DONNELL SLATER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Donnell Slater appeals his jury conviction for conspiracy to sell or deliver cocaine. The appellate court affirmed his conviction, rejecting his five grounds for appeal, including challenges to the admissibility of co-conspirator agreements and expert testimony regarding drug culture slang.
The court affirmed the conviction on all grounds: evidence of co-conspirator agreements made absent the defendant is admissible if shown to be part of the overall conspiracy; expert testimony interpreting coded drug language is admissible when ordinary jurors would find the terms illogical and meaningless; and the defendant failed to meet his burden of proving insolvency.
[1] Evidence of related transactions between co-conspirators, made in the absence of a defendant, may be admitted to establish a conspiracy if the transaction is part of the…
[2] The order of proof in a conspiracy case may be reversed, allowing evidence of co-conspirator declarations or acts before proof of the conspiracy itself, provided adequate…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In establishing a conspiracy the state may adduce evidence of related transactions between or among other co-conspirators not withstanding that all alleged conspirators were not privy to that transaction if it is established that that transaction is part of the overall conspiracy.”
Establishes the governing rule that co-conspirator agreements made absent the defendant are admissible if part of the overall conspiracy.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSlater was convicted by jury of conspiracy to sell or deliver cocaine. The state presented evidence of an agreement between co-conspirators to purchas…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Insolvency Determination cases and more on FLexlaw
BOYER, Judge.
A jury found appellant guilty of conspiracy to sell or deliver cocaine. He now appeals the adjudication of guilt based upon the jury verdict.
There is nothing in the record to support appellant’s first two points on appeal. As to those points we accordingly affirm.
By his third point appellant urges that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an agreement between two co-conspirators to purchase and deliver cocaine, the agreement having been made in the absence of appellant.
In establishing a conspiracy the state may adduce evidence of related transactions between or among other co-conspirators not withstanding that all alleged conspirators were not privy to that transaction if it is established that that transaction is part of the overall conspiracy. (Though distinguishable, see Epps v. State, 354 So. 2d 441 (Fla.App. 1st 1978), and cases therein cited.) As an example, two parties may agree to commit an illegal act: If, thereafter, a third party joins in the agreement, the original agreement may be proved in the trial of the third party notwithstanding that he was not a party to the initial agreement. Further, the order of proof, in an appropriate case, may be reversed and evidence admitted of declarations or acts of co-conspirators prior to proof of the conspiracy itself. (See Honchell v. State, 257 So. 2d 889 (Fla.1971)) Such reversal of sequence is, of course, conditioned on the state subsequently furnishing adequate proof of the conspiracy. (Honchell v. State, supra, and cases there cited)
Appellant’s fourth point is essentially the same as the third and our ruling is the same.
By his fifth point appellant contends that the trial judge committed reversible error when permitting a police officer, over the objection of the defendant, to be qualified as an expert witness regarding street language in the drug culture and permitting the officer to explain to the jury his interpretation of words used by the alleged conspirators in intercepted conversations, the tapes of which were played to the jury. During those conversations the speakers used the terms “C”; “white girl”; “lady”; “snow”; “party pack”; “rock and roll”; “boy”; “white boy”; “doogee”; “kattie” and the expression “three, but I know a duece smoking.” The words were used in contexts wherein their normal lexicographical meanings would be illogical and meaningless. They would make no sense at all to the average juror. We find no error. (See United States v. Cirillo, 499 F. 2d 872 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Borrone-Iglar, 468 F. 2d 419 (2d Cir. 1972); State v. Grayton, 163 Conn. 104, 302 A. 2d 246 (1972), cert. den. 409 U.S. 1045, 93 S.Ct. 542, 34 L.Ed.2d 495 (1972); and Llerandi v. Blackburn, 97 So. 2d 247 (Fla.1957))
Finally, appellant seeks reversal on the ground that the trial judge denied his motion to be declared insolvent for the purpose of taking necessary depositions of witnesses who were later called by the state as witnesses at the trial. In proceedings for the determination of insolvency, there is a presumption of solvency and the defendant has the burden of rebutting that presumption by constant proof. (F.S. 27.52(2)(a)) The record does not reveal that appellant met his burden of proof. He was represented by able counsel and no error has been demonstrated.
AFFIRMED.
McCORD, C. J., and McLANE, RALPH M., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Smith v. State, 7 So. 3d 473 (Fla. 2009)…ion of the words used, which occurred in contexts in which their normal lexicographical meanings would be illogical and meaningless. See Daniels v. State, 381 So. 2d 707, 709-10 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), aff'd, 389 So. 2d 631 (Fla.1980); Slater v. State, 356 So. 2d 69, 71 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Accordingly, we find this claim not preserved for appellate review and to be without merit. Admission of Police Report Smith claims that the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence a police report regarding Domini…
-
Daniels v. State, 381 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)…pose of Officer McClain’s testimony. The jury was also properly advised regarding their function in assessing the testimony.6 Appellant Daniels’ fourth point7 has been resolved contrary to his contentions by this court’s opinion in Slater v. State, 356 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) wherein we stated: “ * * * [Ajppellant contends that the trial judge committed reversible error when permitting a police officer, over the objection of the defendant, to be qualified as an expert witness regarding street languag…
-
Pugh v. State, 971 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…ning from those in the community who use the term; the speakers have tacitly agreed on a meaning. Based on his street experience, the undercover officer testified as an expert witness “regarding street language in the drug culture.” Slater v. State, 356 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); see Daniels v. State, 381 So. 2d 707, 710 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (quoting Slater); Howard v. State, 738 So. 2d 372, 374 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (holding that detective qualified as expert in “street slang” based on her “heritage as…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- United States v. Alphonse Cirillo, 499 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1974)
- Honchell v. State, 257 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1971)
- Norris Epps v. State, 354 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- United States v. Borrone-Iglar, 468 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1972)
- Grayton v. Connecticut, 409 U.S. 1045 (U.S. 1972)
- Hurst v. United States, 409 U.S. 1045 (U.S. 1972)
- Parkway Apts., Inc. v. Willner, 97 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 1957)