STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT GAYLORD, APPELLEE

Fla. | 1978-03-09
No. 52331
' OVERTON, C. J., and BOYD, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.
356 So. 2d 313 Florida Supreme Court (1978) Positive Treatment
Cited by 44 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court reversed a trial court's dismissal of an aggravated child abuse charge, holding that the statutory term "maliciously" in Florida's child abuse statute provides sufficient definiteness and does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.


Holding

The statute is constitutional and not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The term "maliciously" provides a definite standard of conduct understandable by a person of ordinary intelligence, meaning ill will, hatred, spite, or evil intent.


Headnotes

[1] A statute is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad if it conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to what conduct will render a person liable to its penalties.

[2] The term "maliciously" in the context of child abuse statutes provides a definite standard of conduct understandable by a person of ordinary intelligence.

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Key Quotes

“Section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1975), conveys a sufficiently definite warning to those subject to its provisions as to what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties”

Establishes the standard for constitutional definiteness and supports upholding the statute's validity

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Facts & Procedural History

Robert Gaylord, the stepfather and custodian of 13-year-old Harold Wilmore, beat the child with a garden hose as corporal punishment for the child's r…

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Opinion of the Court
KARL, Justice.

KARL, Justice.

We have for review by direct appeal an order of the trial judge finding Section 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (1975), unconstitutionally vague and overly broad and dismissing the information against appellee. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.

Appellee was charged by information with aggravated child abuse in that he maliciously punished Harold Wilmore, a child thirteen years of age, by beating the child with a hose. Appellee moved to dismiss the amended information on the grounds that Section 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (1975), is unconstitutionally vague, indefinite and overbroad, and that the undisputed facts do not, and cannot, constitute a crime under the laws of the State of Florida. In his motion to dismiss, appellee alleged that he was Harold’s stepfather and custodian and that as a result of Harold’s repeated disobedience, insolence and intentional disregard of appellee’s instructions, appellee administered corporal punishment to Harold using a length of garden hose. The trial judge granted the motion to dismiss on the basis that Section 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (1975), is unconstitutionally vague and over-broad.

This Court has recently upheld the constitutionality of Section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1975), in Faust v. State, 354 So. 2d 866 (Fla.1978), against the attack of vagueness and overbreadth. Therein, this Court held that Section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1975), conveys a sufficiently definite warning to those subject to its provisions as to what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. See also Jordan v. State, 334 So. 2d 589 (Fla.1976).

Contrary to appellee’s assertions, we find that the term “maliciously” does provide a definite standard of conduct understandable by a person of ordinary intelligence. Malice means ill will, hatred, spite, an evil intent. Cf. Huntley v. State, 66 So. 2d 504 (Fla.1953).

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith..

It is so ordered.

' OVERTON, C. J., and BOYD, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (21 total)

  • Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 2002)
    …ongfully, intentionally, without legal justification or excuse.” Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 227 (1992). This definition is in conflict with the definition of the malice element for aggravated child abuse set out by this Court in State v. Gaylord, 356 So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla.1978). In Young v. State, 753 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), the First District Court of Appeal explained this conflict by stating: In State v. Gaylord, 356 So. 2d 313 (Fla.1978), the court held that section 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (…
    1 / 2
  • Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 1979)
    …cted are vague and overbroad. Appellants’ due process attacks upon section 827.03 concerning aggravated child abuse have been rejected by this Court on several occasions. We see no reason to overturn our well-established precedent. State v. Gaylord, 356 So. 2d 313 (Fla.1978); Faust v. State, 354 So. 2d 866 (Fla.1978); Jordan v. State, 334 So. 2d 589 (Fla.1976). The appellants contend the offense of third-degree felony murder, set forth in section 782.04(4), is unconstitutionally vague because it contains no…
  • Reed v. State, 783 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
    …were less severe or long-lasting than the state’s charges indicated; and (2) by giving an erroneous standard jury instruction defining an essential element of the crime in a manner directly contrary to the requirements set forth in State v. Gaylord, 356 So. 2d 313 (Fla.1978), as recently construed in Young v. State, 753 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). We find no abuse of discretion in the lower court’s refusal to require the victim to reveal her physical wounds at the trial. As to the second issue, we affirm…
    1 / 2

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