B. A. A., A JUVENILE, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed a juvenile delinquency adjudication for loitering and prowling, holding that the statute requires specific and articulable facts showing imminent breach of peace or threatened public safety, and that mere conversation between a juvenile and drivers at traffic lights was insufficient to satisfy the statutory elements.
The Court held that the loitering and prowling statute requires: (1) loitering or prowling in a place, time, or manner not usual for law-abiding individuals; and (2) circumstances warranting justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for safety of persons or property. The Court concluded that the juvenile's conduct did not satisfy these elements because there were no specific and articulable facts reasonably warranting a finding that public peace, order, or safety was threatened.
[1] A loitering and prowling statute requires specific and articulable facts that reasonably warrant a finding that a breach of the peace is imminent or public safety is thre…
[2] To sustain a conviction for loitering and prowling, the defendant's conduct must occur in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals and under circumstances that warr…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant' a finding that a breach of the peace is imminent or the public safety is threatened”
Establishes the required standard for loitering and prowling arrests, adopted from Terry v. Ohio and applied in State v. Ecker
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA juvenile was arrested for loitering and prowling after a police officer observed her on approximately forty occasions approaching cars stopped at a …
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BOYD, Justice.
This cause presents an issue of the application of Florida’s loitering and prowling statute, Section 856.021, Florida Statutes. We have conflict certiorari jurisdiction under Article V, Section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. Conflict in this cause is with State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104 (Fla.1975).
The juvenile in the instant case was arrested for loitering and prowling after a police officer observed her, a number of times, approaching cars stopped at a traffic light and engaging the drivers in conversation. The arresting officer observed the juvenile acting in this manner on approximately forty previous occasions, and on the night of her arrest had earlier warned her to leave the streets.
Following a delinquency hearing in the Juvenile Division of the Circuit Court of Dade County, the juvenile was found to have violated the “loitering” statute. Adjudication of delinquency was withheld and she was placed under the supervision of the Division of Youth Services. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, upheld the decision of the trial court. B. A. A., a juvenile v. State, 333 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976).
In State v. Ecker, supra, we construed Section 856.021, Florida Statutes, as requiring that “ ‘the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ a finding that a breach of the peace is imminent or the public safety is threatened.” 311 So. 2d 104, 109. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968). In Ecker, the elements of the offense which must be satisfied for conviction of loitering and prowling were set forth as:
“(1) the defendant loitered or prowled in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals; (2) such loitering and prowling were under circumstances that warranted a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity. This alarm is pre sumed under the statute if, when the law officer appears, the defendant flees, conceals himself, or refuses to identify himself. Prior to any arrest, the defendant must be afforded an opportunity to dispel any alarm or immediate concern by identifying himself and explaining his presence and conduct. If it appears at trial that the explanation is true and would have dispelled the alarm or immediate concern, then the defendant may not be convicted under this statute.” 311 So. 2d 104, 106.
In the instant case, there are no specific and articulable facts which would reasonably warrant a finding that the public peace and order were threatened or that safety of persons or property was jeopardized by the actions of the juvenile. If the finding of loitering is upheld under the facts of this case it could be upheld against anyone at street intersections lawfully seeking donations, for charitable purposes, from drivers of automobiles.
The statute is not to be used as a “catchall” provision hereby citizens may be detained by police and charged by prosecutors when there is an insufficient basis to sustain a conviction on some other charge.* Rather, it is a specific prohibition against specific conduct. All elements of this crime must be satisfied. We reaffirm these elements as set forth in Ecker, supra. In utilizing these elements and examining the juvenile’s conduct, we must conclude that the statute may not be applied here. The decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, is quashed and the cause remanded.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, C. J., and ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and KARL, JJ., concur. *
The District Court found a threatened breach of peace because the arresting officer believed the juvenile was offering to commit prostitution, a misdemeanor, if there was evidence of such solicitation, it should have been charged against her. But the record here does not establish that there was a reasonable alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity, the second element necessary to sustain a charge of loitering.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (23 total)
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D.A. v. State, 471 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…wling adjudication, the juvenile’s actions in watching traffic while his companion burglarized an adjacent closed car lot at 10:00-11:00 p.m. obviously constituted a threat to the safety of the cars on the lot. On the other hand, in B.A.A. v. State, 356 So. 2d 304 (Fla.1978), rev’g, 333 So. 2d 552 (Fla.3d DCA 1976), where a loitering and prowling adjudication was reversed, the female juvenile’s actions in approaching stopped cars in traffic and engaging the drivers in conversation created no threat whatever t…
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Chamson v. State, 529 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…:40 P.M. and where defendant could not explain his presence); White v. State, 458 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (sleeping defendant cannot threaten safety of persons or property), review denied, 464 So. 2d 556 (Fla.1985); see also B.A.A. v. State, 356 So. 2d 304 (Fla.1978) (approaching cars at intersection does not justify loitering arrest); Patmore v. State, 383 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (“peculiar” behavior upon approach of police fails to satisfy loitering arrest); Boal v. State, 368 So. 2d 71 (Fla.…
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V.E. v. State, 539 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…de the required degree of alarm and concern which would justify a loitering and prowling conviction. D.A., 471 So. 2d at 153. See L. C. v. State, 516 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Ingram v. State, 502 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); B.A.A. v. State, 356 So. 2d 304 (Fla.1978), rev’g, 333 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). Moreover, assuming the confession of V.E.’s companion were admissible against V.E., that confession concerned past, completed criminal conduct, not the incipient criminal conduct necessary to pro…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968)
- State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1975)
- B. A. A. v. State, 333 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)