ROBERT EARNEST DEFOREST, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant's probation revocation was proper, but he must receive credit for time served on the original split sentence when resentenced to prison.
A defendant whose probation is revoked and who is resentenced to prison must receive credit for time previously served under the original split sentence.
[1] A defendant whose probation is revoked must receive credit against the new prison sentence for time previously served under the original split sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the appellant should be given credit for the time previously served on the split sentence”
The court agreed with appellant's argument that credit must be given for jail time served under the original split sentence.
DeFOREST pleaded guilty to being an accessory after the fact for robbery and received a split sentence of six months in county jail followed by three …
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant entered a plea of guilty to a charge of an accessory after the fact for robbery and was sentenced to a term of one year in the county jail, with credit for seventy-four (74) days jail time. After having served six (6) months of said term, appellant was to be placed on probation for three (3) years. During the period of probation, an affidavit was filed alleging a violation of probation. Following a hearing on the alleged violation, appellant was found guilty of the violation and his probation was revoked. The appellant was sentenced to two (2) years in State prison with credit for the time spent in jail awaiting the revocation hearing and sentencing, ninety-five (95) days.
The appellant’s probation was properly revoked.
However, the appellant urges that the trial court was required to give the appellant credit for the jail time previously served as a condition of probation. State v. Jones, 327 So. 2d 18 (Fla.1976).
We agree that the appellant should be given credit for the time previously served on the split sentence. Although the record does not reflect what portion of the six-month split sen tence the appellant actually served, the record clearly reveals that the appellant was not given credit for such period, contrary to State v. Jones, supra.
Therefore, the judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for proper sentencing.
The trial court shall determine the period of credit time to be allowed attributable to the split sentence and the appellant shall be credited for such time. The appellant need not be present for this purpose.
McCORD, C. J., and BOYER and MELVIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Calhoun v. State, 403 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…DCA 1978). Also appellant is entitled to all time he spent in the county jail on the burglary charges, all time served on warrants charging violation of probation and all time served in the county jail as a condition of probation. DeForest v. State, 356 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Hutchinson v. State, 360 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (1979), provides as follows: A sentence of imprisonment shall not begin to run before the date it is imposed, but the court imposing…
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Lavonia Dewitt Hutchinson v. State, 360 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)…ections 810.02(3), 775.082(3)(d), Florida Statutes (1975). However, the court was required to credit appellant with all time previously served in jail, including that time served as a condition of probation. State v. Jones, supra; DeForest v. State, 356 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978). Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed and the cause is remanded for proper sentencing. Appellant need not be present for this purpose. McCORD, C. J., and MILLS and ERVIN, JJ., concur.…
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Delgado v. State, 423 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…la.1980); State v. Jones, 327 So. 2d 18, 25 (Fla.1976); Schell v. State, 379 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). The appellant need not be present at this hearing upon remand. Meintzer v. State, 399 So. 2d 133, 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); DeForest v. State, 356 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Affirmed as modified and remanded for further proceedings.…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Jones, 327 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1976)