to a successor judge.
The motion to disqualify should have been granted because the trial court failed to rule on it within thirty days as required. Additionally, the trial court was not authorized to rule on the other pending motions while the disqualification motion was pending, and all such rulings must be vacated.
[1] A motion for judicial disqualification must be ruled on within thirty days following its presentation to the court.
[2] Failure to rule on a motion for judicial disqualification within thirty days mandates that the motion be granted.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a motion for judicial disqualification filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.160 must be ruled on within thirty days following its presentation to the court”
Establishes the controlling legal standard from Tableau Fine Art Group that was violated by the trial court's delay in ruling
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn February 9, 2004, appellant Francisco Gomez filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge. The trial court denied the motion on June 2, 2004—approxi…
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[*761] GROSS, J.
On February 9, 2004 appellant Francisco Gomez filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge. The court denied the motion on June 2, 2004.
In Tableau Fine Art Group, Inc. v. Jacoboni, 853 So. 2d 299 (Fla.2003), the supreme court held that “a motion for judicial disqualification filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.160 must be ruled on within thirty days following its presentation to the court.” Id. at 302-03. Because the trial court failed to rule on the motion to disqualify within thirty days, the motion should have been granted.
Additionally, while a motion to disqualify is pending, the trial court is not authorized to rule on other pending motions; all such motions upon which the trial court rules must be vacated. See Fuster-Escalona v. Wisotsky, 781 So. 2d 1063, 1065 (Fla.2000); Brown v. State, 863 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding that trial court must first rule on recusal motion before resolving any other matters).1
Accordingly, we reverse the ruling on the motion for recusal and on the motions to withdraw plea and to correct sentencing error. We remand the case to the circuit court, where the motions to withdraw plea and to correct sentencing error shall be assigned to a successor judge.
STEVENSON and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur. . There is a limited exception to this general rule. A trial judge may complete ministerial matters after there is a recusal motion, and even after the trial court is recused. See Fuchs v. Fuchs, 840 So. 2d 449, 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Fuster-Escalona v. Wisotsky, 781 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 2000)
- Tableau Fine ART Grp., Inc. v. Jacoboni, 853 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 2003)
- Thomas v. State, 840 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- Brown v. State, 863 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)