SAMUEL ESSIE BARKET, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The court held that the jury instruction, when considered with other instructions, was not reversible error.
[1] A jury instruction is not erroneous if, when considered with all other instructions given to the jury relative to the state's burden of proof, it does not require reversa…
[2] A jury instruction is sufficient if the circumstances of the transaction were so suspicious as to put a person of ordinary intelligence and caution upon inquiry, and the…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSamuel Barket was convicted of receiving stolen property and appealed, challenging a jury instruction that allowed conviction without proof of actual …
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[*264] PER CURIAM.
Following his conviction for receiving stolen property, Samuel Barket appealed to the First District Court of Appeal challenging the validity of former Florida Standard Jury Instruction 2.06, insofar as it allowed the jury to find him guilty without proof of his actual knowledge that property in his possession was stolen.1 The district court affirmed Barket’s conviction and certified its decision to us as having passed upon a question of great public interest.2 We accept jurisdiction under Article V, Section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution.
The district court correctly rejected each of Barket’s challenges to the jury instruction, and properly affirmed his conviction. When our instruction on the type of proof necessary to attribute to a defendant knowledge that goods in his possession were stolen is considered with all other instructions given to the jury relative to the state’s burden of proof, we cannot say that there is error which requires a reversal of Barket’s conviction. Forrest v. State, 133 Fla. 310, 182 So. 849 (1938). The certified question is answered accordingly, and the decision of the district court is affirmed.3
OVERTON, C. J., and BOYD, ENGLAND and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. ADKINS, J., dissents.
.The challenged portion of the jury instruction provides:
“It is not necessary for the state to prove that the defendant knew beyond a reasonable doubt that the property had been stolen. It is sufficient if the circumstances of the transaction were so suspicious as to put a person of ordinary intelligence and caution upon inquiry and, nevertheless, the defendant did buy it, receive it or aid in concealing it.” This instruction has been amended to reflect changes to former § 811.16, Fla.Stat. (1973), which now appear in § 812.031, Fla.Stat. (1975).
. The district court’s opinion is reported at 342 So. 2d 526.
. Having determined the certified question, we decline to entertain other issues raised here by petitioner but resolved by the district court.
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State v. Tomas, 370 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 1979)….” State v. Allen, 362 So. 2d 10, 12 (Fla. 1978). Finally, the phrase “knows or should know” is entirely consistent with our recent pronouncement concerning the requisite proof of knowledge as to the stolen character of property in Barket v. State, 356 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1978). See also State v. Graham, 238 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1970), discussing the necessary quantum of proof required to establish guilty knowledge under the predecessor to this provision, which encompassed both the receipt and disposition of stolen…
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Nelson v. State, 372 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)…er, that he had stolen it. . Several recent cases have dealt with the question whether the state has succeeded in its burden of proving guilty knowledge of stolen property. See, e. g„ Barket v. State, 342 So. 2d [*952] 526 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) aff'd 356 So. 2d 263 (Fla.1977), cert. denied 439 U.S. 843, 99 S.Ct. 136, 58 L.Ed.2d 142 (1978); O'Sullivan v. State, 335 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Aboy v. State, 334 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) [where the state succeeded in its burden]; Ward v. State, 347 So. 2d…
Authorities Cited
- Forrest v. State, 133 Fla. 310 (Fla. 1938)
- Barket v. State, 342 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)