PENSACOLA BEACH REALTY, INC., GRACE B. FUTCH AND THOMAS E. ARCHER, PETITIONERS,

v.

FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT

Citator

Cited By

• Villery v. The Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1980)
  …9). We agree with the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in McGowan v. State, supra, that incarceration as a condition of probation does not constitute a sentence. See also Olcott v. State, 378 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Bracey v. State, 356 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). A sentence and probation are discrete concepts which serve wholly different functions. Imposed as a sentence, imprisonment serves as a penalty, as a payment of defendant’s “debt to society.” Imposed as an incident of probation,…
• Peter v. VAN Tassel, 486 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1986)
  …is not a “sentence.” William v. Lamar, 414 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Heatherington v. State, 388 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Adams v. State, 387 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). The First District Court of Appeal held in Bracey v. State, 356 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), that jail time as a condition of probation was not a “sentencing” which requires credit for prior time served (section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes), and the Second District Court of Appeal ruled in State v. Williams, 237 So. 2d…
• Griner v. State, 523 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)
  …osed, but the court imposing a sentence shall allow a defendant credit for all of the time he spent in the county jail before sentence. The credit must be for a specified period of time and shall be provided for in the sentence. In Bracey v. State, 356 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) the First District held that this subsection did not apply to incarceration as a condition of probation because court ordered probation did not constitute an imposition of sentence. While a number of decisions have held that a p…

Authorities Cited

• Robins v. The Fla. Real Est. Comm'n & Joseph Condermann, 162 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)